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ABSTRACT
A study performed under Contract NAS2-3705 (NASA, OART-MAD, Ames Research
Center), entitled "Study of Maintainability for Long-Duration Manned Space
Flight," evaluates the influence of maintainability in sustaining a high level
of reliability throughout long-term missions. A 99% probability of crew sur-
vival is a basic constraint in the analysis. Spacecraft of four representa-
tive but widely varying missions, one Earth-orbital and one interplanetary
each in the mid-1970 and the mid-1980 time periods, are examined to the
replaceable component level. Detailed maintenance analyses of subsystems and
components, vehicle configuration optimizations performed with a unique com-
puter program, and statistical results of several hundred mission simulations
are described and evaluated. The effects of hardware reliability and failure
rates, skills, environmental factors, mission durations and resupply potential,
and various resources are considered in many interrelationships. Optimum
distributions of redundant and spare items to be included on board each space-
craft configuration for assuring mission success are identified, and their
implications as to operational requirements and design philosophies are dis-
cussed. Tables, charts, and graphs summarizing analytical results and dis-
playing parametric sensitivities are provided. Gross cost estimates also are
included to indicate trends and to place the respective missions in context
relative to each other.
The study indicates that no attempt should be made to apply a single
maintenance philosophy to all subsystems unilaterally. Rather, specific
maintenance philosophies by subsystem, or by component where necessary, should
be used. This will require strong management control at all levels and very
close design integration throughout program development. If an on-board work-
shop capability can be justified by maintenance requirements common to several
subsystems, a substantial reduction in the weight of inflight support elements
could be realized. Maximum commonality among components should be exercised
for the same reason. Items requiring only a single spare to achieve a desired
assurance level should be designed for standby redundancy where possible.
Accurate, valid, and detailed design data on space hardware is lacking in
many important areas; this should be developed and disseminated as soon as
possible for future programs. Space mission planning can be enhanced by
employing complementary optimization and mission simulation models to evaluate
parameters affecting the maintainability and overall operation of manned
vehicles.
Volume I summarizes results of the study and describes very briefly its
approach and methods. Volume II discusses the study in detail, including
source material and rationale, analytical effort, and explanations of proce-
dures. Volume III is a compilation of the material developed during the
course of the analysis.
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FOREWORD
In February 1966, Ames Research Center of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration issued Request for Proposal A-II798(WEB-49) entitled
"Study of Maintainability for Long-Duration Manned Space Flight." The intro-
duction to that RFP reads, in part, as follows:
"Even with anticipated future technology to permit an order of magnitude
increase (over the reliability of current systems---ed.) in the mean time
tO failure, and using complete parallel redundancy of all components, it
is possible to meet a minimal desired level of system reliability only
for a period of a few months. For such longer missio-ns, system restora-
tion Ithr0ugh in-flight maintenance probably will be necessary to insure
reliability. To attain reliability by in-flight maintenance, the system
must be designed for maintenance, and a working environment must be
created that is compatible with maintenance. Studies are needed to
identify the effect of a requirement for in-flight maintenance on system
design, considering the crew as part of the system."
This report presents guidelines for system and subsystem maintenance con-
cept selection, and in addition records conclusions and recommendations derived
during the study effort.
A very significant aspect of the study was the initial task of collecting,
reviewing, and distilling a great deal of reference material, listed in Section
ii.0. Detailed determination of basic mission factors such as trajectories,
boost requirements, rendezvous and resupply techniques, etc., and origination
of basic configuration and subsystem design concepts and details were beyond
the scope of the study effort. Rather, using such information as was applica-
ble and available from various resources, the study team modified, extrapo-
lated, or otherwise adapted this material for compatibility with character-
istics of the space mission being considered. In this respect, the study is
typical of the way modern research efforts depend so heavily on previous work
performed by many technicians in many different disciplines. Consequently,
the study group acknowledges its indebtedness to earlier research activities.
A key factor in accomplishing the study is the computer programming
technique employed for optimizing mission vehicle configurations. As described
in greater detail in Section 3.5, the program is designed to achieve the
desired level of overall system reliability by adding parallel redundancy,
standby redundancy, or spares in the most "cost"-effective manner to an ini-
tially nonredundant system. This approach involves the determination of system,
subsystem, and component operational characteristics and reliabilities, the
identification of maintenance tasks to be performed, the kinds of skills that
must be included within the flight personnel_ and numerous other support re-
quirements premised on accomplishing inflight maintenance (e.g., availability
of appropriate technical data). "Cost" as used in this context can be consid-
ered in terms of weight, volume, repair times, etc., as well as dollars. The
study group believes that this optimization technique, used in combination with
full mission synthesis and simulation, comprises an analytical method that
engenders a very high degree of confidence in the results obtained.
xviil
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1.0 STUDY OBJECTIVES
Future long-duration manned space missions will require a drastic improve-
ment in spacecraft capabilities to attain satisfactory probabilities of mission
accomplishment. Increases in reliabilities of parts and assemblies, although
mandatory, will not be sufficient in themselves to achieve the overall levels
o4 assurance that are sought. The solution lies in the inclusion of appropriate
on-board resources to augment or maintain, through the mission, the high relia-1
bility level that a spacecraft initially possesses. Three alternatives are
available: (i) provide redundancies, (2) perform manual fault correction, or
(3) incorporate a selective combination of the first two. Recognizing that
certain redundancies will be necessary to accommodate operational or remedial
requirements, it is evident that numerous opportunities also will exist for
using crew capabilities effectively to perform maintenance. This study seeks
to determine areas of such utilization, to develop an optimum approach to item
(3), and to accomplish the following objectives:
a) Identify subsystems that are sensitive to maintenance philosophy; identify
the effect of inflight maintenance requirements on their design, operation,
and cost.
b) Specify, for subsystems and the overall spacecraft system, variations or
additions that are needed to meet various levels of maintenance require-
ments.
c) Determine the effect that requirements for inflight maintenance will have
on the development and performance of crew functions.
d) Develop maintainability design criteria for space vehicles, to be applied
by designers of future systems.
e) Recommend maintenance philosophies for various types of space missions.
f) Identify areas warranting additional study and research on maintainability
requirements and provisions.
When man embarks on a long-duration, unsupported space mission, design of
the vehicle must include certain characteristics that would not necessarily be
needed in an unmanned spacecraft. Chief among these is the life support/
environmental control system. By its very nature, the life support function
involves continuing, periodic manual servicing of several elements for which
there are no known means of automation. Thus, some degree of scheduled mainte-
nance becomes a mandatory requirement during a long-termmanned mission, and
must be planned for from the beginning. With on-board maintenance a foregone
conclusion, the following objectives also become _ important: (i) to determine
the extent of scheduled maintenance that could be expected, (2) to determine
the kinds of activities and capabilities that would be involved, and (3) to
determine the relationships of scheduled maintenance to any unscheduled restora-
tion actions that might be performed. It should be noted that, throughout this
report, the term "maintenance" generally refers to the unscheduled variety un-
less otherwise stated, or when the meaning is obvious from the context.
÷ ÷
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2.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions and recommendations are derived from the analytical work per-
formed during the study. To better understand the following discussion, and to
avoid detailed repetition, the reader should review the "Definitions of Terms
and Abbreviations" in Section 3.3 before evaluating the statements made in this
section. The most significant terms are defined briefly here for convenience:
• Crew Survival (Probability)---Assurance that no equipment-induced fatality
occurs during a mission. In accordance with the work statement,
this study used a factor of 99% probability of safe crew return
as a mandatory requirement before any other mission assurances
were considered.
• Degree of Maintenance---An arbitrary division of the spectrum of possible
concepts for performing unscheduled maintenance, increasing in
order of complexity. Degree "0" is essentially fully automated,
Degree "i" is limited to simple adjustments and manual switching,
Degree "2" permits fault isolation and physical replacement with
spares, Degree "3" expands Degree "2" to include on-board repair
and more sophisticated support actions.
• Maintainability---The quality of spacecraft hardware incorporated in its
basic design to permit the performance of maintenance.
• Maintenance---Actions necessary to ensure continued proper operation of a
unit (scheduled), or to restore a faulty unit to its specified
operating condition (unscheduled). Generally, the term "mainte-
nance" as used in this report refers to the unscheduled variety,
unless its meaning is obvious from the context.
• Mission Success (Probability)---Assurance that no equipment function is
lost that would preclude completion of all mission objectives.
In this study, no particular objective was specified; all mis-
sion success factors include 99% probability of crew survival as
a prerequisite, and 99% probability of mission success was used
as a data base for comparison.
This section has been organized into general and specific conclusions. De-
tailed study findings from which specific conclusions were drawn are stated in
Sections 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0 of this volume, and are referenced in parentheses.
Recommendations given in Section 2.3 are based, to a great extent, on the areas
requiring additional technical research, as reported in Section i0.0.
2.1 GENERAL STUDY CONCLUSIONS
Implementation of many of the conclusions and recommendations will be a
matter of management concern. For instance, it might have been inferred from
some sources that subsystem maintenance concepts can be developed and imple-
mented independently. This is not the case, as pointed out in Item i) below.
The principle of developing maintenance concepts for each subsystem, and imple-
menting them to achieve an effective total spacecraft, will require closer
÷ ÷
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control and coordination between subsystem design organizations than would be
required if a single arbitrary concept were levied on all systems. A second
example is that of component commonality, and this is where configuration man-
agement takes on an added dimension. There are a number of subsystems that
could be designed with a larger number of common modules or components. Achieve-
ment of both the above goals will require very intensive intersubsystem disci-
pline and will involve a high degree of management cognizance to provide the
positive direction that will be necessary.
i) Development of Maintainability Concurrent with Hardware Design---Because
the requirements for maintainability on a manned spacecraft form part of
the hardware design criteria, it is necessary that maintainability charac-
teristics be considered and their qualities included from the earliest
phases of any design program for a manned mission. During the course of
this study, it became apparent that no one maintenance philosophy could be
applied unilaterally to all subsystems. Specific maintenance philosophies
by subsystem, or by component if necessary, will be far more useful during
design of the spacecraft. The maintenance concept for each subsystem must
be determined by careful consideration of subsystem design features and
parameters and the relationship of the subsystem to the spacecraft as a
whole. For example, there are several subsystems that are on the border-
line of a Degree "3" maintenance concept (see Section 3.4.1), and if enough
common requirements can be found, it may be possible to specify a Degree "3"
maintenance concept for all such candidates. The resulting benefit could be
a reduction in total weight (including spares) required to support the mis-
sion. During spacecraft design and development, it will be necessary to
modify the maintenance philosophies according to design progress, and to
guide design with the planned baseline philosophy. In practice, this can
be implemented only by a flexible and fully integrated team of maintenance
and design engineers with decision autonomy restricted to the highest level
of engineering management. (Problem areas should be resolved through mutual
agreement at the working level wherever possible.)
2) Detailed Subsystem Study Required---Further research and study effort are
necessary to define more accurately the components that comprise typical
spacecraft subsystems and the parameters (weight, volume, failure rate,
etc.) associated with each component. The more accurate the data inputs to
study analyses, the more accurate the results obtained. The MARCEP and
maintenance task analysis sheets contained in Volume III indicate the depth
of detail required at the component level to perform this study. Consider-
able research was done to obtain the data needed, but it was found that
good detailed data unfortunately was not readily available. Therefore, it
is recommended that this area be studied further so accurate valid data can
be made available to designers and future research and study programs.
3) Effectiveness of Study Technique---The technique of using both a mathemati-
cal model (MARCEP) and a general-purpose system simulation model to evalu-
ate parameters that affect maintainability of long-duration manned space
missions provides results that complement each other. This data should be
very useful for planning future space missions. The results obtained from
the mathematical optimization and general-purpose simulation models appear
to be quite realistic. (Refer to Section 3.5 for discussions of these models.)
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2.2 SPECIFIC STUDY CONCLUSIONS
2.2.1 DESIGNING FOR MAINTENANCE
i) Commonality of Spacecraft Components---Commonality of components and equip-
ment, both within and between spacecraft subsystems, and between elements of
the spacecraft, on-board experiments, and reentry vehicle, is one of the
most important of all design objectives. Spares requirements decrease sig-
nificantly, program costs are reduced, and training can be consolidated when
a high degree of commonality is achieved (Sections 7.1 and 7.2).
2) Modularization---Modularization of components is an effective way to reduce
the spares requirements and maintenance workload. The greater the common-
ality of modules the more effective is the spares usage, particularly for
high failure rate components (Sections 5.1 and 6.1).
3) Design for Degree "2" Maintenance Concept---Subsystems should be designed
for a Degree "2" maintenance concept (remove and replace) whenever practi-
cable. This concept results in the most efficient use of spares, and the
least weight and cost. As commonality of equipment increases, the concept
becomes more advantageous. Particular exceptions to this concept include
structural parts and large bulky items (Sections 7.1 and 7.2).
4) Maintenance Concept for One-Spare Items---If only one spare of an item is
required to achieve the desired probability of assurance, it probably could
be used most effectively as a standby redundant item, whenever system de-
sign permits (Section 8.2).
5) Battery and RCS Engine Service Life---The batteries and reaction control
engines used in the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission have a service life of
only 1 year, which adds about 16% to the workload. An improvement in the
design life of these components can materially reduce the spacecraft main-
tenance requirements (Section 5.2.1).
2.2.2 IMPACT OF MAINTENANCE ACTIONS ON MISSION CONDUCT
l)
2)
Scheduled Maintenance Workload---The scheduled maintenance workload is sig-
nificant. This varies from 114 to 147 man-minutes per day, on the average,
for the four missions studied. The life support system is a major contrib-
utor to the workload. However, this situation can be improved considerably
by designing the system to reduce the number and frequency of the filter,
cartridge, and wick replacements, and by designing for quick replacement of
these items where it is necessary (Sections 5.2 and 6.2).
Unscheduled Maintenance Workload---The crew workload imposed by unscheduled
maintenance requirements is relatively low and does not significantly affect
the operation of the spacecraft. No mission required unscheduled mainte-
nance for more than 20% of the days involved; repair could be performed in
under 2 hours for well over half of the days requiring unscheduled mainte-
nance, and the mean daily repair time during such days was under 1 hour. i
Also, one of each type of crew skill is sufficient to handle the unsched-
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3)
4)
5)
uled maintenance workload, and the amount of EVA required for unscheduled
maintenance is negligible (Sections 5.3 and 6.3).
Amount of Spares Actually Used---The actual average spares weight used to
replace failed items is about 3 to 10% of the initial spares weight pro-
vided; and the maximum weight used during any one mission duration or re-
supply interval is about 16 to 20% of the initial weight provided for the
1975 missions, and 8 to 16% for the 1985 missions. Increased efficiency
in the use of the spares provided occurs for the longer resupply intervals
or mission durations (Sections 5.3 and 6.3).
Maintenance Resource Requirements---One of each crew skill type, two basic
tool kits, and one of each other type resource identified (vacuum system,
maneuvering units, etc.) are sufficient to handle all scheduled and unsched-
uled maintenance requirements, even if the equipment failure rates are sub-
stantially higher than predicted (Sections 5.3 and 6.3).
Airlock and Spacesuit Use---Airlock and spacesuit use required in conjunc-
tion with extravehicular unscheduled maintenance tasks is minimal. The
requirements for scheduled maintenance are somewhat higher, but do not sig-
nificantly affect spacecraft operations. As identified by previous studies,
the EVA requirements for experiments have by far the largest influence on
airlock and spacesuit use (Sections 5.3 and 6.3).
2.2.3 EFFECTS OF PARAMETER VARIATIONS
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Effect of Mission Duration on Weight Added---The weight that must be added
to a basic system to achieve 99% assurance of mission success increases
by about 27 to 30% when the mission duration is doubled. Therefore, from
the standpoint of the ratio of spares weight to total spacecraft weight,
it appears that the longer resupply intervals should be used when there is
a choice (Section 5.1).
Weight Increase for Mission Success and Crew Survival---The weight added
to a basic system for 99% assurance of mission success is about 35 to
50% greater than that required for 99% assurance of crew survival (Sections
5.1 and 6.1).
Effect of Failure Rate on Weight Added to System---A 100% increase in fail-
ure rate results in a 27 to 30% increase in weight required for spares and
redundancies (Sections 5.1 and 6.1).
Effect of Failure Rate on Repair Times---Changing the failure rate results i
in a proportional (linear) change in the average daily repair time, but has
no significant effect on the mean maintenance task time (Section 5.1).
Effect of Varying MTTR or Repair Confidence Level---Increasing the mean-
time-to-repair, or the confidence level desired for repair, above the base-
line system results in significant increases in the weight added for redun-
dancies and spares required to achieve designated mission assurances
(Sections 5.1 and 6.1).
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2.2.4 CONFIRMATION OF THE INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
Maintenance is Required for Long-Duration Manned Space Flights---One of
the interesting results of this study was the validation of an original premise
that maintenance will be necessary for long-duration manned space missions. Not
only was it determined that maintenance will be necessary, but that it also will
be desirable and practical. Maintenance is necessary because it is virtually
impossible to eliminate all maintenance activities. Maintenance is desirable
because significant weight and cost savings can be made through maintenance in
comparison with conventional forms of redundancy for most subsystems, as shown
in Sections 4.0 and 7.0. Maintenance is practical because no factors were iden-
tified that precluded the performance of the maintenance tasks considered.
2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
2.3.1 APPLICATIONS
i)
2)
3)
Further Development of Study Data---Further evaluation of the data developed
by the analysis runs conducted in this study should be made to identify
additional pertinent data and relationships not covered within the scope of
this study.
Documenting Subsystem Component Configurations---A document should be com-
piled that lists the subsystem components and equipment of each spacecraft
configuration evaluated in this study, together with the basic component
data such as failure rate, weight, etc., and additional component statistics
derived from this study such as the quantity and type of redundancies allo-
cated, the expected spares utilization, _he expected repair task time, etc.
The development of such a document with the information organized by indi-
vidual component and combining the results of both manual analysis and com-
puter mechanization, was not attempted during this study. However, a docu-
ment of this type, with all information readily accessible, would serve as
a baseline or guideline to industry for future spacecraft studies.
Use of Study Analysis Technique on Existin_ Systems---The concept of using
an optimization model and a simulation model should be applied to an existing
spacecraft/mission or to a spacecraft/mission in an advanced state of
development. This would use a data base for existing equipment or for
equipment in an advanced state of development, which should be broader and
more accurate than that used in this study. The results of such an appli-
cation would further validate the technique and yield results that could
be used in refining existing mission planning. This study technique also
should be applied to space experiment programs so that the maintenance
requirements for experiments can be more accurately determined and be given
appropriate consideration in the basic planning of a flight program.
2.3.2 RESEARCH
1) Degree "3" Maintenance Concept Evaluation---The concept of inflight bench-
level maintenance (Degree "3" maintenance) should be studied in more detail
to determine specific workshop equipment and weight requirements, and trades
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2)
3)
_4)
should be made to determine the effect of Degree "3" maintenance on crew
maintenance workload and on possible weight savings.
Mission Analysis Optimization on Costs---Cost algorithms for the effects of
adding parallel, standby, and spares redundancies should be developed, and
a mission analysis based on optimization of dollar cost at the component
level should be conducted and compared with the results of a weight opti-
mization for the same mission.
Mockup of Life Support Subsystem---A representative life support subsystem
for at least a six-man crew should be mocked up in detail, and trial instal-
lations within a typical spacecraft cabin configuration should be made to
determine the optimum placement of the subsystem for operation and mainte-
nance. This is considered necessary because the study indicated that life
support subsystem placement is a critical factor in spacecraft interior
design.
Additional Study and Technology Research---A number of areas recommended
for additional study or technology research are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion I0.0. These recommendations generally include designing for modulari-
zation and commonality of equipment; investigation into the techniques
required to repair large assemblies or structures in space, to minimize EVA
or spacesuit use, and to enhance malfunction detection; further development
of analysis methodology; better definition of the space environment; and
determination of human performance in that environment.
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3.0 STUDY LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Limitations on the study scope, criteria developed and used in the study,
and the method and techniques used in accomplishing the study are described in
the following paragraphs. Study limitations are identified as ground rules,
assumptions, and definitions. Ground rules, Section 3.1, were provided by
NASA in the contract statement of work. The assumptions, Section 3.2, were
made by the study team when required, and approved by the contract monitor.
The definition of terms, Section 3.3, is a form of limitation in that it pro-
vides constraints upon the interpretation of certain words and phrases used
frequently in the study.
Criteria were developed in the areas of maintenance philosophy, relia-
bility, success, and maintenance requirement determination. Various criteria
were used in making comparisons, or as standards in developing detailed study
data. These criteria are discussed in Section 3.4.
Detailed descriptions of the manner in which the study was conducted, and
of the techniques used, are provided in Section 3.5, Study Methodology.
3.1 GROUND RULES
The following ground rules were established by NASA for the performance
of this study:
i) Two levels of technology were to be studied: the mid-1970's and the
mid-1980's. (The terms "1975" and "1985" are used in the document as
shorthand equivalents.)
2) At least two classes of missions were to be studied: the Earth-orbital
mission, and the interplanetary mission.
3) Crew survivability of 0.99 or better was to be assured for each mission
considered. This was a mandatory requirement within the overall context
of mission success.
Crew sizes to be considered were to fall within the range of a minimum of
six men to a maximum of 30 men.
No provisions for artificial gravity were to be considered for any mission.
Provisions for extravehicular activity and remote experiments were to be
included in the study.
7) Mission goals were to be retained irrespective of any system compromises
that might be incurred for maintainability purposes.
During extravehicular activities, no metabolic losses were to be charged
solely to pressure suit influence. The only disadvantages to be consid-
ered were a loss in reach capability and in tactile sensation, and the
effects of the spacesuit mass.
Mission success was defined as the probability of all equipment functions
of the spacecraft being available for the required time during the mission,
provided crew survivability requirements were first satisfied.
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
9
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3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
Proper performance of the maintenance analysis required that certain as-
sumptions and guidelines be established to ensure uniformity of effort and
reduce the number of variables to a manageable level. Some of those used in
this study include the following:
i) Unscheduled maintenance has priority over scheduled maintenance. There-
fore, if maintenance resources (including crew skills) being used for
scheduled maintenance are required for unscheduled maintenance, the sched-
uled tasks will be delayed until completion of the unscheduled task.
2) The mean maintenance repair times include the time from receipt of a
fault indication through completion of the repair or replacement includ-
ing checkout, and return of equipment to storage. They also include the
effects of other assumptions given here when applicable. Where EVA is
required, the time reflects that necessary for checkout and donning the
spacesuit, egress and ingress through the airlock, and doffing and serv-
icing the spacesuit. Part of the time required for prebreathing pure
oxygen is assumed to be simultaneous with donning the spacesuit.
3) All high failure rate components used in fluid systems will be coupled
into the system through the use of automatic shutoff-type quick
disconnects.
4) All plumbing runs will be continuous where possible. All joints not
expected to require disconnection will be brazed or welded.
5) Interconnecting wiring that might be expected to require repair will use
wire wrap or similar techniques for high reliability and easily repair-
able connections. This will eliminate the need for soldering and poten-
tial associated problems.
6) Sufficient experience will have been gained on previous manned space
flights that equipment will be designed for maximum ease-of-maintenance
considering the available personnel skills, support equipment, and
expected space environment.
7) Adequate lighting capability will be provided for both external and
internal maintenance.
8) The pressurized spacesuit has a normal endurance capability of 3 hours
with additional reserve capability of 1 hour.
9) Extravehicular activity (EVA) will require about 30 minutes for egress
and ingress of vehicle (15 minutes each way).
i0) Spares will be stored in a location readily accessible to the crew. An
inventory will be kept of the spares lon-board and their storage location
to facilitate finding the correct spare when needed, and where applicable,
to aid in determining new spares needed at resupply.
ii) The probability of death during the mission is not considered in the 99%
probability of crew survival that has been established as a mission
requirement.
I0
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12) Where feasible, as an expediency for the study, it was assumed that the
on-board inflight test system, which includes the display panel indica-
tions, would isolate a failure to the replaceable component, recognizing
that certain design problems may be implicit in such an approach. This
was assumed to be generally true for electronic equipment, in particular.
Otherwise, it was assumed that test points would be available so a fault
could be isolated to the replaceable component through the use of available
maintenance and test equipment. It was also assumed that fault isolation
could be performed without breaking electrical connections and that all
components and test points would be accessible to a pressure-suited man
where this was required.
13) Electronic components requiring replacement will be designed as plug-in
modules.
14) Components will be designed where possible to require the use of no tools
for their replacement, or a minimum number of standard tools.
15) Warning devices will be provided to give immediate warning of failure of
critical components.
16) The interior volume must be sufficient to allow the crew to efficiently
accomplish the mission.
17) The interior must be compatible with the maintainability requirements
for accessibility, and operability requirements for monitor and control
(refer to the maintenance equipment and inflight test subsystem discus-
sions in Volume III).
18) Safety considerations such as rounded corners, easy access to spacesuits,
rapid exits, and enclosure of experiments and operations that could
contaminate the spacecraft interior shall be incorporated.
19) The interior of the vehicle, including all access hatches are sized for
the 10th through 90th percentile crewman (Reference i) in a pressurized
spacesuit.
20) An area of privacy will be provided for each crewman.
3.3 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AEV
AMU
Basic System
CM
CMG
Commonality
Astronaut Encapsulation Vehicle
See "MMU"
See "Single Thread System"
Command Module---an Apollo-type vehicle.
Control-Moment Gyro---for spacecraft stabili-
zation.
The provision for identical replaceable items
within a subsystem or between subsystems.
Such items would perform similar, but not
necessarily identical, functions and be
directly interchangeable.
iI
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Crew Survival (Probability)
Criticality Code
CRU
Degree of Maintenance
Downtime
Dormant Failure Rate
ERV
EVA
GPSS
IMU
Level of Maintenance
LSS
Maintainability
Maintenance
Maintenance Concept
The probability that no fatal crew incident,
caused by equipment failure, occurs during
the mission. See Section 3.4.2.
An arbitrary means to specify the relative
impact of a component failure.
Combined Rotating Unit (See PCS)---the princi-
pal operational element of the PCS.
An arbitrary indication of the complexity of
unscheduled maintenance to be performed. See
"Level of Maintenance" and Section 3.4.1.
The total elapsed time between cessation of
a function and restoration of the function
by automatic means or by crew action.
The rate at which random failures can be
expected to occur while a component is in
an inactive state.
Earth Reentry Vehicle---An Apollo slashed cone
type of vehicle.
Extravehicular activity.
General Purpose System Simulation. See Section
3.5.4.
Inertial Measurement Unit---An element of a
navigation and guidance system, consisting of
a stable platform, gyros, accelerometers, and
associated electronics.
Commonly used to identify the location (com-
plexity) of unscheduled maintenance, i.e.,
organizational, field level, depot, etc.
Not used in this study because of the possi-
bility of confusion. The defining term used
in this study was "Degree of Maintenance"
(see above).
Life Support System (includes Environmental
Control System).
A quality of hardware design and installation
which permits it to be retained in or restored
to a specified operational condition, in accord-
ance with predetermined requirements.
See "Scheduled" and "Unscheduled Maintenance."
A plan for accomplishing scheduled and unsched-
uled maintenance developed during equipment
design. The degree of maintenance to be per-
formed to be specified in the general plan at
the system, subsystem or component level.
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Maximum Allowable Downtime
MARCEP
Mean Repair Time
MEM
Mission Success (Probability)
MM
MMU
MTBF
MTTR
Modularization
Parallel-redundant Item
PCS, PCU
The longest continuous period of time for
which the loss of a function can safely be
tolerated.
Maintainability and Reliability Cost Effec-
tiveness Program. A Boeing-developed optimi-
zation model used to augment basic spacecraft
equipment component lists with spares and re-
dundancies. See Section 3.5.4.
The expected elapsed time required to accom-
plish a maintenance task under the anticipated
work conditions. (Specified on MARCEP Data
Sheets and Maintenance Task Analysis Sheets,
see Volume III).
Mars Excursion Module.
The probability that no loss of hardware func-
tion occurs that precludes completion of all r
mission objectives, with a 99% probability of
crew survival being prerequisite to any degree
of mission success.
Mission Module---the main spacecraft pressur-
ized compartment(s).
Modular Maneuvering Unit---integrated with
backpack for astronaut extravehicular maneu-
vering.
Mean-time-between-failures.
Mean-time-to-repair. Average time required to
restore an item to its original operating con-
dition after a failure has occurred. Also
specified on MARCEP Data Sheets and Maintenance
Task Analysis Sheets as Mean Repair Time, the
expected elapsed time required to accomplish
a maintenance task under the anticipated work
conditions. (See Volume III.)
The design of large assemblies for easy repair
at the subassembly level through the use of
plug-in or bolt-on packages, to reduce the
overall weight of spares required. Commonality
between replaceable packages is a desirable
goal of modularization.
A duplicate unit not required for initial capa-
bility purposes, but provided in the system to
enhance overall system reliability by operating
simultaneously with the basic unit.
Power Conversion System (Unit)---Brayton cycle
machinery to convert heat energy to electrical
energy.
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PLSS
Probability of Repair (PRx)
RCS
Repair Confidence
RMU
Scheduled Maintenance
Simulation
Single Thread System
SM
Spare Item
Standby-redundant Item
Unscheduled Maintenance
Volume
Portable Life Support System (backpack).
See "Repair Confidence."
Reaction Control System.
The probability that an unscheduled maintenance
task will be accomplished within a specified
period of time. Designated in MARCEP as
PR I, PR2,...PR 6.
Remote Maneuvering Unit---A remotely controlled
extravehicular maneuvering and manipulating
unit.
Maintenance activity that occurs on a regular
cycle that can be anticipated and planned for
prior to system operation.
A computer program that operates a system
under anticipated real-time conditions (GPSS).
The spacecraft equipment component list with
items identified in the minimum quantities
necessary to perform all required mission func-
tions. (No spares, redundancies, or backup
subsystems identified.)
Service Module---A spacecraft element like the
Apollo Service Module, housing midcourse pro-
pulsion and isotope power subsystems.
A separately stored unit available for exchange
and replacement of an identical basic unit.
Same as parallel-redundant item, except opera-
tion occurs only when switched in at the time
the basic unit fails.
All maintenance not classified as scheduled;
including replacement of components due to
random failures; repair of damage due to human
error, spacecraft operations, or meteoroid
impact; and adjustment required to meet estab-
lished tolerances.
(as used in analyses) The space occupied by
a component or item with no packing factor
allowance or provision for maintenance "elbow
room."
3.4 STUDY CRITERIA
To conduct the study effectively for all of the missions studied, it was
necessary to establish some criteria and procedural definitions to be used
throughout the study. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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3.4.1 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
The primary objective of this study is to develop useful guidelines for
evaluating the effects of different maintenance concepts on overall mission
requirements. To do this in a logical and consistent manner, it is necessary
to identify the factors affecting or affected by a maintenance concept, and
to establish a selection criterion against which competitive concepts may
be evaluated.
Maintenance Concept Selection---Establishing a logical approach to mainte-
nance in a long-duration space mission is difficult because of the interplay
of many contending factors. For example, appropriate maintenance may permit a
manned system to attain an acceptable level of probability for crew survival
and mission success, at a low weight penalty. But at the same time it must
be recognized that the more maintenance time accumulated during the mission,
the less crew time there will be available for scientific experiments or
other mission tasks; this operates to lower the probability of completing the
mission objectives.
The factors considered in determining preferred maintenance concepts for
each type of mission are grouped as follows:
i) Operational and performance factors including:
• Performance constraints (such as minimum crew survival probability)
• Mission duration
• Resupply interval (for near-Earth missions)
• Crew size and available discretionary time
• Scheduled mission events
• Fault isolation technique.
2) Resource or cost factors including:
• Dollar cost penalties
• Mission module weight penalties (and the resultant effect on number
of launches and launch costs)
• Mission module volume penalties
• Crew skill variations.
3) Hardware and design factors including:
• Functional design constraints
• Component life and failure rate.
Candidate maintenance concepts, and the selection criteria from which they
are derived, must be defined so as to properly relate all of these factors.
The selection criterion used to evaluate alternate maintenance concepts
was primarily the weight required to achieve a desired level of mission success
÷ ÷
÷ ÷
D2-I13204-2
probability. This sterile criterion was tempered by the qualitative evalua-
tion of the effect of a maintenance concept on other mission factors, includ-
ing cost, crew skill and skill training requirements, equipment complexity,
and expected design limitations, to mention only a few.
The following possible criteria for selecting a preferred maintenance
concept were considered:
l)
2)
3)
4)
Minimum dollar cost penalty to obtain a preselected (fixed) probability
of accomplishing stated mission objectives (reliability or crew survival).
Minimum weight penalty to obtain a preselected probability of accomplish-
ing stated mission objectives.
Minimum crew manhour penalty for a fixed probability of success.
Minimum volume penalty for a fixed probability of success.
It would also be possible to use the opposite approach; that is, fix the
maximum resource (dollars, weight, manhours, etc.) that could be expended,
and select the maintenance concept so as to maximize the probability of suc-
cess within the resource limit.
The actual resources that will be available for future space efforts are
unknown at this time, however, and they could vary widely with calendar time.
Therefore, any conclusions or recommendations based on an approach that maxi-
mizes success probability for some fixed resource limit would be of limited
value. For this reason, it was decided that the selection criterion should be
one in which fixed probability of success would be achieved at a minimum "cost"
penalty. The general study approach allows the cost penalty to be measured
in the form of dollar cost, weight, crew manhours, or combinations of these.
Maintenance Concept Definitions---The various maintenance concepts con-
sidered in this study for correcting unscheduled or random deficiencies may
be defined in terms of the degrees of complexity of the maintenance action
and the kinds and quantities of resources that would be required to restore
the system after failure. These concepts cover a wide range of possibilities,
varying from a Degree "0" maintenance, in which no unscheduled maintenance is
contemplated so that the desired probability of success must be achieved by
built-in automaticlredundancy, to a Degree "3" maintenance in which maximum
restoration of failed components can be accomplished. It must be remember-
ed that the performance of scheduled maintenance has been established as an
accepted requirement, for the purposes of this study. The general concepts
for unscheduled maintenance activities are defined as follows:
l) The Degree "0" concept incorporates only provisions for automatic
restoration of the system after failure.
16
÷ ÷
÷ ÷
D2-I13204-2
2)
3)
4)
The Degree "i" concept limits maintenance to adjustment of out-of-
tolerance equipment and manual switching to activate standby redundant
elements. Some fault isolation instructions and simple hand tools are
needed but no special crew skills are required for this concept.
The Degree "2" concept incorporates provisions for physically removing
failed components and replacing with a good spare. The maintenance
actions in this concept include:
o Fault isolation (and switching when a built-in standby also exists).
o Breaking electrical and/or mechanical connections to the component
package.
o Mounting the spare component in the physical space of the failed
unit.
o Remaking electrical and mechanical connections to the component
package.
Fault isolation equipment, maintenance instructions and tool kits are
required. Also, the crew must have greater knowledge of the system and
possess greater technical skills than for the Degree "I" concept.
The Degree "3" maintenance concept allows repairs within the functional
component packages. Such repairs may be made with the package in place
in the system, or by removing the failed component to a more convenient
work location. This concept involves maintenance actions similar to
those for the Degree "2" concept, with the following additions:
o Open or disassemble the component package.
o Fault isolate to the failed part in the component package.
o Repair and reassemble the package, using spare parts as appropriate.
o Test and/or check out the repaired component.
Cutting and joining processes are included. Sophisticated fault isola-
tion equipment, maintenance instructions, and tools are required. Crew
members must have highly specialized maintenance skills in addition to
their capabilities for performing primary mission objectives.
All of these concepts are further defined by identification of the re-
sources (weight, volume, manhours, etc.) that are expended to incorporate
maintenance provisions for specific subsystems and components.
3.4.2 SUCCESS CRITERIA
The basic success criteria used for this study were requirements for 99%
probability of crew survival and 99% probability for mission success. The
99% probability of crew survival as a mandatory requirement within overall mis-
sion success was initially established as a study ground rule by NASA. The
spacecraft components considered for calculating crew survival probability were
those found to be necessary for crew survival over the mission duration. The
duration of the Earth-orbital missions was considered as the interval between
17
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resupplies. The duration of the planetary missions was considered as the
interval between successful injection into transplanetary trajectory and the
arrival of the ERV on the Earth's surface. Mission success was defined as
the probability of all spacecraft equipment functions being available for the
required time during the mission, provided crew survival requirements were
first met. Examples of some equipment necessary for mission success but not
crew survival are: experiments, data management hardware, and recreation and
exercise equipment.
As required, a 99% assurance of crew survival first was met in all of the
study optimizations and simulations. A 99% assurance of mission success was
also met or exceeded in all of the analyses even though a specific require-
ment for this level of success was not levied. Selection of a particular mis-
sion success goal was beyond the scope of this study. It should be noted,
however, that the probability of crew survival is improved by some undetermined
amount above 99% during the process of raising the probability of mission suc-
cess to 99%. Further analysis, not attempted during this study, could be done
to determine some other level of mission success below the 99% point (remember-
ing that 99% probability of crew survival is always implicit), or to optimize
the selection of components in such a way that 99% probability of both crew
survival and mission success is achieved simultaneously.
3.3.3 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Reliability (probability of mission success) and probability of crew sur-
vival were predicted for the various subsystems and missions as a part of the
MARCEP process. For all reliability arrangements (that is, single thread,
active parallel, switched standby or repair with spares), there were two im-
portant data inputs to the mathematical probability expressions:
i) Time (operating and allowable downtime)
2) Failure rates.
Operating time and allowable downtime were determined by examination of
the profile and operations for each mission. To facilitate the computerized
prediction process, all component experience was expressed in time. For those
components whose failures were more dependent on the number of operating cy-
cles than on hours of operation, the time entries in the MARCEP data sheets
represent an equivalent opportunity to fail.
Selecting suitable failure rates for system components would, in general,
require consideration of several influencing factors, including:
i) Operating environment (vibration, thermal, radiation, etc.)
2) Operating load (percent rates)
3) Specific component (by manufacturer's part or specification number) that
might be selected, as influenced by dollar cost and development schedule
limitations.
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For this study of future space systems, however, the engineering definition
of components was not sufficiently detailed to allow precise assessment of the
effects of these factors. For this reason most component failure rates were
selected by the following method.
1)
2)
3)
First, the following basic assumptions were made:
Procurement constraints based on cost or schedule considerations would
be the same as currently encountered in NASA programs. Therefore, part
and component failure rates would be as good as, or better than, military
standard.
Hardware for the 1975 mission would be essentially the same as that now
in existence or under development in 1967.
Reliability growth for most component types would continue at the same
rate as had been experienced over the past 5 years.
Next, failure rates for each component type were found in several sources
to establish a feasible range. The sources of these data were many and varied.
The major portion of the data sources used were made available from The Boeing
Company, Aerospace Reliability Data Center. This data center provides support
to all Aerospace Group programs and also conducts data exchanges with other
Boeing divisions, other companies, and governmental agencies. The principal
file areas maintained by the data center are:
i) Technical reference file
2) Historical information and failure data file
3) Interservice data exchange program (IDEP) file.
The reference material contained in these information files is comprised of
many different types of publications, ranging from a single statistical clip-
ping from a periodical to a complete weapon system history. Some items are
related to a specific function, while others are very general in their appli-
cation. The physical characteristics of items also differ, e.g., reports
obtained from IDEP are on microfilm; other materials are single data sheets
or complete documents.
Utilizing the data and information services provided through the data
center, component failure rate estimates, respective sources and the quali-
fying and limiting factors influencing these estimates were noted. Table
3.4-1 is an example of the variety of information examined and the selected
failure rates.
Finally, point estimates of component failure rates were selected for
the two mission time periods, 1975 and 1985. The variations in failure rates
over the range found for each component type were due to differences in the
following factors:
i) Complexity of functions provided and parts within the components.
2) Loading or stress level of the component parts.
L9
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3) Inherent reliability growth potential and the assumed date of procure-
ment or use.
The selection of point estimates from this range was made on the basis of
analogies to comparable equipment in known systems and judgment relative to
the above factors.
In some instances, such as for the pump listed in Table 3.4-1, the fail-
ure rate for the two time periods was assumed to be the same. It was con-
sidered that such hardware will have reached its reliability maturity prior to
use on 1975 missions. In other cases, reliability growth was assumed beyond
present hardware. The following are typical examples of the rationale used
in selecting point estimates failure rates.
The range of failure rate estimates for an accelerometer was from I0 to
200 per ten million hours. The lowest rate was used by Autonetics Division
of NAA for the Voyager Attitude Reference Subsystem Proposal. The highest
rate was used in the Boeing Burner II Reliability Analysis Report. A rate of
40 for the 1985 Mars mission was selected based on the assumption that reli-
ability growth by a factor of 3 will be achieved over existing hardware by
that time. For the transponder listed in Table 3.4-1, the range of failure
rates was approximately 400 to 700. The lower estimate was taken from an
analysis used on the Voyager Spacecraft Telecommunication Subsystem Proposal
by Philco Radio, while the higher estimate was taken from a Collins Radio
Study of the Apollo X Communications and Data Subsystems. It was assumed that
the differences among the four estimates shown in Table 10.3-1 were due pri-
marily to differences in basic equipment definition, component part generic
failure rate estimates, date of hardware procurement and rate of reliability
growth. The value of 300 for the 1975 time period was selected based on the
assumptions that the article would be similar to the one proposed for the
Voyager spacecraft and would probably have a somewhat lower failure rate since
the Voyager estimate was for a proposed 1971 mission. Two estimates were used
for the 1985 time period. The lower value of 60 was used for the 1985 Libra-
tion Center mission while a higher value of i00 was used for the Mars landing
mission based on the assumption of higher performance requirements for the
latter mission.
3.4.4 CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
Maintenance requirements for manned orbital or interplanetary spacecraft
are based on: (i) an assumed distribution of failure times; (2) probabilities
of failure occurrences; (3) repair/restoration procedures; (4) crew skills
available; (5) troubleshooting and failure detection devices; and (6) hardware
criticality rating.
The identification of maintenance requirements for the configurations re-
viewed in this study involved the description of the spacecraft subsystems down
to the replaceable component level. An analysis of each of these components
resulted in the identification of the equipment requirements, crew skills, re-
pair times, and other maintenance aspects associated with replacement or repair
of the item. Because scheduled maintenance can be predicted, and accounted for
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in system programming (including the provisioning of on-board resources), the
burden of the study was to determine the probable extent and influence of un-
scheduled maintenance as a factor in mission accomplishment. The functions
required to perform the unscheduled maintenance tasks that were considered in
the maintenance analysis are described in the following paragraphs.
i) Fault Indication---An initial requirement for unscheduled maintenance
normally will develop from display indications or scheduled maintenance
inspections. Basic operational data for each system, such as measure-
ment of pressures, temperatures, quantities, guidance and navigation data,
position information, and power levels, is presented on display panels
for monitoring and control of system operations. Caution and warning
lights are used to signal the degradation of those critical system func-
tions that require more immediate attention and corrective action.
2) Fault Isolation and Identification---After a fault indication has been re-
ceived, the indication will be evaluated and cross-checked with other
system instrumentation to verify that the fault indication is valid.
This presumes a significant improvement in the state of the art of fault
isolation equipment by the time the missions considered in this study are
conducted. The available displays will be examined; additional tests
will be made, using either built-in capabilities of display consoles or
checkout equipment, and, if required, other maintenance test equipment
will be used to isolate the malfunction to a replaceable component or
specific part of the system. From the fault indication, it will be deter-
mined whether the maintenance is to be performed in a shirtsleeve environ-
ment or in an unpressurized or exterior area requiring a pressurized
spacesuit and backpack operation. A determination also will be made of
the maintenance equipment required to correct the malfunction, and of the
spares required. The maintenance equipment, including personnel and tool
tethering devices, locomotion devices, and spares will be obtained from
storage.
3) Pressurization and Locomotion Requirements---If the malfunction is within
the normally pressurized area, the maintenance personnel can proceed di-
rectly to the fault location. If the malfunction is in an unpressurized
area or external to the spacecraft, egress through an airlock in a pres-
surized spacesuit with a backpack will be required. Crewmen required to
work in a pressurized spacesuit must prebreathe pure oxygen for about 30
minutes at the spacecraft's normal internal pressure (7 psia) to avoid
bends, before transfer to pure oxygen at the spacesuit pressure of 3.5
psia. For external maintenance a means of maneuvering will be necessary,
either through a maneuvering unit or through the use of tethering devices
and handholds. Tethering devices will be required for the maintenance
equipment and spares for both exterior and interior maintenance.
4) Space Environment Considerations---A space environment factor that could
affect the performance and scheduling of extravehicular maintenance is
radiation hazard. This is greater at some localities in space than at
others. Therefore, it may be necessary to schedule extravehicular activ-
ity (EVA) to avoid high radiation portions of an orbit, if the malfunction
is such that a delay can be tolerated. Additional space environment
factors that must be considered during the development of EVA maintenance
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techniques are temperature extremes, micrometeoroids, electrostatic
charges, and light intensities.
Fault Evaluation---After access has been gained to the area of the mal-
function, verification of the fault will be made; additional fault isola-
tion may be required to identify items to be replaced. If at any time it
is apparent that a malfunction cannot be corrected, the problem will be
coordinated with Earth. If the problem is serious enough, it may require
evacuation of the spacecraft and return of personnel to Earth (if possible),
or retreat to the reentry vehicle until return is possible. In most cases,
an alternate mode of operation can be used until return to Earth or until
the next resupply mission, at which time the necessary maintenance equip-
ment or spares can be brought to the spacecraft.
Restoration to Normal Operation---Corrective action generally will consist
of replacement of the faulty item, although in some cases, such as damage
to structure, ducting, and large tanks, the maintenance will involve
repair. During maintenance operations, provisions must be made for con-
taining debris and fluids to prevent contamination of the area. This will
be true both inside and outside the spacecraft. After the necessary cor-
rective action has been taken, the installation will be inspected, serv-
iced as required, and checked out. Any removed access panels or equipment
will be replaced. Personnel, equipment, and the removed item will return
to the spacecraft, the maintenance equipment will be returned to storage,
and the 02 equipment, spacesuit, or backpacks serviced as required. The
removed faulty unit will be inspected for any visual evidence of failure;
minor tests with available maintenance equipment may also be conducted.
If a small repair shop is available, minor repairs such as cleaning of
parts, adjustment, or calibration of instruments, etc., can be performed.
The maintenance action taken, including pertinent data and observations,
will be logged and the faulty item will be placed in storage for disposal.
The maintenance data also will be transmitted to Earth at the next com-
munication period.
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3.5 STUDY METHODOLOGY
Seven interrelated tasks were identified as basic elements of the study.
These were essentially reiterative throughout most of the study period, be-
cause the material underwent considerable refinement and adjustment as infor-
mation was accumulated and analyses progressed. The tasks were sequenced as
follows:
Task i. Select Missions and Spacecraft Configurations
Task 2. Analyze Spacecraft Subsystems
Task 3. Identify Maintenance Requirements
Task 4. Conduct Performance and Cost Trades
Task 5. Identify Maintenance Philosophies
Task 6. Identify Spacecraft Design Criteria
Task 7. Identify Technical Research Requirements
In the following sections each of the tasks is discussed in more detail and
the methodology employed in each task identified.
3.5.1 SELECTION OF MISSIONS AND SPACECRAFT
Two representative manned long-duration missions were selected for each of
the two time periods of interest. These were categorized as Earth-orbital and
interplanetary. Principal mission factors were defined and the nature of each
mission was identified. Concurrent with analysis and selection of basic mis-
sions, associated spacecraft were reviewed to identify the candidate configura-
tions most appropriate to this study. One determining factor in the selection
of both mission and spacecraft was the availability of useful data. A large
number of references were reviewed during the selection process. References 1
and 2 were found to provide the most comprehensive coverage of the types of mis-
sions to be studied, and were used to baseline the missions and spacecraft con-
figurations. Because these references were not the latest available, changes in
the baselines were made as required using information derived from the various
other references. The process of configuring the spacecrafts necessarily over-
lapped into Task 2 where spacecraft subsystems were identified and analyzed.
3.5.2 SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
Subsystems of the selected spacecraft configurations were analyzed so that
the criteria necessary to perform subsequent tasks of the study could be identi-
fied. A common and logical breakdown of subsystems also was established.
These were segregated into modules and components as necessary to establish the
maintenance level that would form the basis for identification of the mainte-
nance requirements. Wherever possible, commonality of modules within the same
subsystem for each spacecraft concept was established. Baseline subsystems
were established for each spacecraft concept for the 1975 time period, and were
modified or changed as necessary to approximate the expected state of the art
for the 1985 time period. Subsystem variables evaluated included failure rates,
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operating times, weight, volume, cost, mean repair time, maximum allowable
downtime, repairability factor, and criticality factor.
The useful output of Task 2 was a set of subsystem data sheets for each
mission. These sheets organized the subsystem variables into a format that
could be punched on computer cards for automated analysis in a future task.
The subsystem data sheets (MARCEP data sheets) are reproduced in Volume III.
The data point entries made on the MARCEP data sheets are explained below.
i) Nomenclature---The nomenclature describing each component or assembly
provides the first entry on the data sheet. In total, this provides an
equipment component list, by subsystem, for the entire spacecraft.
2) Subsystem---Each subsystem was assigned a two-letter identification code:
Code
CM
CS
DM
EP
EX
EV
ME
IF
LS
NG
PL
PP
RE
RD
SC
ST
3) Component Number---Each component within a given subsystem was assigned an
arbitrary number, according to the original sequence when the subsystem
listing was established. Once this number was assigned it was inviolable,
and never reused if the item subsequently was deleted as a result of fur-
ther analysis and evaluation. Any item added after the original sequence
had been established was given the next unassigned number regardless of
its place in the sequence.
4) Quantity in Basic System---Reflects the number of units required to make
up a basic, essentially nonredundant, but completely operable subsystem.
5) Operating Failure Rate (x 107)---This is the average number of times the
component may be expected to fail in i0,000,000 hours of operation.
Subsystem
Communications
Crew System
Data Management
Electrical Power
Experiment System
EVA Equipment
Inflight Maintenance Equipment
Inflight Test
Life Support
Navigation and Guidance
Planetary Lander
Propulsion
Reentry
Rendezvous and Docking
Stability and Control
Structure
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Dormant Failure Rate (x 107)---This is the average number of times a com-
ponent may be found to be faulty during i0,000,000 nonoperating or on-the-
shelf hours.
Weight in Kilograms---Weight per unit of the line item.
Volume in Cubic cm---Volume per unit of the line item.
Mean Repair Time---Time in hours adjudged to be the average required to
restore the item to its original operating condition after a failure has
occurred.* A very serious effort was made to be realistic in this figure,
taking into account the space environment, special conditions if appro-
priate, kinds of tools and other resources required, and inherent diffi-
culty of the function.
Repairability Code---Each item was evaluated for its susceptibility to
repair, which was introduced into the computer program for determining
relative merits of sparing or making redundant. Codes used were as
follows:
i. Item cannot be spared or made redundant.
2. Item cannot be repaired or replaced in orbit.
3. Repair requires external work in spacesuit.
4. Repair is difficult---poor access or other factor.
5. Repair is easily performed---shirtsleeve environment.
Criticality Code (CC)---Each item also was evaluated for the influence it
had on the system in the event of a fault. Codes used were:
i. Safety critical---item must operate continuously.
2. Downtime critical---redundancy required.
3. Downtime critical---repair in maximum downtime or less.
4. Repair can be deferred up to 7 days (except RC-2 or RC-3).
5. Repair can be deferred indefinitely (item is considered for
mission success only).
6. Spares only.
Maximum Allowable Downtime---This was the maximum elapsed time in hours
that could safely be tolerated between a failure and restoration of the
system or equipment to an operating condition.
First Supplementary Component Number---The entry in this column is a sepa-
rate computer code number for an additional switch, valve, indicator,
sensing or monitoring device, or other part required when the line item
is added in as standby redundant. Weights, volumes, reliabilities, etc.,
of these units are mitigating factors to be applied when the line item is
used in that manner.
Also termed "mean-time-to-repair" (MTTR) in analytical discussions.
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14) Second Supplementary Component Number---An additional entry to be used as
above when a second such component is required. This may or may not be
the same as the first component.
15) Percent Operating Time (x 10)---The proportion of a mission during which
the line item is anticipated to be working. Multiplying by ten permits
computer mechanization of items with low operating times.
16) Parallel Lockout---Denies consideration of the line item as a parallel
redundant unit. Applies particularly to components associated with EVA,
experiments, structure, ducts, and other items for which it is not prac-
ticable to provide parallel redundancy.
It is apparent from the nature of some of the data points that this task
overlaps Task 3. In practice, portions of Task 2 and Task 3 were accomplished
concurrently.
3.5.3 IDENTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
After selected spacecraft systems and components were identified, antici-
pated scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities were determined. De-
sign and operational requirements dictated by these maintenance activities also
were defined. The analysis included identification of scheduled maintenance
items, determination of Degree "2" replaceable items and their failure fre-
quency, and identification of any "unreasonable" activities, which then were
used in developing suggested design criteria and potential areas of further
research. During the analysis, specific attention was directed to such factors
as effects of local environment, tools, automated fault determination and test-
ing, extravehicular maintenance requirements, special skills, spares provision-
ing, and maintenance data.
Worksheets were prepared in analyzing each of the four selected configura-
tions for the maintenance tasks to be performed by the crew. These sheets dis-
play the maintenance factors such as crew skill, task times, tools, data, etc.,
that influence or are affected by the equipment being analyzed. The visibility
they provide gives opportunity for comparing effects of progressive technical
development, as well as defining major aspects of hardware design, crew factors,
and general logistics considerations involved with the various maintenance
tasks.
The worksheets, which are reproduced in Volume III, are grouped by space-
craft configuration for a given mission. Within this group each configuration
is subdivided by subsystem, which in turn is broken down into its maintenance-
significant components. The component list so identified is the same as that
used in the computer optimization program (see the MARCEP data sheets). Each
of the major assemblies or components of the subsystem is analyzed with respect
to requiring repair, replacement, or servicing (and servicing frequency). In
some instances a more detailed description of the maintenance functions is in-
cluded for clarity. Each maintenance function has listed with it the antici-
pated number and type of skill required to perform the maintenance task. The
mean time required to perform the task and the average metabolic rate of the
crewman performing the task are estimated and listed. Where applicable, an
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indication of the special tools required to perform the maintenance task is
shown. To conserve space on the worksheet, these are listed by numbers that
are referenced to the inflight maintenance equipment list in the subsystem
description for the respective configuration, given in Volume III. Useful
maintenance data aids are listed on the worksheets and checked as deemed appro-
priate. The component location and the associated environmental factors are
also listed and checked as appropriate to the maintenance task. A column is
included for any additional requirements or remarks pertaining to the mainte-
nance function.
One of the principal uses of the worksheet data is to give visibility to
the design engineer as to various considerations he must take into account
during the design of his hardware. For example, the designer may need to con-
sider that his component should be maintainable by only one crewman, using one
primary skill. He must consider the crewman to be limited in his metabolic
workload, particularly if the component repair requires EVA. He must ensure
that the necessary tools required for the maintenance task are available. He
should consider which maintenance aids will be most useful in maintaining the
component he is designing. The ease of maintenance must be considered in rela-
tion to the component location in the vehicle, the workspace around the compo-
nent, the effect of zero-g, cabin pressure required, radiation hazards that
must be attenuated, lighting requirements, maneuvering necessary, restraint
required, and whether the task must be performed EV.
The maintenance task analysis worksheets will aid in determining reason-
able crew performance requirements. Whereas crew size is relatively independ-
ent of maintenance requirements with respect to the time loads involved, main-
tenance tasks, skills, and related training are dependent on the maintainabil-
ity aspects of the component design. Time allowances and EVA considerations
are important factors from the standpoint of the crew physical limitations.
For example, if a component is designed to be accessible only under EV condi-
tions, it must be easily repaired or replaced to minimize the frequency dura-
tion of EVA required and to compensate for the degradation in restraint, mobil-
ity, and dexterity associated with spacesuit tasks.
Logistics considerations also may be obtained from the worksheets. The
quantities of expendables associated with EVA are directly dependent on the
frequency and duration of the EVA. The expendables may be summarized from
the worksheets. In addition, system trades may be performed on the basis of
worksheet information. For example, the scheduled maintenance average man-
minutes/day breakdown by skill type, as shown in Sections 5.2 and 6.2, is
extremely helpful in determining crew composition and training requirements.
3.5.4 CONDUCTING PERFORMANCE AND COST TRADES
The first step in the performance and "cost"* analysis part of the study
was performed with a computer programmed mathematical model called MARCEP
(maintainability and reliability cost effectiveness program). With a
* "Cost" or "costs" refer to the penalty or penalties incurred by the use of a
component, i.e., weight, volume, and repair time.
÷ ÷
÷ ÷
D2-I13204-2
single-thread system provided, MARCEP first determines the reliability of each
component and then the basic system reliability. Each item is then considered
for addition to the system. Up to three ways of addition are considered; the
possible methods being determined by repairability and criticality codes used
to describe the component as part of the basic system. The three methods of
addition are: (i) parallel redundancy; (2) standby redundancy; and (3)
spares redundancy. The program uses Fortran IV language that is operated on by
the Univac 1108 digital computer.
For each component, parametric evaluation and selection of the best method
of addition are conducted, and the parametric value stored in tabular array.
The parametric value stored in this study was change in reliability per weighted
change of component weight. The change is due to the trial addition of the com-
ponent to the system. When parametric values have been stored for each compo-
nent, the entire array is searched to select the largest value. The component
responsible for this value is then added to the system.
As a component is added to the system, a new parametric value is deter-
mined for it, and the new value is entered in the tabular array. Each time a
component is added to the system, it is added in the most advantageous form of
redundancy allowed. This iterative process can proceed ad infinitum, but prac-
tical or required constraints are applied to terminate the process. A more de-
tailed technical discussion of the MARCEP processes is available in Reference 88.
The useful result of the program is a printed sheet of the components
added to the system, in their sequence of addition, with new system reliability,
method of addition, and cumulative system "cost" parameters shown. The inherent
flexibility of the MARCEP model made it possible to perform a number of paramet-
ric sensitivity studies with relative ease. Among the sensitivities evaluated
were: weight and volume of spares and redundancies to mission duration; weight
and volume of spares and redundancies to repair confidence level and mission
duration; and weight and volume of spares and redundancies to gross errors in
estimated mean repair times. Results of the above sensitivity studies are pre-
sented in Sections 5.1 and 6.1. Trial investigations showed that gross errors
in component weights and failure rates could be evaluated easily by other means,
and investigation of these sensitivities was not continued further. As ex-
plained in Section 5.1.1, errors in overall failure rate could be evaluated by
changing the mission duration (look at half the mission time to evaluate half
the failure rate). It was also found that a gross component weight error would
affect the added weight of spares and redundancies by the same factor.
Additional studies into the effects of selecting a Degree "0" maintenance
concept were made by reidentifying component repairability and criticality codes
for the 1975 Mars flyby mission, and making analyses at both the system and sub-
system levels.
Far more detailed information was available in the mass of computer outputs
than could possibly be handled within the time and budget limitations of this
contract; maximum effort was addressed to the extraction of meaningful informa-
tion in fulfillment of specific study objectives, with the realization that at
least an equal effort could have been devoted to more depth of detail in the
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review of specific subsystems, or to further analyses of contending maintenance
concepts.
The second step in the task was to simulate the operation of the mission
under real-time conditions. The mission simulation model was designed to simu-
late the unscheduled maintenance requirements of a fully configured spacecraft
as developed by MARCEP to the desired level of assurance, and to determine the
effects of maintenance time, spares weight, resupply intervals or mission dura-
tion, system reliability, and maintenance resources on the system. The simula-
tion method uses the IBM general-purpose system simulation (GPSS) Model III
language that is operated on by the IBM 7094 digital computer. This GPSS pro-
gram has been used by the contractor on a number of other contracts and studies.
Two applications are documented in References 67 and 68.
The initial step towards development of this simulation model was to por-
tray the activities involved with unscheduled maintenance in a functional se-
quence diagram. This is then translated into a decision logic network that in
turn can be readily transcribed into the GPSS language.
Figures 3.5-1 and 3.5-2 provide a simplified version of the decision logic
network used in this simulation, which is given here to illustrate the general
procedure used in the simulation. The first block labeled "Create Random Fail-
ures" caused unscheduled failures to occur randomly within an assumed exponen-
tial distribution about the total system mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) rate.
A separate small Fortran program was used to calculate the total system MTBF,
including any parallel or standby components added to the basic system by the
MARCEP, and the contribution that each of the over 500 component types made to
the total system MTBF. Each time a failure was created, random numbers were
generated to identify the subsystem and the component of that subsystem that
failed. The probability that the failure was within a specific subsystem was
directly proportional to: (i) the ratio of the subsystem failure rate to the
total spacecraft failure rate; and (2) the ratio of the component failure rate
to its subsystem failure rate. After the failed component had been determined,
its number, weight, and volume were tabulated within the computer. Next the
resources (crew skills, maintenance equipment, locomotion aids, etc.) required
to perform the maintenance task were identified. A check was then made to
determine if the resources required were available. The types of resources and
the numbers of each resource previously had been inserted into the computer.
This resource quantity could be unlimited, or restricted, as desired to deter-
mine the effects of queuing. In this study unlimited quantities were assumed
at first to determine maximum usage. From this it was decided to provide two
of the basic maintenance tool kits and one of each other resource. Further
simulations based on the resources thus limited resulted in some queuing, but
it was not significant enough to warrant providing additional quantities of the
resources.
If all of the resources were not available, then it was necessary to wait
until an existing maintenance task was completed and the desired resource was
again available. The time that was spent waiting for a resource was recorded.
Once it had been determined that all the resources were available, the mainte-
nance time that must be spent on the task was calculated. Initially the
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mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) for each component type, as determined in the main-
tenance task analyses (see Volume III), were fed into the computer. However,
in reality it is known that the actual repair times may actually vary consider-
ably about the mean value. Therefore, the MTTR values entered into the program
were multiplied by a number randomly picked from a log normal cumulative dis-
tribution curve. This resulted in the actual repair time varying from 0.i to
i0.0 times the expected MTTR. This calculated maintenance time was then used
as the time that the maintenance resources were applied to the task. If more
than one man was required for the task, the time was multiplied accordingly.
The data on maintenance time and the use of the resources were then recorded.
A check was then made as to whether the maintenance task involved EVA. If EVA
was required the number of airlock uses were recorded, based on one airlock use
(one-use is one complete cycle of egress and ingress through the airlock) for
every 3 hours or fraction thereof of maintenance time. The manhours of space-
suit use were also recorded, based on two men being required for all tasks that
required EVA. The resources used on the maintenance task were then returned to
storage so they would be available for the next task. After each day of simu-
lation, statistics were tabulated on the spares weight used, spares volume used,
number of airlock uses, and the manhours of spacesuit use required. The com-
puter storages where these values were accumulated were then reset to zero.
The simulation was then continued until this cycle had been repeated i00 times.
The statistics for the total simulation of i00 cycles of the selected mission
duration or resupply interval were then tabulated.
3.5.5 IDENTIFYING MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHIES, SPACECRAFT DESIGN CRITERIA, AND
TECHNICAL RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS
The final three tasks of the study were found to be so interdependent that
they must of necessity be discussed as a group. The actual accomplishment of
these three tasks did not evolve as a separate step that started after Task 4
was completed. Bits of information were filed under these task headings
throughout the study for evaluation after completion of Task 4. It was in this
manner that feedback from problems identified in earlier tasks was used.
Maintenance philosophies were derived for each of the mission types ana-
lyzed during the study. The combination of maintenance tasks, crew number and
-1-" 11
_l±±s, maintenance aids and equipment, spares, resupply, =_-_ _=_=_L_ design
were considered to the end that the best and most efficient combination could
be determined. An associated requirement was the determination of a proper
selection criterion on which a good maintenance philosophy could be based.
Also, specific design criteria, to be applied to spacecraft programs of the
future, that would most effectively improve system maintainability were identi-
fied for recommendation. The analysis of spacecraft subsystems and the identi-
fication of maintenance requirements served to establish those tasks or items
of equipment that:
l)
2)
3)
Required the most maintenance time;
Caused the most maintenance actions;
Were the most critical to spacecraft operation.
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Finally, areas of technological research needed to acquire the maintainability
desired for the 1975 and 1985 time periods were identified for recommended
study. Development risks in terms of cost, program delays, and hazardous con-
ditions also were identified where proposed solutions to the problem areas
being researched could incur such adverse effects.
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4.0 MAINTENANCE CONCEPTCOMPARISONS
The baseline maintenance concept used for the four study missions was pri-
marily Degree "2," with deviations to Degrees "0," "i," and "3" for specific
items that did not lend themselves to Degree "2" maintenance. It was felt that
this approach would yield a first approximation to the optimum maintenance con-
cept. To substantiate this, a Degree "0" maintenance concept was generated for
the 1975 Mars/Venus flyby mission and evaluated. The required probabilities of
assurance for the Degree "0" maintenance concept are achieved in almost all
cases by using built-in parallel and standby redundancies instead of spares.
Therefore, essentially no unscheduled maintenance is required to correct compo-
nent failures. It should be noted that the Degree "0" concept does not apply
to scheduled maintenance activities, because it was found to be impractical to
eliminate this maintenance. Fixed redundancies for some components (such as
structure, ducting, etc.) was found to be illogical within the constraints of
the mathematical model used for optimization. Therefore, the Degree "0" con-
cept does include some spares and maintenance kits for selected items; but for
most components, fixed parallel or standby redundancies were allowed with rela-
tively low penalties for automatic switching. Similarly, for the Degree "2"
concept, due to various criticality factors it is illogical to spare every
component that might fail, and therefore a small amount of fixed redundancies,
together with automatic switching when required, are included in the added
weight for the Degree "2" concept when manual restoration appears unfeasible.
The effects of Degree "0" and Degree "2" maintenance concepts were also
evaluated a t the subsystem level. Again, this comparison was made for the 1975
Mars/Venus flyby mission only; however, the trends found are considered repre-
sentative of other missions as well. The detailed maintenance concept comparison
by subsystem is found in the appendix to this volume.
4.1 WEIGHT COMPARISON OF MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
The first comparison of the Degree "0" and the Degree "2" maintenance con-
cepts was made at the total spacecraft level. Comparison at this level showed
that less weight was added under a Degree "2" concept to achieve 99% assurance
of crew survival and 99% assurance of mission success than was added for the
Degree "0" concept. However, the weight added to achieve mission success for
the Degree "0" concept appeared completely unreasonable. This resulted from
including backup probes for the experiments subsystem. The number of probes
carried to achieve 99% assurance of success was excessive even though the prob-
ability improvement was calculated by a spares formula. Results of the compari-
son are shown in Figure 4.1-1. The broken line curve labeled "B" shows the
excessive weight of probes added to achieve 99% assurance of success. Because
this approach was unfairly biased, the maintenance concept for the experiment
subsystem was redefined. Increments of parallel redundancy were allowed to be
added to the probe internal mechanisms and to the on-board experiment packages.
The weight increments were small in comparison to the basic weight of the probes
and experiment packages; however, the probability increase gained by one incre-
ment addition to a probe was equivalent to that gained by launching two dupli-
cate probes to accomplish one mission. This result was considered optimistic,
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but certainly fair, for the comparison. The results of the redefined Degree
"0" concept are shown as broken line curve "A" in Figure 4.1-1.
As expected, the Degree "2" maintenance concept showed significantly less
weight added to achieve a 99% assurance of mission success. The numerical
weight difference between the two concepts was over 5600 kg at the 99% mission
success points.
4.2 COST COMPARISON OF MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
For mission planning purposes, one of the principal factors in selection of
a maintenance concept will be dollar cost, assuming achievement of the same
assurance level. To determine the cost impact of the Degree "0" and the Degree
"2" maintenance concepts, a relative cost comparison was made. The final con-
figurations of the spacecraft under each of the maintenance concepts were inputs
to the costing effort, along with assessments of requirements for additional
design, crew training, technical data development, automated fault isolation
and numerous other factors affected by the maintenance concept. The summary of
the costing is shown in Table 4.1-2. The equivalent dollar cost associated
with the 1.000 relative cost shown for the Degree "2" concept is 3,198 million
dollars. The assumptions made in the costing as well as the factors eliminated
from the costing are indicated in Sections 9.1 and 9.4. Other costing infor-
mation for specific missions is provided in the subsystems descriptions given
in Volume III. It is evident from examination of the costing table that the
Degree "2" maintenance concept is desirable from a cost viewpoint as well as
from a weight viewpoint. It should be noted that a relative cost factor of
0.001 is roughly equivalent to 3.2 million dollars and the total difference of
0.149 between the two concepts represents approximately $477,000,000. This
figure does not include ancillary increases such as booster requirements to
accommodate the additional weight incurred by the Degree "0" concept.
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5.0 EFFECTSOFMISSION PARAMETERSAND MAINTENANCEON
REPRESENTATIVEEARTH-ORBITAL MISS IONS
A number of different missions, described in other studies, were eval-
uated for mission concepts, goals, operational characteristics, personnel
and hardware requirements, and depth of detailed information, to establish
representative and workable baseline missions that could be analyzed in
this study. Volume III of this report presents a detailed discussion of
the missions selected, spacecraft configuration analyses and selections, and
the spacecraft subsystem analyses. It is necessary to review this informa-
tion and examine the MARCEP data sheets and maintenance task analysis sheets
(also contained in Volume III) to fully appreciate the depth of data used as
a background for the study analyses.
At the system level, the effect of varying major mission/system param-
eters was investigated. These parameters included mission duration (resupply
period in the case of Earth-orbital missions), weight, volume, mean repair
time, and required level of repair confidence. In evaluating the effects of
the mean repair time, gross errors in the estimation of repair times were
assumed and applied as factors to the baseline repair times. The results of
investigating the system-level effects of parametric variations are presented
under Section 5.1 for the Eartl -orbital class of missions.
Scheduled maintenance activity will have an effect on mission require-
ments. In particular, scheduled maintenance will affect crew workload and
the weight of expendables required to conduct the mission. These aspects of
scheduled maintenance are discussed in Section 5.2.
The effects of unscheduled maintenance on overall mission requirements
were evaluated by conducting a series of simulations where the mission was
examined under simulated real-time conditions. In the simulations, failures
were allowed to occur randomly and statistics were recorded on queuing, re-
source expenditures, and maintenance time (also determined randomly). The
results of these investigations are presented in Section 5.3.
As a result of evaluating the effects of various parameters on the mis-
sion requirements, it was possible to make preliminary estimates of spacecraft
weight and launch payload requirements for each mission. Table 5.0-1 presents
a launch weight summary for the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission. Table 5.0-2
presents a launch weight summary for the 1985 L1 Libration Center mission.
These launch requirements are discussed in more detail in Volume III.
5.1 EFFECTS OF VARYING SELECTED MISSION/SYSTEM PARAMETERS
All baseline spacecraft configurations (see the MARCEP data sheets con-
tained in Volume III for identification of components) were analyzed with the
mathematical optimization program to determine the spacecraft system and
mission sensitivity to maintainability-related parameters such as weight,
volume, cost, reliability, MTTR, MTBF, resupply rate, mission duration, and
spares requirements. The mechanics of how this was done have been explained
/
÷Table 5.0-1:
First Launch---Unmanned Spacecraft
Spacecraft (dry weight)
Expendables (propellants, 02, N2)
D2-I13204-2
1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION LAUNCH SUMMARY
Total
Total
Second Launch---Initial Manning of Spacecraft
8-Man Stretched Apollo Reentry System
8-Man Crew (200 ib each)
Cargo Module
Expendables (food, clothing, LSS supplies)**
EVA-Powered Locomotion Units
Spares Weight (0.99 PMS - 120 days)**
Basic Experiment Requirements*
Subsequent Launches---90-Day Re supply
Reentry System
Crew
Cargo Module
Expendables (all requirements including experiment supplies)
Spares Weight (range 5 to 265 kg)
Total
Total
Basic Experiment Requirements*
15,544
11615
17,159 kg
7,904
1,130
4,030
1,084
284
1,747
2,5OO
17,679 kg
7,904
1,130
4,030
3,972
265
17,301 kg
2_500
19,801 kg
About i0,000 kg are required for the basic experiment program. It was
assumed that 25% of this is carried on each of the second through the
fifth launches.
Initial expendables and spares are provided for 90 plus 30 days reserve
supply.
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Table 5.0-2: 1985 L I LIBRATION CENTER MISSION LAUNCH SUMMARY
First Launch---Unmanned Spacecraft
Spacecraft (dry weight)
Expendables (propellants,'02, N2)
Total
Launch Capability
Radiation Shielding Allowance
Second and Third Launches---Initial Manning of Spacecraft
Reentry System (8-man Apollo and service module)
Crew (6 men in each launch)
Cargo Module
Expendables (food, clothing, LSS supplies)*
EVA-Powered Locomotion Devices
Spares Weight (0.99 PMS - 240 days)*
Basic Experiment Requirements**
Total
15,676
4,581
-20,257 kg
+36,700
+15,443 kg
10,180
848
4,030
1,763
142
815
21,528
Subsequent Launches---180-Day Resupply
Reentry System 10,180
Crew (8 men) 1,130
Cargo Module 4,030
Expendables (all requirements including experiment supplies) 11,148
Spares Resupply (range i0 to 120 kg) 120
Total
Basic Experiment Requirements**
Total
26,608
30,358
Total quantity required for spacecraft for 240 days (180 plus 60 days
reserve) is divided between these two launches.
About 15,000 kg are required for the basic equipment program. It was
assumed that 25% of this is carried on each of the second through the
fifth launches.
÷D2-I13204-2
in Section 3.5. Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 discuss the results of these trades
and analyses.
5.1.1 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
Figure 5.1-1 shows the weight that must be added to the baseline 1975
near-Earth orbital spacecraft to achieve desired mission probabilities of
assurance for a number of different resupply intervals (mission times). The
curves shown in this figure have been plotted on an inverted log scale so
that the higher reliability values could be more accurately plotted. Some
significant data for the 90-day interval shows 1071 kilograms added weight
for 99% probability of crew survival (Pcs), and 1630 kilograms for 99% proba-
bility of mission success (PMs)" For 180 days, 1387 kilograms of weight
were added for 99% PCS and 2056 kilograms for 99% PMS" In both cases, the
increased weight in going from 99% PCS to 99% PMS was about 50%. Only a 27%
increase in weight for mission success was required to double the mission
time, i.e., 90 to 180 days. A 30% increase resulted from doubling the mission
time from 180 to 360 days. Of the total added weight for 99% assurance of
mission success, 166 kilograms are for parallel and standy redundancy for
30 through 360-day mission times. The remaining weight is for spares. At
540 days, the weight for parallel and standby redundancy increased to 296
kilograms.
Figures 5.1-2 and 5.1-3 illustrate the effects of varying some of the
baseline system parameters. Figure 5.1-2 depicts the changes in added weight
required for 99% assurance of mission success when varying the confidence
level desired in repair of items within the item mean-time-between-failures
(MTBF), allowable downtime, or a combination of these factors. PR-4 items
were assigned a higher confidence level because these are mission safety
critical items. As the required confidence level was increased, it was neces-
sary for more items to be added as parallel redundant to ensure the desired
confidence level; therefore, the added weight increased correspondingly.
The baseline system was assigned a confidence level of 0.99 for PR-4, which
seemed to be a reasonable value and was compatible with the overall probabil-
ities of desired mission success. Note that there was no significant advan-
tage gained from using a lower confidence level for repair, whereas the added
weight increased markedly as the confidence level increased.
Figure 5.1-3 shows the changes in added weight resulting from varying
the baseline mean-time-to-repair (MTTR). One of the entries in the MARCEP
form was an MTTR value for each component. To derive the data presented in
this chart, the computer first multiplied each of the component MTTR's by the
factor shown before it started its selection process for adding parallel or
standby redundancies and spares to the basic system. Again, note that de-
creasing the MTTR did not significantly affect the weight added. However,
large weight increases were obtained when the MTTR values were increased.
Actually, in this study it was felt that the MTTR value assigned to each
component was generally on the pessimistic (or high) side. This meant that
a higher confidence could be placed in the accuracy of the results than if
the MTTR values were considered to be optimistic.
D2-I13204-2
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To check the sensitivity of results to possible errors in data inputs, the
effects of varying component weights, volumes, and failure rates were also in-
vestigated. As suspected, a linear relationship was obtained. That is, if the
weight and volume of all components is doubled, the total added weight to achieve
a desired reliability will be exactly double. It is apparent from the reliabil-
ity expression, e-_t, increasing the failure rate (%) by a factor of 2 has
the same effect as increasing the mission time (t) by a factor of 2. The re-
sults of this study indicated that doubling the failure rate or the mission time
time would increase the required spares weight by approximately 25 to 30%, or
expressed in another way, halving the failure rate or the mission time would
reduce the required spares weight by approximately 20 to 23%.
iOn all the MARCEP runs, statistics were also gathered on volume added to
the system as well as weight. Figure 5.1-4 shows the volume added to the base-
line configuration to achieve the desired mission probabilities for different
mission times. Figure 5.1-5 illustrates the added volume resulting from vary-
ing the desired confidence level of repair. For a 30-day mission time, the
added volume varied from about 3.5 to 4.5 cubic meters; for a 180-day mission,
the added volume was about 6.5 to 7.2 cubic meters. As a rough estimate, in-
creasing the mission time by six results in about double the added volume.
The previous charts show the weight or volume added for the total space-
craft. Figure 5.1-6 illustrates by subsystem what the initial weight was, and
what weight was added, for 90- and 180-day missions to achieve a 99% PMS for
the baseline mission. The first item on the left, the data management sub-
system, indicates that the weight added exceeded the initial system weight.
This was primarily because the system includes a computer and data adapter,
which weigh 29 and 74 kilograms, respectively, have relatively high failure
rates, and operate practically continuously. The added weight shown was based
on replacement of the entire unit whenever a failure occurred. By modulariz-
ing the computer and data adapter as i_dicated, the added weight dropped to
170 kilograms. This is a reduction of 71%. Not only was there a reduction in
the added weight for the computer and data adapter, but the optimal selection
process resulted in a reduction of the number of spares added to some of the
other components in the system. This was because it •was more weight-effective
to increase the reliability of the computer and data adapter above the pre-
viously attained value, which resulted in a reduction in the reliability re-
quired for other components to achieve the same total reliability for the data
management subsystem as a whole.
The large initial weight and relatively low added weight for the electrical
power subsystem was because the solar panels and batteries comprised about
three-quarters of the system weight. The solar panels initially were designed
for a 5-year life assuming normal degradation, giving a high reliability, and
the battery random failure rate was based on a 1-year scheduled replacement of
each battery. Consequently, the resulting added weight for 99% PMS was low
compared to the initial system weight.
The initial weight shown for experiments included the weight required for
a 121-experiment program. Actually, this entire weight would not be on board
the spacecraft from the start of the mission, but would be brought up as
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required during regular resupplies. Most of any redundancy or spares re-
quired for any experiment was expected to be provided as part of the experi-
ment. Therefore, the added weight shown was mostly that required to support
the experiment airlock, remotely controlled booms, and experiment mounting
masts.
The inflight test subsystem again showed the added weight to be about
the same as the initial weight. This was due to the large quantity of high-
failure-rate display lights and indicators that were included as part of this
system.
The low added weight for the reentry system was because the Apollo reentry
vehicle would be stowed externally to the mission spacecraft and the equipment
would be operated only once every month for checkout purposes. This low op-
erating time resulted in minimum added weight required to achieve mission
Success.
The big percentage of added weight to initial weight for the stability
and control subystem was due to the high-weight control-moment gyros (CMG)
used.
The structure has a very low failure rate and therefore a low added
weight requirement.
5.1.2 1985 L 1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
Figure 5.1-7 shows the total weight added to the baseline 1985 mission to
achieve the desired probabilities of assurance for mission times (resupply
intervals) of 120, 180, 270, and 360 days. The increase in added weight, in
going from 99% probability of crew survival (Pcs) to 99% probability of mission
success (PMs) varied from 35% for the 120-day mission time to 46% for the 360-
day mission time. These increases compare with about 50% for the 1975 Earth-
orbital mission times. Doubling the mission time from 180 to 360 days resulted
in a 27% increase in added weight for 99% PMS. This compares with about 30%
obtained for the 1975 mission. This again points out the advantage to be
gained in terms of more efficient application of the weight added to the basic
spacecraft for longer mission durations or resupply intervals. Of the total
added weight for 0.99 PMS, 183 kilograms are for parallel and standby redun-
dancy for 120- and 180-day mission times. This increased to 199 kilograms of
parallel and standby redundancy for 270- and 360-day mission times. The re-
maining weight is for spares.
Figure 5.1-8 shows the variation in added weight for different confidence
levels of repair. This curve reflects a significant increase in added weight
only if it is desired to have a 0.9999 confidence of repair for safety critical
items. This is basically the same trend as shown for the 1975 mission. As
explained in Section 5.1.1, a confidence level of greater than 0.99 is not
thought to be compatible with the other mission criteria.
Figure 5.1-9 shows the variation in added weight for different MTTR
changes from the baseline system. As indicated for 1975 also, the only
52
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significant increase is shown for MTTR factors of 2.0 times the baseline
system values for each component. In comparing Figures 5.1-8 and 5.1-9
the added weight curves for PR-4 values of 0.90, 0.99, 0.999, and 0.9999 are
almost exactly the same as for MTTR factors of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, respec-
tively.
Data was also obtained on the volume added to the system as well as weight.
Figure 5.1-10 shows the volume added to the baseline configuration to achieve
the required mission probabilities for different mission times. Figures 5.1-11
and 5.1-12 show the added volume for variations of MTTR factors and repair con-
fidence levels.
Figure 5.1-13 illustrates for each subsystem the initial weight of the
subsystem and the weight added for 180- and 360-day resupply intervals. The
comments made in Section 5.1.1 on the similar chart for the 1975 mission in
general are applicable for this chart as well; the initial and added weights
for the data management system are considerably less. The initial weight of
the system is lower because of the increased capability from lighter weight
components assumed for 1985. In addition, as a result of the trade made for
the 1975 mission, it was assumed that the computer and data adapter were mod-
ularized.
A more extensive analysis of the effect of equipment modularization was
made for the 1985 mission. In this analysis it was assumed that many of the
heavier electrical or electronic components consisted of replaceable modules or
subassemblies. For the 180-day resupply interval, this resulted in reducing
the added weight to the total spacecraft by 94 kilograms, which is about 6.3%
of the 1489 kilograms added initially. The weight reductions by subsystem are
discussed below.
i) Life Support System--The added weight to this system was reduced by 8
kilograms. Although there was no modularization of components assumed
here, the reduction was due to the side effects of modularizing the
components of the data management system, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.
2) Communications--A reduction of 20 kilograms resulted from assuming that
the unified S-band transceiver equipment, which weighs 22 kilograms,
could be broken down into 30 modules of 12 different types.
3) Data Management--A reduction of 8 kilograms was obtained from modulariz-
ing the 12-kilogram electronic scanner into 15 modules of 5 different
types.
4) Rendezvous and Docking--A reduction of 12 kilograms resulted from assuming
tha_ the 6.8-kilogram radar transponder would consist of 13 modules of 6
different types.
5) Navigation and Guidance--A reduction of 21 kilograms was obtained by assum-
ing that the 15-kilogram inertial platform consisted of 19 modules of 8
different types.
6) Inflight Test System--A reduction of 16 kilograms was realized by assuming
that the manual test unit, test display, and control unit each consisted
of 8 modules of 4 different types; and the safety monitor unit consisted of
30 modules of 6 different types.
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7) Crew System--A reduction of 9 kilograms resulted, although no changes
were assumed.
No weight reduction was shown for the other systems.
5.2 EFFECTS OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ON OVERALL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
The scheduled maintenance requirements, which by definition occur at pre-
planned time intervals instead of randomly, could be calculated manually and
it was not necessary for this study to include these requirements in the mission
simulation program. The maintenance task analysis, performed on each of the
approximately 550 component types identified during the study for each mission,
specified the scheduled maintenance required to keep the spacecraft system in
a satisfactory operationg condition. The task analysis forms are included in
Volume III. The following paragraphs summarize these scheduled maintenance
requirements for each of the Earth-orbital missions.
5.2.1 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
Table 5.2-1 summarizes the scheduled maintenance requirements for this
mission within each frequency interval, by minutes required for each skill
level to perform the task. If more than one task of one type is indicated, as
shown in parentheses, the time is the total required. The code number refers
to the resource identification as listed in Table 5.2-2 and also as used in the
maintenance task analysis sheets in Volume III. Lamps for various types of
lighting equipment are shown as scheduled replacement items, whereas they
actually will not be replaced until they burn out. The replacement schedule
is based on the average expected lamp wearout life. Resources required to
perform the scheduled maintenance are indicated on the table by the resource
set code numbers that are given in Volume III.
The tasks that require EVA are noted, as indicated at the bottom of
Sheet 3 of Table 5.2-1. The number of extravehicular trips required per year
will vary from 37 to 54, depending on how many of the tasks can be combined
into each EV excursion.
The scheduled maintenance shown in Table 5.2-1 accomplished under the
resupply heading can only be done at that time and not apportioned over a
number of days. The total estimated time required was 1340 man-minutes
(22.3 manhours). However, the additional crewmen that arrive with the re-
supply vehicle will assist in performing the resupply tasks, so the total
manhours would not be charged to the basic eight-man spacecraft crew. The de-
tailed expendable requirements that must be resupplied periodically are shown
on data sheets in Volume III. A summary of these resupply requirements by
system is presented in Figure 5.2-3.
The scheduled maintenance shown for a 360-day interval includes only
scheduled replacements based on an expected wearout life for the components.
These scheduled replacements probably would be planned to spread the workload
over several weeks once the mission has completed the first 360 days; 7930
man-minutes are required to complete the yearly scheduled maintenance. For
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Table 5.2-2: MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT
Task Analysis
Reference No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
Equipment Nomenclature
Subsystem
Reference No.
Standard Tool Kit (wrenches, pliers, screwdrivers,
personnel and tool restraints, multimeter, flash-
light, tape, fluid-containing bags, etc.)
Vacuum System
Space Power Tool Kit
Electron-Beam Welder
Stemfab Tool
Leak Detection Equipment
Temperature Measuring Device
Pressure Measuring Device
Water Test Kit
Battery Test Kit
Electrical Repair Kit
Lubrication Kit
Fabric Repair Kit
Airflow Meter
EVA Restraint Aids
EVA Tether Cable
ME 1
ME 2
ME 3
ME 4
ME 5
ME 6
ME 7
ME 8
ME 9
ME i0
ME ii
ME 12
ME 13
ME 14
EV i0
EV ii
Special Maintenance Kits
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
External Structure
Internal Structure
Space Radiator
Plumbing and Ducts
Battery Case
Experiments
Reentry System
Spacesuit and Backpack
Airlock
Modular Maneuverable Unit (MMU)
Remote Maneuverable Unit and Astronaut
Encapsulation/Vehicle (RMU and AE/V)
Restraint Aids
Pumpdown System Storage Tank
ST 17
ST 16
LS 167
LS 166
EP 18
EX 37
RE 18
EV 13
EV 14
EV 15
EV 16
EV 12
LS 174
Note: Technical data is provided as part of the data management subsystem
and test equipment such as meters, scopes, etc., are part of the in-
flight test subsystem. See Volume III for discussions of these
subsystems.
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comparison, this averages out to about 22 man-minutes per day, which adds
about 16% to the 133.2 man-minutes per day calculated for the basic scheduled
maintenance workload. About 79% of the 360-day maintenance workload is con-
tributed by the 1-year service life of the reaction control engines. Battery
replacements account for another 18% of the workload. If the service life of
these engines and batteries could be extended, this annual workload would be
considerably reduced. The replacements required at 600 and 800 days contrib-
ute so little to the overall maintenance workload that they can be neglected
as an influence on the analysis.
Table 5.2-4 surmnarizes the total man-minutes and average man-minutes per
day for the scheduled maintenance required at I-, 3-, 7-, 21-, 30- and 90-day
intervals for each subsystem. It is expected that these tasks could be appor-
tioned over all the days in each 90-dayinterval so the workload would be
evenly distributed over each day. An average of 133.2 man-minutes (2.2 man-
hours) per day are required through the 90-day period to complete the sched-
uled maintenance indicated. The life support system and the crew system_
which includes the general housekeeping functions, together account for about
78% of the scheduled maintenance.
Table 5.2-5 shows a breakdown of the total and average man-minutes per
day for each crew skill specialty. More than 50% of the scheduled maintenance
requires the life support system skill. This is primarily due to the numerous
replacements of filter, cartridges, and wicks.
5.2.2 1985 L1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
The maintenance task analysis sheets used for this mission to identify
the scheduled maintenance requirements are included in Volume III. The sched-
uled maintenance functions required are basically the same as for the 1975
near-Earth orbital mission, except that some of the intervals between tasks
were increased and some of the times to perform the tasks were decreased to
reflect expected improvements by 1985.
Table 5.2-6 summarizes the scheduled maintenance requirements by the fre-
quency interval and minutes required by each skill level to perform the task.
The scheduled maintenance shown here for intervals greater than 90 days in-
cludes only scheduled replacements based on expected wearout life. The average
man-minutes per day for these tasks is about 6.0; 75% is caused by the 720-day
scheduled replacement of the battery and reaction control engines. However,
a large improvement has been shown from the 1975 mission because of a reduc-
tion in the number and replacement frequency of batteries and engines. The
resource identification is given in Table 5.2-2.
The tasks requiring EVA are identified in the table. The number of EV
trips required per year will vary from 16 to 28, depending on how many of the
tasks can be combined into each EV trip.
The maintenance required at the resupply intervals is also shown in Table
5.2-6. A summary of the expendables requirements that must be resupplied peri-
odically is given in Figure 5.2-7. The detailed expendable requirements are
included in Volume III.
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Table 5.2-8 summarizes the total and average man-minutes per day for the
scheduled maintenance required at i-, 7-, 14-, 30-, 60- and 90-day intervals
for each subsystem. An average of about 114 man-minutes (1.9 manhours) per
day are required through the 90-day period to accomplish the scheduled mainte-
nance indicated. About 77% of this is attributed to the life Support and crew
systems; about 47% of this is caused by the weekly general interior cleaning
function that was estimated to require two men for 3 hours (total of 6 man-
hours) .
Table 5.2-9 shows a breakdown of the total and average man-minutes per
day for each crew skill. The life support system skill is involved in 50% of
the scheduled maintenance.
5.3 EFFECTS OF UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ON OVERALL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
A mission simulation model (described in Section 3.4) was used to simulate
the unscheduled maintenance requirements of the spacecraft and determine the
effects of maintenance time, spares weight, resupply intervals, system relia-
bility, and maintenance resources on the mission. The data presented in this
study is based on i00 simulation runs of each mission time or resupply interval.
By performing many runs, a broad and authoritative statistical base of expected
unscheduled maintenance activities can be established. The figures and tables
presented summarize the unscheduled maintenance requirements by crew skill and
subsystem, the spares use rates, repair task time, daily repair time, airlock
use, and spacesuit usage for each of the Earth-orbital missions.
5.3.1 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
The mission simulation was conducted for mission times (resupply intervals)
of 90, 120, 180 and 360 days. In each instance i00 simulation runs were made
for each time interval. Therefore, for the 90-day mission time, the range of
values and probability figures presented represent what could be expected in
the equivalent of 25 years of operation. Similarly, the i00 simulations of
the 360-day time period represent the expected statistics resulting from the
equivalent of i00 years of operation. A 90-day resupply was assumed as a base-
line and the statistics presented are for this mission unless stated otherwise.
Table 5.3-1 summarizes the unscheduled maintenance crew skill requirements
for the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission. It indicates that the average number
of days between requirements for a crew skill to perform unscheduled mainten-
ance is 6.6 days and the average time that a given skill will be required is
about 148 minutes. This results in a mean of about 22.5 minutes per day
throughout the mission; that is, substantially less than 0.5 hour per day will
be spent on unscheduled maintenance activities. This is a relatively insig-
nificant workload and there should not be any problem integrating it with
normal operation of the spacecraft. The life support system skill specialty
will be required over 33% of the total time. Although the electrical/electron-
ic skill is required most frequently (18.2 days between tasks, as a mean), the
average time spent on each task is low, so the overall requirement for this
skill amounts to about 24% of the total repair time.
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Table 5.3-2 summarizes the unscheduled maintenance requirements by sub-
system. The life support subsystem accounts for about 45% of both the total
system failures and repair time. The inflight test subsystem accounts for
about 19% of the failures but only 11% of the repair time, because of the rel-
atively low repair time per task. The total average minutes per day shown
here are less than those given in the previous table because this table re-
flects the elapsed repair time, whereas table 5.3-1 is affected by the fact
that two crew skills are required for some maintenance tasks. Figure 5.3-3
graphically portrays the contribution of each subsystem to the total failures
and repair time.
In the simulation, it was assumed there was only one of each type of
skill available, two basic maintenance tool kits available, and one of each
other maintenance resource available. The only queuing that occurred, during
the i00 ninety-day runs, was once for 66 and 132 minutes, respectively, for an
EE skill and a guidance and control skill (GC). For the 180-day simulation
the queuing only increased slightly; four times for an EE skill at an average
of 188 minutes, once for a GC skill for 132 minutes, and once for a mainte-
nance tool kit for 24 minutes. To determine what the impact on the maintenance
resources would be if a higher incidence of failures occurred, another i00
ninety-day simulations were made while assuming twice the basic system failure
rate. A total of 15 instances of queuing occurred at an overage of 137 minutes
each. The 15 queues occurred over the total i00 simulation runs or the equiv-
alent of 25 years of operation. Therefore, even at an assumed higher-than-
expected failure rate, a crew complement of one of each type skill level should
be sufficient to support any unscheduled maintenance requirements. Queuing
statistics were tabulated separately during the simulation runs; therefore,
the average minutes per task or failure shown in these charts does not include
any queuing time.
Previously, in Section 5.1, the curves shown depicted what weight must be
added to the basic spacecraft system to achieve a desired probability of crew
survival ann mission success. The mission simulation was used to predict how
much of the added weight will actually be used as spares to correct random com-
ponent failures.
Figure 5.3-4 presents the expected spares weight usage for 90- and 180-day
resupply intervals. Figure 5.3-5 presents the same data for 120 and 360 days.
As mentioned previously, each curve represents i00 simulations of each time
interval. A summary of the data shown in the figures is presented in the
following table in terms of percentages of the initial weight added to the
system for a 0.99 PMS. The spares usage data is based on replacing all fail-
ures in the basic system, plus the identified parallel and standby redundancy
requirements. The parallel redundant items were assumed to operate the same
amount of time as the basic item. The nonoperating failure rate was assumed
for the standby redundant items.
÷D2-I13204-2
I
I
I
)---t
0"0
UN
_ )--4
=
mZ
p_
b-t
r_
r_
°.
I
r¢3
,...-t
b-4
4-I -.-r O O '.O _.O I O') O_ I O C_ -.d" O_ ,-_
, .
c._
_ ,--I _-) -.1- ,-I ..I" I 0o "-I" I o ,'N o_ o_ o'_ r--
•_ -.1" O_ ,--I 0 oo I -.1" 00 I ,.o _o _N N ,--I -.I"
._ H -.1- _N I ,'q I ol ,--I ,--I .'_ ,--I
il L_ _ooo , o_ , _o_o_°_° , _ , =o_o co,d
,-1-i (D
o _ El
.,-I
o
(11
o --1- o o'_ ..o I -.1- r-. I _ o _ _ _ i o
I • I
_ -_ o _ _ , _ o , -_ o _ _ o o
,--I ,-I ,--I O
,-I
'I-t (D
O 4-1
o
_4 o
_ _- o _o ,-i o o _ c_ _ o _ _ o o
<'1" ,-I ,--I (_
,--t
> _ -,_ o
._ .,_ _ o
• o _ ._ r.=l _ _ ,x_
o _ oJ _I) _-_ _ 0 _ _ _ >_
•M o _ _ ,-I _ N _ _ _ • _D ._ ._
,-I
.lJ
o
,-t
>
.,-.t
¢1
4.1
-M
O
-M
O
.,-I
4-1
,--I
.M
I
c)
o_
(ll)-1
0
0 ._
q-4
m _
m _
•_ _
4..1 0
E-t
O
÷D2-I13204-2
NOISlndO_ld
IN3W30.VNVW VIV(]
SNOIIVOINnWWO0
I,-- I-,,-
e,m I_-
IOBINO3 (]NV AIillBVIS I
, I,,,.,.
l.l_
÷f
D21113204-2
I !
Z z
N
0
0
. AllllOVOO_d 3OVSfl _AllVlnwn3
l
\
D2-I13204-2
O
O
r--I
,kil-llSVl]O_d 3ovsn 3AI .I.VII'IWI_:)
82
÷D2-I13204-2
PREDICTED SPARES USAGE
Resupply
Interval
Initial Added
Wt-kg (0.99PMS)
Spares Weight Used---k_ (% Initial Wt)
Minimum Mean Maximum
90 days 1630 5 (0.3) 65 (4.0) 265 (16.3)
120 days 1747 5 (0.3) 87 (5.0) 390 (22.3)
180 days 2058 i0 (0.5) 133 (6.5) 420 (20.4)
360 days 2717 40 (1.5) 277(10.0) 570 (21.0)
Therefore, on each 90-day logistics resupply mission it is expected that
an average spares weight of 65 kilograms will be required. However, because
there is a statistical possibility that up to 265 kilograms must be resupplied,
allowance for this much weight must be included in the logistics resupply mis-
sion planning. Another use of the data is the maximum expected spares usage
for 360 days is 570 kilograms. Therefore, if the expected maximum of 265 kilo-
grams is used for one 90-day interval, the maximum usage to be expected over
the next three 90-day intervals (270 days) is 570 minus 265 or 305 kilograms.
The table shows that the longer the resupply interval, the higher the percent-
age of spares weight used, which means that usage of the spares provided was
more efficient. The bulge in the curves was caused by the few relatively
heavy items in the system. When none of these are used, the weight is low,
but increases rapidly when heavy items are used. As the resupply interval in-
creases, the probability of using some heavy items during any one interval in-
creases and the curve smooths out. Figure 5.3-6 graphically portrays what
spares weight in orbit was initially provided and what the range in expected
usage was for the different resupply intervals. Figure 5.3-7 shows the spares
volume used for 90-, 120-, 180- and 360-day resupply intervals.
Figure 5.3-8 portrays the daily repair time distribution for unscheduled
maintenance resulting from the system failures that occurred in the simulation.
On 86.2% of the days there will be no requirement for unscheduled maintenance;
on 3.56% of the days between 1 to 30 man-minutes of maintenance will be re-
quired. The mean daily repair time would be about 23 man-minutes assuming the
maintenance could be distributed over all the days. The maximum repair time
is 2400 man-minutes. However, on only 3% of days will more than 200 man-
minutes be required. This repair time data was based on the mean-time-to-
repair determined for each component during the maintenance task analysis and
is the same as the MTTR value used in the MARCEP program. To more accurately
simulate the real life situation where a task may take much less or more time
than expected, the MTTR values entered into the simulation program were multi-
plied by a value randomly picked from a cumulative distrubution of a log nor-
mal curve. This resulted in the actual repair times varying from 0.i to i0.0
times the expected MTTR, with about 36% of the repair times being within the
range of -0.5 to +0.5 of the basic MTTR.
Figure 5.3-9 represents the repair task-time distribution for 14% of the
days during which some repair was required. This chart shows that 18.3% of
the tasks will require from 21 to 40 minutes, and 50% of the tasks require
less than 70 minutes. However, the mean task time was about 147 minutes due
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to the effect of a few repairs that require a large amount of time. Approxi-
mately 90% of the tasks will take less than 360 minutes or 6 hours. The sim-
ulations for 180-day resupply intervals resulted in a mean task time of 152
minutes.
Analyses of the effects of failure rate differences on required mainte-
nance time were also conducted. The results of the computer simulation indi-
cated that doubling the failure rate would double the average daily mainte-
nance time. The same increase in failure rate, however, increased the mean
task time by approximately 3% and increased the 95 percentile task times by
approximately 5%.
Figure 5.3-10 shows the number of airlock uses during a 90-day resupply
interval for performing unscheduled maintenance. One airlock use was assumed
to be one complete cycle as required for each extravehicular activity (EVA)
task. A maximum stay-time of 3 hours was assumed for EVA, so that one air-
lock cycle was required for every 3 hours, or portion thereof, of the task.
This graph shows that during 66% of the 90-day intervals there was no un-
scheduled maintenance task that required EVA and associated airlock use. On
the average, a little less than one airlock use was required every 90 days
for unscheduled maintenance, and the maximum expected airlock usage was ii
times during any one 90-day period, which occurred during one of the i00 runs.
This represents a 1% probability of ii airlock uses being required during any
one 90-day interval. For comparison, the data for 180-day intervals was:
45% of the intervals require no airlock usage, the average was 1.6 uses every
180 days, and the maximum was 12 uses.
In conjunction with EVA for unscheduled maintenance, the manhours of
spacesuit use were recorded. This data is shown in Figure 5.3-11. It was
assumed that all EVA tasks required at least two men. Again, 66% of the 90-
day intervals did not require EVA and therefore the use of spacesuits. The
mean usage was 3.9 manhours per 90-day interval, with a maximum of 61 man-
hours that 0ccurred on one of the i00 runs. For the 180-day runs, the mean
was 7.2 and the maximum 65 manhours.
5.3.2 1985 L1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
/
\
The 1985 mission simulation was performed for resupply intervals of 180
and 360 days. The baseline mission was assumed to have a 180-day resupply
interval; therefore, the charts shown are generally for 180 days. Comments
are made where differences were noted for a 360-day resupply interval. For
each resupply interval i00 simulation runs were made.
Table 5.3-12 summarizes the unscheduled maintenance crew skill require-
ments. The mean days between skill use (8.5), the average minutes per skill
use (138), and the average minutes per day (16.2) are all lower for this
mission than for the 1975 baseline mission. The life support system, elec-
trical/electronic, and mechanical skills account for about 30%, 27%, and 22%,
respectively, of the total repair time, but for any one skill the average is
less than 5 minutes per day. Again, this workload is relatively insignificant.
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Table 5.3-13 summarizes the unscheduled maintenance requirements by sub-
system. Again, the life support subsystem accounts for the major workload,
42% of the total. The inflight test subsystem, while creating 25% of the
failures, only accounts for 16% of the repair time. The statistics for the
subsystems indicate some variations from the 1975 mission, but in general
they compare favorably.
Figure 5.3-14 illustrates the expected spares weight use foe 180- and
360-day resupply periods. The maximum expected use for 360 days is 150 kilo-
grams. Therefore, if the expected maximum of 120 kilograms is used for one
180-day interval, the expected maximum use for the next 180 days should not ,
/
be over 30 kilograms (150 minus 120). A summary of the data shown in the •....
figure, in terms of a percent of the initial weight added to the system for _
la 99% probability of mission success, is presented in the table below. - '_
I # ',
PREDICTED SPARES USAGE
Resupply
Interval
180 days
360 days
Initial Added Wt-
kg (0.99 PM_)
1489
1861
Spares Weight Used---kg (% initial weight)
Minimum Mean Maximum
i0 (0.7) 27 (1.8) 120 (8.i)
20 (i.i) 55 (3.0) 150 (8.1)
These values in all cases are considerably less, both in terms of weight
and percentage of initial weight, than that shown for the 1975 mission. Again,
this is a result of the improvements in component reliability and component
weight that were assumed for the 1985 time period. As noted in Figure 5.3-14,
the system MTBF for the 1985 mission is 248 hours, compared with 160 hours for
the 1975 mission. The added system weight of 1489 kilograms compares with
2058 kilograms for the 1975 mission 180-day resupply interval.
Figure 5.3-15 shows the distribution that can be expected of repair times
on a daily has,is. On 90.5% of the days of the mission there will be no repair
actions required because of unscheduled failures and on 4.1% of the days, 1
manhour or less will be required. The mean daily repair time will be about
0.27 manhour. On only 3% of the mission days will the unscheduled maintenance
time exceed 2.5 manhours. The statistics for the 360-day resupply period com-
pared very closely with 0.3%.
Figure 5.3-16 shows the distribution of the repair task times for 9.5% of
the days on which unscheduled maintenance is expected to be required. This
chart indicates that most of the tasks, about 26.2%, will require 30 minutes
or less. The mean task time is 2.3 hours, 67% of the unscheduled maintenance
tasks will require 2 hours or less, and 95% will require less than 9 hours.
The 360-day simulations resulted in a mean repair time of 2.25 hours.
Figure 5.3-17 presents the number of airlock uses expected during any
one 180-day interval. It points out that 28% of the 180-day periods will re-
quire no airlock use for unscheduled maintenance; the maximum airlock use that
occurred 1% of the time is between 20 and 25 for any one 180-day period. The
statistics for the 360-day simulations show 14% of the time no airlock use is
÷D2-I13204-2
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required, the average is 4.7 airlock use every 360 days, and the maximum is
still 20 to 25, but this occurred only 2% of the time.
Figure 5.3-18 shows the expected manhours of spacesuit use required for
any one 180-day interval. The average spacesuit use is 12.4 manhours every
180 days, 95% of the time 40 or less manhours are required, and 1% of the
time a maximum of 121 to 140 manhours of spacesuit use will be required during
180 days. The 360-day simulation runs showed an average of 18.5 manhours, the
95% point was 70 manhours or less, and the maximum was 141 to 160.
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6.0 EFFECTS OF MISSION PARAMETERS AND MAINTENANCE ON
REPRESENTATIVE INTERPLANETARY MISS IONS
A number of different missions, as described in other existing studies,
were evaluated for mission concepts, goals, operational characteristics, per-
sonnel and hardware requirements, and depth of detailed information to estab-
lish representative and workable baseline missions that could be analyzed in
this study. Volume III of this report presents a detailed discussion of the
missions selected, spacecraft configuration analyses and selections, and the
spacecraft subsystem analyses. It is necessary to review this information
and examine the MARCEP data sheets and maintenance task analysis sheets (also
contained in Volume III) to appreciate fully the depth of data that was used
as a background for the study analyses.
The effect of varying major mission/system parameters was investigated
at the system level. These parameters included mission duration, weight, vol-
ume, mean repair time, and required level of repair confidence. In evaluating
the effects of the mean repair time, gross errors in the estimation of repair
times were assumed and applied as factors to the baseline repair times. The
results of investigating the system-level effects of parametric variations
are presented in Section 6.1 for the interplanetary class of missions.
Scheduled maintenance activity will have an effect on mission require-
ments. In particular, scheduled maintenance will affect crew workload and the
weight of expendables required to conduct the mission. These aspects of sched-
uled maintenance are discussed in Section 6.2.
The effects of unscheduled maintenance on overall mission requirements
were evaluated by conducting a series of simulations where the mission was ex-
amined under simulated real-time conditions. In the simulations, failures
were allowed to occur randomly and statistics on queuing, resource expendi-
tures, and maint_nanre time (which ...... I°_ determined w_.__l.._ ..... J
................ _=_u L_±yj were LeuuLu-
ed. The results of these investigations are presented in Section 6.3.
As a result of evaluating the effects of various parameters on the mis-
sion requirements, it was possible to make a preliminary estimate of the space-
craft weight and the launch payload requirements for each mission. Table 6.0-1
presents a mission weight summary for the 1975 Mars/Venus flyby mission. Table
6.0-2 presents a mission weight summary for the 1985 Mars landing mission.
These mission and launch requirements are discussed in more detail in Volume
III.
6.1.1
6.1 EFFECTS OF VARYING SELECTED MISSION/SYSTEM PARAMETERS
1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
The interplanetary spacecraft was analyzed for all the parametric varia-
tions considered for the 1975 near-Earth orbital vehicle, discussed in Section
5.1.1.
101
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Table 6.0-1: 1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION WEIGHT SUMMARY
SPACECRAFT WEIGHTS
Mission Module, Earth Entry Module, Service Module,
Basic nonredundant weight
Experiments:
fueled probes;
Mars
Venus
7951 kg (17,508 ib)
4960 kg (10,922 Ib)
Expendables; including cryogenic 0^ and N_ tanks
z z '
food, water, filters, wicks, etc.
Spares and redundancies for 0.99 probability of success
Crew at 86 kg each
Total Unfueled Spacecraft Weight
Midcourse Correction Fuel (I = 305; V = 762 m/sec)
sp
Total Fueled Spacecraft Weight
Weight at End of Mission (S/C less probes and
midcourse fuel)
EARTH-ORBITAL WEIGHTS
Spacecraft
Mars Vector Stage (Kick Stage)
dry weight 12,258 (26,992)
fuels 162,719 (358,307)
I = 305,V = 3680 m/sec
sp
Injection Stage
dry weight 43,130 (94,972)
fuels 532,097 (1,171,678)
I = 410,V = 4100 m/sec
sp
Kilograms
28,256
17,568
7,440
4,134
516
57,914
26,063
83,977
45,003
83,977
174,977
575,277
Total Orbital Mass 834,181
÷D2-I13204-2
Table 6.0-2: 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION WEIGHT SUMMARY
Spacecraft Weights
Mission Module, Mars Excursion Module, Earth
Entry Vehicle, Service Module, Basic nonredundant
weight
Experiments
Exp endab les
Spares and Redundancies for 0.99 PMS
Crew at 86 kg each
Total Unfueled Spacecraft Weight
Kilograms
69,197
3,190
8,200
3,528
688
84,803
÷D2-I13204-2
Figure 6.1-1 shows the optimal weight growth of the spacecraft from a
single-thread system to a system enhanced by redundancies and spares. The
added weight is plotted against mission probabilities (crew survival and suc-
cess) for various mission durations. The probability scale is an inverted log
scale wherein 1.0 is at infinity, which was chosen because it allows greater
plotting accuracy and visibility in the prime area of interest, that is, the
higher probabilities. It is interesting to note that the growth curves closely
approximate straight lines. Consistent irregularities in the family of curves,
where the curve slopes change slightly, are due to transient stagnation of the
optimization process caused by a heavy item (or items) that suppresses the reli-
ability growth when the optimal selection of that component is delayed because of
its weight. The component that caused the irregularity at approximately 80%
probability on the crew survival curves was the Brayton cycle power conversion
unit (PCS) in the electrical power subsystem. It is expected that if all com-
ponents identified for optimization were of equivalent weight, the curve plot-
ted would be indistinguishable from a straight line. This leads one to believe
that the optimal selection sequence* for a given system of components will be
cyclical, with a repetitive subsequence. This, of course, assumes that the
ultimate probability is not limited by components with fixed probability val-
ues. If the optimal selection sequence is cyclical, once the average slope
of the curve is determined the curve can be linearly extrapolated to determine
the weight that must be added to achieve any desired probability. The mission
success curves of Figure 6.1-1 seem to belie this statement. This is because
the mission success probabilities are limited by certain components in the crew
system that have fixed reliabilities less than 1.0, causing the curves ulti-
mately to become asymptotic to the lowest fixed value.
Figure 6.1-2 presents by subsystem the end result of the optimization of
the 550-day baseline mission to a 0.99 probability of mission success. Initial,
or nonredundant, subsystem weights are shown by the solid bars and the weight
of spares and selected redundancies added is shown by the cross-hatched bars.
It is interesting to compare the data management weights for this mission with
the data management weights shown for the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission in
uaLdJ._IU
_u_= . i,_ _,±L±_ w_±_.L of L,_ spZLIL=_p±=LI=L_zy acecraft m_,age-
ment subsystem is higher than that for the orbital vehicle because of some ad-
ditional items considered as part of the subsystem. In spite of this, the
added weight for the interplanetary subsystem is lower than that for the orbi-
tal subsystem. This is because of a basic difference in the maintenance phi-
losophy for the two subsystems. The orbital subsystem is structured so that
the on-board computer and the data adapter are replaceable as complete units
only. This accounts for the large amount of added weight, because these items
are the most massive items in the subsystem and they are spared as complete
units. In the interplanetary mission a different approach was taken. The
computer and data adapter were arbitrarily modularized into replaceable sub-
units. This resulted in a remarkable reduction in the weight of spares added
to support the mission. The greatest disparity between initial weight and
* This is an optimal process only within the boundaries of the component
system described.
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added weight occurred in the experiment, reentry, extravehicular activity, and
structure subsystems. This is because these subsystems were supported almost
entirely by repair kits. Repair kits were planned because it was considered
unrealistic to spare or make redundant major elements of the spacecraft struc-
ture, or similar items from the experiment, reentry, and extravehicular activ-
ity subsystems. The communications subsystem was the only subsystem that re-
quired more than the basic weight to beadded to achieve the 0.99 mission suc-
cess pr0bablity. This was in part due to the high failure rate and the
weight of the 500-watt transmitter. Six spare transmitters were added for a
total weight penalty of 54 kilograms.
Figure 6.1-3 investigates the sensitivity of mission duration, and
added weight of spares and selected redundancies, to gross errors in the esti-
mated repair task times. It can be seen that a 50% underestimation of all re-
pair task times (MTTR = 1.5) results in only a 200-kilogram increase in added
weight for a 550-day mission. The added weight results from addition of com-
ponents in parallel and standby redundancy rather than as spares when the de-
sired confidence of repair cannot be attained within the maximum allowable
downtime. The confidence requirements for this sensitivity investigation
were 0.99 for repair of safety critical components and 0.95 for all other com-
ponents. Repair confidence levels and their application in this study are
discussed in Section 3.3 of this document.
In a similar manner, Figures 6.1-4 and 6.1-5 show the sensitivity of
added weight (and volume) and mission duration to variations in the required
repair confidence levels. The confidence levels investigated were: 0.9999/
0.999; 0.999/0.99; _0.99/0.95; 0.95/0.90; 0.90/0.80; and 0.80/0.70 for safety
critical/other components, respectively. There was no distinguishable differ-
ence between the added weights for confidences 0.99/0.95 and 0.95/0.90, and
0.90/0.80 and less. This is because of the combination of components, their
repair task times, and the maximum allowable downtimes specified for this mis-
sion. The added weight for a specific mission is not as sensitive to repair
confidence as was originally anticipated. The penalty caused by increasing
the repair confidences from 0.99/0.95 to 0.9999/0.999 was only o_u............_±±og_am_
Conversely, the reduction of repair confidence below 0.99/0.95 resulted in re-
latively minor gains. This seemed to indicate that a repair confidence of
0.99/0.95 is practical to specify for design of repairable spacecraft items.
The incremental weights gained or.lost in changing from one confidence level
to another are independent of mission duration, as indicated by the curves.
This also substantiates the use of 0.99/0.95 repair confidences as a best
choice for specifications, even though the percentage gain through the use of
a lower confidence at shorter mission times is greater. The above discussion
applies similarly to the volume curves shown in Figure 6.1-5.
Figure 6.1-6 was derived for one mission only; the 1975 interplanetary
mission. This figure provides a means of estimating the additional weight
that must be added to a mission vehicle to achieve a desired probability of
crew survival for a given mission duration. This figure applies only to a
flyby mission module, the midcourse propulsion package, and the Earth reentry
vehicle. The percentage found from the curves is the percentage weight that
Rev: 9-19-67
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must be added to the basic (nonredundant and dry) weight of the mission module,
midcourse propulsion package, and Earth reentry vehicle. The figure should be
used for planning and sizing purposes only, and in these uses should give rea-
sonably good results, assuming the maintenance concept for the manned vehicle
is not widely divergent from that specified for the 1975 interplanetary mis-
sion of this study.
6.1.2 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Figure 6.1-7 is a 1985 version of Figure 6.1-1. The four mission time
ivariations were selected because they are for specific Mars-capture trajecto-
/ries with a 30-day Mars stay-time. It can be seen that slightly less addition-
al weight is required to achieve the prerequisite 99% probability of crew sur-
vival than was required for the 1975 interplanetary mission. Improvements in
component weights, failure rates, and more modularization for maintenance were
assumed for 1985. One specific application of modularization was to the on-
board computer. The effects of this are discussed in more detail with Figure
6.1-12. The improvements established have more than balanced the larger crew
size (8), which accounts for the decrease in added weight. The weights added
to improve probability of mission success are significantly lower for 1985.
This is because the on-board experiment subsystem is smaller. No probes were
identified for this mission because of the planetary lander (MEM). This ex-
plains the low amount of weight added to improve mission success. Generally,
it was found that the curves of Figure 6.1-7 are not far different from the
1975 interplanetary mission analysis curves of Figure 6.1-1. The character-
istics of these curves are described in more detail in Section 6.1.1.
It should be noted here that the MEM was not considered in the curves
of Figure 6.1-7. The MEM mission is classified as a sub-mission whose proba-
bilities must be considered apart from the parent mission. The probability of
crew survival for the MEM sub-mission was assumed to be 99% according to the
following conditions. The MEM will be checked out in detail before launch. It
is assumed that the final check will ensure descent and ascent engine operation.
_^_= --_o_=__1_-" _ _e_ - _._M_ o_°y=_ems_-_.... _ __+_ during _,,_.... _-___.. is
assured by adding, by weight only, packages of redundancy and spares to the sub-
systems. The weight of the packages was estimated on a percentage basis from
the analysis of the 1975 30-day Earth-orbital mission (30-day resupply period).
Table 6.1-8 indicates the weights of the redundancy and spares packages esti-
mated for the MEM.
Figure 6.1-9 presents by subsystem the end results of the optimization
of the baseline 460-day mission. Comparison of this figure with Figure 6.1-2
shows the differences between the 1975 and 1985 interplanetary missions. The
electrical power subsystem initial weight is about i000 kilograms heavier than
for t--he1975 mission. This is due to the increased shield weight and component
weights required for the higher power levels of the mission. Included in the
basic weight is a single Brayton cycle power conversion assembly. Two are re-
quired for the mission, but only one is required for crew survival. The
weight of the second unit is included in the weight added. This unit was
added in parallel redundancy and will be operated at rated power for all
112
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Table 6.1-8:
Mars Planetary Lander Subsystems
PL 541
PL 542
PL 543
PL 544
PL 545
PL 546
PL 547
Electrical Power
Electronics
Instrumentation
Reaction Control
Stability Control
Life Support & Crew System
Communications
PL 548 Propulsion
PL 549 Navigation and Guidance
PL 550 Controls and Displays
Structure
Electrical Power
Electronics
Instrumentation
Reaction Control
Life Support & Crew Systems
Landing Gear
Parachutes
Payload
RCS Propellant
Descent Propellant
Structure
Electrical Power
Stability Control
Instrumentation
Reaction Control
Life Support & Crew Systems
Communications
Propulsion System (Common)
Payload
RCS Propellant
Ascent Propellant
Navigation and Guidance
Controls and Displays
TOTAL
MEM ALLOCATED WEIGHTS
Kilograms
Allocated Redundancy & Spares
46.65
22.2
31.95
37.50
3.08
114.75
10.88
123.30
11.93
6.80
409.04
Basic Descent Stage Weights
2479.0
395.0
296.0
340.0
268.0
985.0
926.0
3555.0
363.0
404.0
6016.0
16027.0
Basic Ascent Stage Weights
1135.0
227.0
/,1
_,0
86.0
232.0
545.0
145.0
1644.0
404.0
313.0
2508.0
159.0
91.0
17530.0
33_966.0
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experiment and nonessential equipment requirements. Switchover capability is
assumed so the second unit can carry essential loads if the first unit fails.
This concept is discussed in Section 1.4 of the Appendix, in relation to Figure
I-4. In spite of the increased power requirements and higher weights for this
mission, the weight added to the electrical power subsystem was approximately
the same as added for the 1975 interplanetary mission.
The life support subsystem shows an increase in initial weight, and a de-
crease in added weight. This is due to the increased crew size and improve-
ment in component MTBF's.
The data management subsystem shows a significant decrease in initial
weight. This decrease is due to elimination of many sensors, with the remain-
der assumed to be integral with other subsystems, and primarily due to reallo-
cation of the film developer rolls to the experiment subsystem. Thus, the de-
crease in initial weight is not due entirely to component weight improvements.
The navigation and guidance subsystem initial weight is about half that
for the 1975 mission due to design improvements. The added weight is far less
than that added for the 1975 mission due to decreases in component failure
rates expected between 1975 and 1985.
The experiment subsystem initial weight is well below that for the 1975
Mars/Venus flyby mission because the heavy probes are not required for the Mars
landing mission. The weight of repair kits added to the experiment subsystem
is about half that added for the 1975 mission.
The stability and control subsystem is initially heavier because of control-
moment gyros (CMG's) required to maintain orientation of the spacecraft with
respect to the Sun.
The remaining spacecraft subsystems compare well with the 1975 subsystems.
Differences in initial and added weights are due to the increased crew and im-
provements in component weights and failure rates.
Figure 6.1-10 shows the sensitivity of added weight with respect to vari-
ations in mission time and mean-time-to-repair. As explained in Section 6.1.1,
increasing mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) by a factor causes an increase in weight
added to get the same level of reliability. The increase in weight added is
due to additions of parallel and standby redundancy caused by failure to meet
required probabilities. MTTR times a factor of 4.0 was not evaluated; however,
the variations evaluated are not too different from the 1975 curves of Figure
6.1-3. The delta difference between added weights for MTTR times 1.0 and MTTR
times 1.5 appears to be about the same for the 1975 and 1985 time periods.
The difference is approximately i00 kilograms across all the mission times.
Figures 6.1-11 and 6.1-12 investigate the sensitivity of added volume to
variations in the MTTR, repair confidence, and mission time parameters. An
interesting anomaly is present on both of these figures. The rapid upswing
of the volume curve after 600 days mission time seems to indicate an asymptotic
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situation. Obviously this cannot be correct. It was found that this was
caused by the last component added for the 680-day mission. The component
happened to be the telescope and optical system required for the laser commu-
nications subsystem (item coded CM 183). This item is the reflecting tele-
scope tube and mirrors, and it is relatively light compared to its volume.
At 400 days, it had already been added as a spare assembly that accounts for
the high added volume at 400 days in comparison to the other missions. A
plateau is apparent between 400 and 600 days, where low volume items are be-
ing added. At 680 days, a second spare telescope assembly is added causing
the upswing. If longer mission times were examined, a second plateau would
be found, probably extending between 700 and about 1200 days.
It can be seen in Figure 6.1-12 that the upper two confidences share a
common curve, and that the lower two confidence levels share a common curve
beyond 550 days. Before 450 days, the 99% confidence level is coincident with
the 99.99% and 99.9% confidence levels, and crosses over to meet the 90% con-
fidence level line during the 450 to 550 day range. The broken line extensions
indicate the expected volume trend if the telescope tube and mirror assembly
were not spared at 680 days. In other analyses, high added weights have led
to modularization of assemblies and sparing of the modules. This is the first
apparent instance where volume effects seem to indicate the necessity for mod-
ularization. It appears reasonable that the telescope tube could be repaired
by kit rather than by replacement with a spare. The mirrors and other optics
could be designed to be replaceable, and spared individually.
Figure 6.1-11 shows the same characteristics noted for the curves of
Figure 6.1-12. It is interesting to note the similarity in the curve charac-
teristics and spacing on the two previous figures. This indicates the inter-
relationship of repair confidence level and component mean-time-to-repair.
The broken line extensions again indicate the expected volume trend if the
telescope tube assembly were not added at 680 days.
Weight sensitivity to mission time and changes in the required levels of
_ .......... cnce are sho_m on Figure 6.1-13. The conf _4 .... I_I= _=e_-
gated are the same as for the 1975 missions except that some of the lower levels
were eliminated. Confidence levels for the repair of safety critical compon-
ents of 0.9999, 0.999, 0.99, and 0.90 were investigated. Confidence levels for
nonsafety critical components were assumed as 0.999, 0.99, 0.95, and 0.80, re-
spectively. Investigation of the upper two confidences resulted in essentially
the same curve, as indicated in the figure. The curves did show a definite
curvature that was not apparent in the curves for the 1975 mission, (Figure
6.1-4). The scaling of the 1975 curves may have prevented determination of
the curvature. The curvature for the 1985 mission seems to approach a limit-
ing value. Logically, this cannot be the case until a completely time inde-
pendent, self-sustaining entity is produced. It is assumed that a temporary
plateau or transition is being approached, and if longer mission times were
analyzed, an upward trend would again be observed. The upper two confidence
curves are separated from the 0.99 (baseline) confidence curve by about i00
kilograms, which is about the same as the difference between the baseline, 0.99,
curve and the 0.999 curve for the 1975 mission. The whole spectrum of repair
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confidence curves leads one to the conclusion that the weight to be added
to the spacecraft is relatively insensitive to the repair confidence level, at
least up to a confidence of 0.9999. The overall change of about 200 kilograms
from 0.90 to 0.9999 confidence represents only 5.5% of the total weight added
for mission success.
6.2 EFFECTS OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ON OVERALL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
Scheduled maintenance, which by definition occurs at preplanned times
instead of randomly, could be determined directly from the maintenance task
analysis sheets included in Volume III. The following sections summarize the
scheduled maintenance requirements by subsystem, skill, maintenance interval,
and expendables weight allocation for the 1975 and 1985 planetary class mis-
sions.
6.2.1 1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Table 6.2-1 summarizes the scheduled maintenance requirements for this
mission within each frequency interval, by minutes required for each skill
level to perform the task. Where more than one task of a given type is indi-
cated by parentheses, the time shown is the total required. Also indicated on
this table is the subsystem code number of the item being serviced and the
service time by skill required to perform scheduled servicing. The code num-
ber refers to the identification used in the MARCEP data sheets included in
Volume III. Resources required to perform the scheduled maintenance are in-
dicated in Table 6.2-1 by the resource identification numbers, which are given
in Table 6.2-2. The resources most frequently used are the standard mainte-
nance tool kit and the vacuum system identified by Codes 1 and 2, respectively.
Lamps for various types of lighting equipment are shown as scheduled replace-
ment items, whereas they actually will not be replaced until they burn out.
The replacement schedule is based on the average expected lamp wearout life.
Table 6.2-3 summarizes the total man-minutes and average man-minutes per
day for the scheduled maintenance required at i- , 3- , 7- , 21- , 30- , and
90-day intervals for each subsystem. It is expected that these tasks could be
apportioned over all the days throughout the 550-day mission so that the time
expended per day could be evened out and a relatively constant scheduled main-
tenance load can be realized.
Table 6.2-4 summarizes required scheduled maintenance by skill and main-
tenance interval, indicating the total man-minutes required. These two tables
do not indicate scheduled maintenance requirements beyond 90 days; it is felt
that the maintenance actions occurring beyond 90 days are of an overhaul nature
and cannot be averaged out over the entire mission. Special mission planning
must be accomplished to accommodate scheduled maintenance actions occurring
at intervals greater than 90 days.
Detailed expendables requirements for a six-man flyby mission are listed
on data sheets in Volume III. Figure 6.2-5 summarizes these by subsystem, as
a function of mission duration.
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Table 6.2-2: MAINTENANCE RESOURCE CODE IDENTIFICATION
1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Maintenance Resource Code Number
Standard Tool Kit
Vacuum System
Space Power Tool Kit
Electron-Beam Welder
Stemfab Tool
Leak Detection Equipment
Temperature Measuring Device
Pressure Measuring Device
Water Test Kit
Battery Test Kit
Electrical Repair Kit
Lubrication Kit
7
8
9
l0
ii
12
Fabric Repair Kit
Airflow Meter
Life Saving Bag
Aux. Life Support System
Special Attachment and Towing Devices
MMU
13
14
15
16
17
18
RMU
AEV
Locomotion and Restraint
Insulation Repair Kit
Spare Fitting Kit
Spacesuit Repair Kit
19
20
21
22
23
24
Life Support System Repair Skill
Electrical/Electronic Repair Skill
Mechanical Rcpair i_11
Structural Repair Skill
Communications Repair Skill
Guidance and Control Repair Skill
Medical Skill
Scientist-Experiment Skill
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
÷ ÷
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6.2.2 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Tables 6.2-6, 6.2-8, and 6.2-9 tabulate the scheduled maintenance re-
quired by subsystem, task, and skill. It can be seen by comparing Table 6.2-6
with Table 5.2-4 for the 1985 L_ Libration Center mission that the require-I
ments for the two missions (spacecraft) are quite similar. The major points
of difference are in subsystems that are unique to the Mars landing mission.
The maintenance resources are again identified by number on Table 6.2-6. As
there are slight changes from the resources used for the 1975 missions, Table
6.2-7 is included to show the 1985 resources.
The Earth reentry vehicle will require use only at the end of the mission
and periodic inspection is less frequent than for the libration center mission.
The ERV will, however, require extensive checkout and preparation before Earth
reentry. This period of checkout will start at least a week before the ac-
tual reentry maneuver. The checkout will be made using spacecraft power,
thereby delaying battery drain until the ERV is separated from the spacecraft.
Supplies, experiment data, films, and samples from the Mars surface will be
loaded into the ERV after it has been checked out.
The electrical power subsystem and the propulsion system, which includes
the midcourse hardware and the reaction control thrust system, will require
periodic inspection. This requirement is common to the 1975 Mars/Venus flyby
mission, except that the period between inspections was increased. It may be
desirable to inspect the Mars capture and Mars departure propulsion modules
(PM2 and PM3) before use. However, this study has not established a definite
need for that action, and has not determined whether an adequate inspection
can in fact be made.
The most significant single scheduled maintenance item is the laser as-
sembly in the communications subsystem. This item is expected to have a use-
ful life of 2000 hours. Replacement is scheduled for 90 days, which is some-
what over 2000 hours. In practice it may be proper to delay replacement until
failure of the assembly or until the quality of the beam has fallen below ac-
ceptable standards. As an alternative, replacement could be planned for peri-
ods of low scientific and scheduled maintenance workload providing these
periods can be found 2000 hours, or less, apart. Scheduled replacement time
was estimated to be the same as unscheduled repair time, less an increment for
trouble-shooting. It seems possible that the actual replacement time can be
reduced by design of the transmitter structure, but this may be insignificant
if automatic alignment cannot be achieved. The present task time includes a
large amount of time allocated to realignment of the laser beam with the
pointing and tracking equipment.
Figure 6.2-10 summarizes expendables requirements for the 1985 Mars land-
ing mission. Details are given on a data sheet in Volume III.
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Table 6.2-7: MAINTENANCE RESOURCE CODE IDENTIFICATION
1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Maintenance Resource
Standard Tool Kit
Vacuum System
Space Power Tool Kit
Electron-Beam Welder
Stemfab Tool
Leak Detection Equipment
Temperature Measuring Device
Pressure Measuring Device
Water Test Kit
Battery Test Kit
Electrical Repair Kit
Lubrication Kit
Fabric Repair Kit
Airflow Meter
Safety Devices
Powered Locomotion Devices
Manual Locomotion and Restraint
Insulation Repair Kit
Spare Fitting Kit
Spacesuit Repair Kit
Life Support System Repair Skill
Electrical/Electronic Repair Skill
Mechanical Repair Skill
Structural Repair Skill
Communications Repair Skill
Guidance and Control Repair Skill
Medical Skill
Scientist-Experimental Skill
Code Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
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6.3 EFFECTS OF UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ON OVERALL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
A mission simulation model (described in Section 3.4) was used to deter-
mine the unscheduled maintenance requirements of the spacecraft and find ex-
pected effects of maintenance time, spares weight used, reliability, and main-
tenance resources on the mission. The spacecraft configuration simulated was
the same basic configuration optimized by the MARCEP analysis (Section 3.5).
For the simulation the fixed redundancies (parallel and standby redundancies)
identified by MARCEP were included in the configuration analyzed and allowed
to fail randomly. When an element of a redundant set failed it was repaired
with a spare if repair was allowable. Repair times were assumed to be dis-
tributed log-normally about the mean repair time specified for each repair-
able component on the MARCEP and maintenance task analysis sheets (included
in Volume III). Selection of specific repair times in the simulations was
done randomly.
The information presented in the following sections is based on at least
i00 simulations of each mission time. By performing many simulations, an au-
thoritative statistical base of expected unscheduled maintenance activities
was established. From the simulations crew skill requirements, subsystem un-
scheduled maintenance requirements, spares use, distributions of repair task
times and daily maintenance times, airlock use, and spacesuit use for unsched-
uled maintenance were determined for each of the planetary class of missions.
6.3.1 1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Unscheduled maintenance requirements according to skill required and ac-
cording to subsystem are shown in Tables 6.3-1 and 6.3-2. As indicated by the
first table, the average daily demands on any one skill are minimal. The high-
est demands are required of the electrical/electronic and mechanical skills
with 20.2 and 10.9 minutes/day average workload, respectively. However, the
average skilluse time for any discrete task taken at random is 186 minutes;
this figure considers both interior and exterior tasks. The average daily
workload is calculated by dividing the average skill use time by the mean time
between skill uses. Table 6.3-2 shows the unscheduled maintenance require-
ments by subsystem. When this and the previous table are compared, differ-
ences in the accumulated averages can be noted. The differences are because
the subsystem table, (Table 6.3-2) includes tasks that require more than one
workman employing simultaneous or overlapping skills. If each task had re-
quired only one repairman, the totals on each table would be exactly the same.
Figure 6.3-3 is a graphic presentation of Table 6.3-2.
In studying such complex missions, it is risky to plan on the basis of
averages alone. Averages do not give adequate visibility to queuing (the de-
lays caused by required resources being used on other tasks). It was found
that in i00 missions the life support skill was queued for three times with an
average delay of 32 minutes. More significant were the queues for electronic
and mechanical skills. The electrical/electronic skill was queued for 112
times, or slightly over once per mission. The average delay for this skill
was 498 minutes. The mechanical skill was queued for 16 times with an average
137
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delay of 663 minutes. Although at first glance this may seem excessive when
related to the average skill use time of 338 minutes (Table 6.3-1), it can be
explained by noting that the average use time was developed from nearly 1800
discrete mechanical skill requirements throughout i00 missions, wherein a
waiting period occurred on only 16 occasions. These occasions may have en-
tailed multiple queuing for the same skill, chance selections of repair time
requirements in the higher regions of the log-normal distribution curve, or
a combination of these factors. The only other skill queue recorded was for
the communications skill, which was queued for six times with an average delay
of 271 minutes. Some queues for hardware resources also were found. The major
item was a queue of 69 times for the electrical repair kit. The average delay
for this was 492 minutes. This seems reasonable because in most cases the
electrical/electronic skill (repairman) will be using the kit, therefore, the
queuing for the skill and for the kit are parallel rather than series queues.
Also, the figure can be rationalized in the same way as for the mechanical
skill queuing, considering that there were more than 9000 separate require-
ments during the i00 simulated missions. The information indicates that
queuing will not be a major problem; however, cross-training would be desirable
and the first skill to be cross-trained would be the electrical/electronic
skill. This skill should be cross-trained with one of the low-demand skills
such as guidance and control or scientific.
Figures 6.3-4 and 6.3-5 show the cumulative probability of spares use by
weight and volume for 450-, 550-, and 650-day missions. The range of values
and probability numbers represent what could be expected to occur in 150 years
of operation. By selecting the 95% cumulative probability point and reading
spares weight used, one can state with 95% confidence that the indicated weight
of spares, or less, will be used for that mission. By comparing the 95% con-
fidence level of spares weight used with the spares weight allocated by the
MARCEP analysis (Figure 6.1-1), it is found that about 15% of the MARCEP allo-
catedspares are actually used. The mean spares use is found to be about 7.5%
in a similar manner.
The irregularities in both the weight and volume curves of Figures 6.3-4
and 6.3-5 are caused by relatively heavy, high volume, items. When these items
are consumed, weight and volume increase rapidly with a small increase in the
"cumulative use probability. As mission times are increased the probability
of using the heavy items increases and the curves will acquire a smoothing
trend.
The daily repair time distribution for unscheduled maintenance is shown
by Figure 6.3-6. No unscheduled maintenance is required on 80.4% of the mis-
sion days, as shown in the figure. This compares well with the 1975 near-Earth
mission that showed 86.2% of the mission days requiring no unscheduled main-
tenance. The mean of the distribution was found to be 47 man-minutes per day.
Figure 6.3-7 shows the distribution of task times for the days on which
unscheduled maintenance occurred. The figure indicates that the mean for all
tasks performed was 2.75 hours (161 minutes) per task. The largest task time
recorded was i00 hours. This occurred during replacement of the inertial plat-
form. The normal replacement time for the item is i0 hours and requires two
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men. The replacement time includes fault isolation to the platform itself and
alignment of the new unit after replacement. By chance, the task time deter-
mined for this item when it failed happened to be i0 times the expected normal
requirement. One can rationalize that the extreme task time was due to prob-
lems in isolating the fault to the platform and difficulties in getting the
new platform aligned.
The distribution of airlock uses for unscheduled maintenance for the 550-
day mission is shown by Figure 6.3-8. The mean number of uses for all the sim-
ulation runs was 28 uses per mission. The 95th percentile of the distribution
was found to be 48 uses per mission, which means that 95% of all missions will
require no more than 48 airlock uses for unscheduled maintenance. One airlock
use is assumed to be a complete egress-ingress cycle for two extravehicular
repairmen.
Manhours of spacesuit use for unscheduled maintenance are shown by Figure
6.3-9. All tasks external to the pressurized areas are assumed to require
two men for safety purposes. In some cases two and even three men are re-
quired to perform the maintenance task. This is reflected in the distribution
of spacesuit manhours of use. The mean spacesuit use was found to be 120 man-
hours of use per mission.
6.3.2 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Unscheduled maintenance requirements for the 1985 Mars landing mission
are shown in Tables 6.3-10 and 6.3-11. The general description of these tables
is the same as provided for the 1975 mission in Section 6.3.1. It is inter-
esting to note that percent of total repair time accrued by each skill showed
a leveling trend in Table 6.3-i0_ in comparison with the trend for the 1975
mission shown in Table 6.3-1. The most probable explanation is that improve-
ments for the 1985 time period in components with high failure rates during
the 1975 mission caused most of the leveling, and the reduction in repair time
for the more lengthy tasks accounted for the rest of the leveling. Unexpec-
tedly, the total average minutes/skill use in Table 6.3-10 increased from the
186 minutes/skill use shown for the 1975 mission. It has been determined that
this was caused by elimination of many short duration tasks performed in the
1975 mission, thus biasing the average upwards. The trend in the average min-
utes per day and in the mean days between tasks was downward as expected. The
medical skill showed a significant decrease. This was because the skill was
used to assist in maintenance on the biological probes carried on the Mars/
Venus flyby mission, and on the 1985 mission this would not be a requirement.
The trends shown in Table 6.3-11 are as expected. It can be seen that
there appears to be a discrepancy in the last three entries for the propulsion
systems. This is because the propulsion system experienced a significant num-
ber of failures that were not repairable. Average minutes per failure should
be read in this case as average minutes per repairable failure. All of the
failures noted as nonrepairable were in items with redundancies provided. The
highest number of such failures were noted for the tank bladders that were
added within the tanks as fixed redundancies during the MARCEP analysis runs
made previously. Figure 6.3-12 i_ a graphic presentation of the information
show_ in Table 6.3-11.
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Queuing also was reduced below that shown for the 1975 mission. LS, E/E,
ME, and G&C skills were queued for 2, 4, 3, and 1 times, respectively. The
average delay times for each queue recorded were 123, 659, 490, and 60 minutes !
for the respective systems. Again, the most promising field for cross-train-
ing is the electrical/electronic skill field. The general problem of queuing
is even less important than it was for the 1975 mission. Hardware queues were
shown for the vacuum system and the electrical repair kit only; these queued
4 and 3 times, respectively, with average delay times of 536 and 380 minutes.
In actual practice the vacuum system would not be used throughout a single
repair task and could be shared between tasks. Also, it will probably be a
built-in system with multiple intake connections, and could be used for a
variety of purposes simultaneously.
Figure 6.3-13 shows the spares use for the 1985 Mars landing mission.
This curve can be compared with the curves for the 1975 Mars/Venus flyby
mission, Figure 6.3-4. The mean of the usage curve for 1985 is less than half
that for the 450-day mission simulated in the 1975 analysis. A better point
of comparison is the 95 percentile point that shows that 340-kilogram use is
expected for 1985 versus 520 for the 1975 450-day simulation. This is a 35%
decrease from the 1975 value. The improvement is caused by improved failure
rates and low component weights ms well as modularization of some system ele-
ments. The maximum weight of spares used on any of the i00 simulated missions
was 490 kilograms, which is a 32% decrease below the 1975 value.
Figure 6.3-14 shows the daily repair time distribution determined by the
simulation of the 1985 Mars landing mission. As indicated on the figure, no
maintenance will be required on approximately 92% of the mission days. One
manhour or less maintenance time will be required on 3.5% of the mission days
and 4.2% of the days will require over 1 manhour of maintenance. In the simu-
lation of the 1975 mission, approximately 10% of the mission days required
more than 1 manhour of maintenance time. It should be remembered that the
maintenance times discussed here, in fact all the maintenance times deter-
mined by the SSmulation runs, are unscheduled maintenance times. This un-
scheduled workload is in addition to the scheduled maintenance and servicing,
which is known and planned for. When comparing the unscheduled with the
scheduled workload, the unscheduled work load appears to be insignificant.
The mean unscheduled!workload distributed over all the mission days is 18
man-minutes per day.
On the 8% of the mission days that required maintenance, it was found
that 50% of these days required tasks that took 1 hour or less, as illustrated
by Figure 6.3-15. It is interesting to note that the 50 percentile point is
at 1 hour, although the mean task time is at 2.6 hours. In this case there
are a few infrequent long task times that increase the mean. These longer
times are evident at the far right of the distribution. Representative of
this is the 1% probability of encountering a task that takes between 20 and
60 hours. On the average, one might expect this to occur once every i00
missions.
Figure 6.3-16 shows the number of airlock uses that can be expected per
460-day mission. As indicated, 6% of the missions recorded no airlock uses
152
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for unscheduled maintenance. The mean of the distribution is 11.4 uses per
mission, or rounded off so no one gets left outside, ii uses per mission.
Each use is a complete egress-ingress cycle for at least two men. A more
meaningful point to look at for planning, is the 95 percentile point. In
this distribution the 95 percentile is 34 uses. This means that 95% of all
missions will use the airlock 34 or less times for unscheduled maintenance.
Figure 6.3-17 is a companion to Figure 6.3-16 and shows the spacesuit
manhours accumulated per mission. The mean here is 60 manhours per mission.
The 95 percentile is 192 manhours per mission. If one assumes an equivalent
number of hours for experiments and 50 hours for scheduled maintenance inspec-
tions, it is found that up to 300 kilograms of suit cooling water can be re-
claimed by providing external suit connections at appropriate points. The
possibility of suit modification and the weight of plumbing to external con-
nections should be investigated, but it is likely that a net weight savings
could be found.
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Z.O GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING SUBSYSTEM
MA INTENANCE CONCEPTS
During this study it became apparent that recommendation of an overall or
spacecraft-level maintenance concept was difficult because of the exceptions
that must be made for individual subsystems. It was decided that recommendation
of maintenance concepts at the subsystem level would be more useful. Even at
the subsystem level, exceptions to a recommended concept were found, but these
could be moreeasily identified.
Recommendations given here for subsystem maintenance concepts are based
on the various analyses and simulations conducted during the study, and upon
insights into spacecraft/equipment configuration and operation gained during
the structuring of the four mission spacecraft.
7.1 GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS FOR
EARTH-ORBITAL MISSIONS
A maintenance concept matrix for each of the Earth-orbit missions, the
1975 near-Earth orbital mission and the 1985 L 1 Libration Center mission, is
presented in Figures 7.1-1 and 7.1-2. Each matrix summarizes the maintenance
concepts for the subsystems of the particular mission. Section 3.4.1 defines
the "0" through "3" degrees of maintenance categories used in the chart. On
the matrices, the recommended concepts are noted by heavy lines and the letter
"R." Specific exceptions to the recommended concept are shown under the appro-
priate degree of maintenance. The notation "FS" indicates a need for further
detailed study into the recommended maintenance concept or concepts for a
particular system or component. It should also be noted that the maintenance
concepts recommended are applicable only for unscheduled maintenance require-
ments. The:maintenance concepts and considerations associated with each of the
subsystems foK the Earth-orbital missions are discussed in more detail in the
following paragraphs.
The subsystems used for the 1985 L1 Libration Center mission are generally
the same as for the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission. In many instances, an
improvement in reliability was indicated for the 1985 time period because of
expected advances in technology by that time. This reliability improvement
resulted in a decrease in the expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for
the total system from 163 hours MTBF for the 1975 mission to 244 hours MTBF for
the 1985 mission. This also resulted in a reduction of the average unscheduled
maintenance time per day from 22.5 to 16.2 minutes. Summaries of the relative
maintenance workloads of each subsystem are given in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Modularization for a number of components was also analyzed for the 1985 mission.
The results of this analysis are discussed in Section 5.1.
The following sections discuss (i) each of the 1975 subsystems and (2) the
differences, as applicable, for the 1985 subsystems.
i
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7.1.1 COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM
Degree "i" maintenance (standby redundancy) is generally recommended for
the 90-day resupply 1975 mission and 1985 180-day resupply because of the low
spares required to achieve the required reliability. Exceptions were for the
intercom and TV equipment which it would not be practical to make redundant.
For the 1985 mission it is recommended that a repair capability be provided for
the parabolic antenna. Also, for longer mission times, Degree "2" maintenance
becomes more practical than Degree "i."
All components of this system, except for the antennas, are located within
pressurized areas of the spacecraft which are occupied by the crew. Access to
the components will generally be good and replacement can be accomplished in a
shirtsleeve environment. Replacement or maintenance of the antennas will
require EVA, and therefore must be accomplished within the constraints of a
pressurized spacesuit and backpack (PLSS). However, with the low failure rate
of the antennas, it is expected there will be no more than one, and probably
not any, random antenna failure during a 5-year mission. Because of the hazard
presented, there is some possibility of damaging an antenna during EVA or dock-
ing operations with a logistics vehicle, but again, an antenna failure from
these causes is expected to be slight. The expected unscheduled maintenance
frequency for the 1975 baseline communications system is 2132 hours (89 days).
The components expected to require the most unscheduled maintenance are the
intercom control panels; there is a 75% probability that one will have to be
replaced during any one 90-day period. Therefore, this item should be designed
for easy replacement or repair.
It appears that two of the heavier components, the multiplexer and the digi-
tal command receiver/decoder, could be modularized, resulting in a reduction
of the initial spares weight. However, the computer program indicated only one
of each was required for a 99% probability of mission success. Therefore,
modularizing these components may not be justified. There was no scheduled
maintenance required for the communications system.
The inclusion of a 10-foot parabolic steerable antenna in the 1985 system
is the only change that will affect maintenance of this system. Any malfunc-
tions of the pointing mechanism or motors will require EVA to replace the
faulty item. Therefore, design of equipment must take this into consideration.
There may also be a requirement to lubricate the pointing mechanisms, but this
should be avoided if possible. The MARCEP analysis indicated there would be a
requirement for a spare antenna, in order to achieve 99% probability of mission
success.
The spare antenna may present some storage problems unless it is designed
to be collapsible, or can be stored in a disassembled condition and then easily
reassembled if needed. Another alternative is to omit such a spare initially,
but to include one in a resupply mission if the requirement arose. However, it
is believed maintenance of the antenna could best be done by providing a repair
capability. Therefore, it was recommended that the antenna be designed for
repair. If a total loss of transmission or receiving capability occurred which
could not be repaired with the maintenance equipment provided, communications
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could still be maintained by using the reentry system command module equipment.
_This would result in some degradation of capability but it might be tolerated
until the next resupply mission. This antenna will also present some hazard to
personnel while they are working outside the spacecraft. Possible mechanical
or shadowing interference between the antenna and solar panels must also be
considered in the system design.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1985 system is
4936 hours (205 days). The components causing the most failures are the inter-
com control panel and the TV camera, which have a 38% and 32% probability,
respectively, of failing during any one 180-day resupply interval.
7.1.2 CREW SYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance (remove and replace) is recommended for this system
except for some items which are more practical to repair as noted in the
matrices.
All of the equipment considered as part of this system is located within
pressurized areas occupied by the crew, and access to the equipment will be good.
Disposable garments are used to eliminate the need for washing and drying equip-
ment, and to decrease the workload of the crew. Film viewing equipment is in-
cluded with the crew system for recreational microfilm reading material. How-
ever, it appears this function could be incorporated in the file unit console
viewer of the data management system. The expected unscheduled maintenance
frequency for the 1975 crew system is 50,000 hours (2080 days).
Scheduled maintenance attributed to the crew system includes general inte- I
rior cleaning of the spacecraft; inspection and/or cleaning of vacuum cleaners,
fire extinguishers, and film projectors; and replacement of some lamps. Because
of limited life, it is expected that an average of two fluorescent and one incan-
descent lamp will have to be replaced every 90 days. The crew system scheduled-
maintenance amounts to about 53 man-minutes per day. Most of this time results
from the general interior cleaning function which has been listed as a weekly
requirement. It may very well be that future space flights will indicate this
task is not necessary, or with proper operational procedures can be performed
at less frequent intervals. Any improvement in this area will significantly
reduce the scheduled maintenance workload. An additional 60 man-minutes will
be required at resupply intervals for replenishment of crew clothing and per-
sonal items.
There is no significant change in the 1985 system except for increasing
some facilities to support the 12-man crew. The expected unscheduled mainte-
nance frequency is 48,850 hours (5.6 years).
7.1.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance (remove and replace) is recommended for all of this
system with the added recommendation that the electronic equipment be modular-
ized as much as possible. All components of this system are located in pres-
surized areas occupied by the crew, and access to the equipment will be good.
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The computer and data adapter are relatively heavy items with high failure
rates, and therefore a number of spares are required to ensure a 99% proba-
bility of successful operation throughout the mission. Modularization of these
items resulted in a considerable savings in initial spares weight requirements
as explained in Section 5.1. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the com-
puter and data adapter be designed to permit ready identification of failures
to a module level and easy replacement of the module.
The typewriter is a fairly complex device that requires thorough training
in its repair. If this maintenance capability exists, then parts of typewriters
could be spared, instead of complete typewriters, with a resulting savings in
spares weight. However, it is believed the savings in weight cannot be justi-
fied by the added crew training costs. The MARCEP analysis indicated three
spare typewriters would be required for 99% probability of mission success for
180 days. However, since mission success will not be seriously curtailed by
temporary loss of this function, it is recommended that only one spare be car-
ried on board. Additional spares can be brought up as required on the resupply
vehicles. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 data
management system is 2500 hours (108 days). The component expected to fail
most frequently is the data adapter; there is a 59% probability of failure
during any one 90-day period, based on the simulation program results. Modu-
larization will decrease the maintenance time of this item also.
Scheduled maintenance on this system consists of inspecting and cleaning
the typewriter, console viewer, and film projection/scanner unit, and replacing
projection lamps. This scheduled maintenance averages out to just over 1 man-
minute per day.
There is no significant change in the 1985 system except for a consider-
able improvement in reliability and capability. The expected unscheduled main-
tenance frequency is 7867 hours (328 days).
7.1.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system except for the items
noted in the matrices. All components of this system, except for the solar
panels, are located in the pressurized storage compartment located between the
crew living area and the operational area. Access doors are provided to facili-
tate maintenance of this equipment. Interconnecting wiring that could possibly
require repair or modification will be connected using wire-wrap techniques for
high reliability and easily repairable connections. These techniques will pre-
clude the need for wire soldering equipment and its associated problems.
It is assumed that there will be no capability of repairing the solar
panels while in orbit. Therefore, the solar panels must be designed initially
to provide the required power for a 5-year period assuming expected degradation.
The solar panels will present some hazard to crew members working outside the
spacecraft and to logistics vehicles during docking operations. If extensive
damage does occur, the situation will have to be evaluated to determine:
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a)
b)
c)
whether operations can be continued until a logistics vehicle can bring the
necessary equipment to accomplish a repair;
if repair cannot be accomplished, then possibly operation at a reduced
power level will be required, perhaps with a smaller crew, to continue the
mission; or
if the spacecraft must be abandoned and the crew returned to Earth.
In any case, it is apparent that adequate procedures for docking operations and
movement of extravehicular crew members must be devised to preclude the possi-
bility of solar panel damage.
The computer analysis indicated that some redundancy of the main electri-
cal power contactors, inverters, and voltage regulators would be required to
ensure continuous availability of electrical power. The anticipated battery
life is 1 year. Therefore, scheduled replacement of all six batteries will be
required each year, and one inverter will require replacement every 2 years.
The 1975 electrical power system scheduled maintenance amounts to 1550 man-
minutes (25.8 manhours) per year. An improvement in the battery state of the
art to increase the service life is required to substantially reduce the sched-
uled replacement workload. Also, because of the existing scheduled replace-
ment requirements, it is necessary that good access be provided for replacing
the batteries. Procedures must be established for isolating the battery to be
replaced and for distributing the power demands over the remaining batteries.
Unscheduled maintenance of batteries between scheduled replacements will
consist of replacing defective battery cells. It is necessary to replace
failed cells promptly as they can cause gassing, excessive pressure buildup,
and possible cell rupture. Replacement of a cell will result in isolating the
battery from the power system for about 24 hours. Initially, i0 to 15 hours
are required to allow internal pressures to dissipate, and then conditioning
of the battery will be required to ensure that the old and new cells are in a
similar state of charge. However, the demands on crew time are expected to be
only about 2.5 manhours.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 electrical
power system is 11,848 hours (494 days). The battery charge regulators, fuse
and circuit breakers, and module interconnecting wiring failed the most fre-
quently in the mission simulation program, but even then the probability of a
failure during a 90-day period was only 3% for each of these components.
The only significant changes in this system for the 1985 mission are a
slight decrease in solar panel area and a decrease in batteries from 6 to i.
The battery life was also increased to 2 years which will considerably reduce
the scheduled maintenance requirements of this system. Since only one battery
is in the basic system, and its operating cycle is not as severe as for 1975,
battery cell replacement was not considered. The MARCEP analysis indicated one
spare battery would be required to achieve a 99% probability of mission success
over a 180-day resupply period. It is thought in this case that the spare
should actually be wired into the power system. Then, if the basic battery
fails, the other would be adequate to provide operational requirements until
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the next resupply, at which time a replacement could be brought up. The expect-
ed unscheduled maintenance frequency is 20,000 hours (2.3 years). The items
that failed most in the simulation were fuses and circuit breakers, which had
an 8% probability of failure during any one 180-day interval.
7.1.5 EXPERIMENT SYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system. A detailed mainte-
nance analysis of the experiment packages is beyond the scope of this study.
Further detailed study will be required to define specific maintenance require-
ments of experiments. In fact, the maintenance of equipment used in experi-
ments may actually be considered as part of the experiment itself. Therefore,
experiments were identified as gross packages of a typical weight and volume
as indicated in the MARCEP data sheets. In the initial design of experiment
packages, it is strongly recommended that wherever possible the equipment used
be common with spacecraft subsystem equipment and components. Commonality in
this area would provide an additional source of spares, allow more effective
use of existing spares, and most likely could result in a reduction of total
spares requirements. The maintenance developed for this system in the study is
mainly that required to support the experiment airlock, mounting masts, and
mounting booms. Extravehicular activity will be required to replace most com-
ponents of this equipment. However, the anticipated failures are quite low, as
indicated by an expected unscheduled maintenance frequency of 34,130 hours (4.0
years) for the 1975 system.
The only scheduled maintenance identified was a requirement for lubrication
of some experiment equipment mechanisms, which required 30 man-minutes every 90
days.
The only significant change for the 1985 system is an increase in the num-
ber of experiments because of the 12-man crew. This resulted in a slightly
lower expected unscheduled maintenance frequency of 22,589 hours (2.6 years).
7.1.6 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY EQUIPMENT
Degree "2" maintenance is also recommended for this system except for the
airlock, spacesuits, and restraint aid equipment where it was thought repair
would be more practical. The equipment making up this system will be stored or
located inside the vehicle except for some powered and manual locomotion items.
Maintenance of the airlock may require working in a pressurized spacesuit
depending on what malfunction occurred. Very little information was available
on the Litton hard suit for this study. However, it is expected that some suit
repair may be accomplished by sewing, patching, or replacement of disconnect or
joint seals. It is also expected that some maintenance of the backpack may be
performed. Further study is required to determine detailed maintenance require-
ments of the spacesuit and backpack. Since sufficient data was not available
to make a detailed analysis of the above items, and also of the powered loco-
motion devices, repair of these items was assumed to require a special mainte-
nance kit of an estimated average weight and volume. However, the use rate of
this equipment should be quite low and therefore should not generate many fail-
ures. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 system is
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24,570 hours (1023 days). The limited maintenance that was required was mainly
attributed to the spacesuit and the remote maneuvering unit. The simulation
showed a 5% probability of a spacesuit failure and a 3% probability of an RMU
failure during any one 90-day period.
There is some scheduled maintenance of the backpack and spacesuit required
before and after every use, such as checkout and servicing. The time required
to accomplish these functions is assumed to be included in the 30 minutes
allowed in the tasks requiring EVA for egress and ingress of the vehicle. See
assumptions included in Section 3.2.
The changes in this system for 1985 amounted to increasing the spacesuit
and backpack requirements to support 12 men and showing an improvement in
reliability of these and the powered locomotion devices. The expected unsched-
uled maintenance frequency is 41,649 hours (4.3 years).
7.1.7 INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system as it was not consid-
ered practical to make this equipment redundant. Further study is required to
determine the feasibility of repairing this equipment. All components of this
system will be located at the maintenance station. These items are to be used
in the performance of maintenance in conjunction with the inflight test system.
The unscheduled maintenance caused by this equipment will be minimal as evi-
denced by the expected unscheduled maintenance frequency of 178,571 hours (20
years) for the 1975 mission.
The 1985 system is the same as for the 1975 mission. Some improvement was
shown in the reliability of the electron-beam welder, and the usage rate of
this item was increased which resulted in an increase in failures. The expected
unscheduled maintenance frequency is 16,700 hours (2 years).
7.1.8 INFLIGHT TEST SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system as excessive redun-
dancy would be required for Degree "0" or "i." See Section 1.7 of the appendix
for further discussion. All components associated with this system are at one
of the operations or maintenance stations. Most of the switches, lights, meters,
and other displays will be mounted on panels. Because of the profuse numbers
of these items, some of which have a relatively high failure rate, the mainte-
nance will be relatively high. Therefore, it is necessary that all of this
equipment be mounted for easy disconnection and removal from the system. Many
of the components are small in size and some design thought will be required to
provide sufficient access so the items can be handled without escaping. All
screws and nuts used for mounting these items should be captive to prevent their
loss. In addition, it may be necessary to devise a method of retaining control
of the item being removed, such as small tethers using an adhesive material,
fine-mesh nets, etc. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the
1975 inflight test system is 890 hours (37 days). The components that failed
most frequently were digital readout indicators (82%), digital time indicators
(47%), and the flight director display (35%). The percent values reflect the
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probability of the component failing during any one 90-day period. The sched-
uled maintenance attributable to this system is a daily function of reading the
console displays and recording readings as required.
The system is basically the same for 1985 except for some reliability
improvements. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency is 996 hours (42
days).
7.1.9 LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system as it is impractical
to incorporate the redundancy that would be required. Repair was recommended
for the space radiator, large storage tanks, and plumbing and ducts. However,
further study is required into the repair possibility.
Components of this system are located throughout all pressurized sections
of the spacecraft. The space radiator is integral with the exterior structure
and EVA will be required for maintenance of this item. However, the expected
failure rate of the radiator is very low and the simulation did not show any
failures during the i00 simulations. If a radiator failure should occur, it is
expected to involve leakage from a punctured radiator tube. Redundant radiator
tubes are included so one leak will not result in complete loss of thermal radi-
ation capability. Repair would be accomplished with some type of fusion joining
equipment to patch a puncture.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 life support
system is 354 hours (15 days). The components of the system expected to cause
the most unscheduled maintenance are atmospheric supply pressure switches (54%),
water heating indicator lamps (49%), gas pressure regulator valve (44%), and
rotary fluid bypass valve (40%). The percentage figures indicate the proba-
bility of the item failing during any one 90-day period.
The scheduled maintenance requirements for the life support system com-
prise the majority of the spacecraft scheduled requirements as shown in Section
5.2. Since the scheduled maintenance is the major maintenance workload imposed
on the crew, the greatest benefit to be gained will be from decreasing the
scheduled maintenance workload. Where scheduled maintenance cannot be elimi-
nated or the frequency decreased, it is necessary to design the system so the
maintenance can be very readily accomplished.
The 1985 system is basically the same as for the 1975 mission. Improve-
ments in reliability have been shown where considered feasible and the frequency
of scheduled maintenance has been decreased. However, this system still requires
an average of over 30 minutes per day for scheduled maintenance. This indicates
there still are benefits to be gained from reducing scheduled requirements by
redesigning features, such as carbon disposal, that now require crew attention.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency is 600 hours (25 days).
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7.1.10 NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system except for the iner-
tial platform which required parallel redundancy. However, if this item were
properly modularized, it is believed Degree "2" maintenance would apply to it as
well.
This system was identified only for the 1985 mission. All components have
been assumed to be replaceable from within the pressurized spacecraft. This will
require a design for installation of the space sextant and scanning telescope
with a separate window through the pressure hull to provide the desired field of
view. Again, since the windows might have to be replaced they should be in a
double configuration, as mentioned in the structure subsystem discussion. It
may require some design advance to provide a window installation with the
required optical qualities. Another possibility would be to use a single window
configuration with a protective cover which could be controlled remotely as
required.
The MARCEP analysis indicated a requirement for a parallel redundant iner-
tial platform to achieve the desired 99% probability of mission success. If the
mean replacement time of 4 hours could be decreased, or the allowable downtime
of 12 hours increased, the required probability could most likely be met with a
standby redundant or spare unit. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency
for this system is 16,502 hours (1.9 years).
7.1.11 PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
Degree"2" maintenance is generally recommended for this system. However,
since EVA is required to perform maintenance on this system, some redundancy
of critical items was assumed. Further study is required on this system to
determine the most practical maintenance concepts for the different components.
All components of this system are located in the unpressurized interstage
area of the spacecraft. Therefore EVA will be required for all maintenance and
the system must be designed to facilitate replacement of components within the
system while working in a pressurized spacesuit. The engines which require
scheduled replacement on a yearly basis must be designed for easy disconnection
from propellant and electrical lines, and for removal and replacement. Any pro-
pellant lines that are opened during maintenance will require purging with nitro-
gen. Therefore, the nitrogen pressurant should be interconnected with the pro-
pellant lines with the valving necessary to permit the purging to be done.
Procedures must also be established to preclude the firing of the reaction-
control engines while crew members are outside the spacecraft, and in particular
while working on the propulsion system. The simulation model did not show any
failures of propellant tanks during the i00 simulations and only one spare tank
assembly was initially required to ensure the 99% probability of mission success.
Therefore, leakage of a tank itself is not expected to occur during a 5-year
mission. However, procedures must be provided to cope with the problem in the
event it does occur. If the leak is minor and not an immediate hazard, it may
be possible to use this tank to feed all engines and thereby deplete its supply
faster. Or, it may be possible to depressurize the tank, apply a temporary
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patch, then repressurize only as required to use up the propellant. Even if
the propellant supply of one tank is lost, there is presumed to be sufficient
reserve capacity in the system to allow normal operation until the next resupply.
Valves are provided in the system to isolate any replaceable component.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 propulsion sys-
tem is 6662 hours (276 days). The most frequent failures occurred with the
solenoid purge valve and the solenoid engine prevalve, which had probabilities
of 8% and 7%, respectively, of failing during any one 90-day interval.
The scheduled maintenance requirements, other than resupply functions,
involve the annual replacement of the reaction-control engines, which causes a
major workload on the crew. Therefore, this is another area where a significant
reduction in scheduled maintenance time could be obtained by increasing the
expected engine life and simplifying the replacement procedure. A considerable
improvement in the design life of engines must be shown to achieve this goal.
The 1985 system is basically the same as for 1975, except some of the com-
ponents are repackaged into assemblies to facilitate that maintenance requiring
EVA. Instead of assuming replacement of individual attitude control engines
during both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, it was assumed these engines
would be packaged into assemblies of three engines each. The larger package
should be easier to design for ready replacement also. With an increase in the
time between scheduled replacements and a reduction in the number of items to
be replaced, the workload will decrease significantly.
The components comprising the nitrogen high and low pressure modules and
the propellant transfer module were assumed to be replaced individually whenever
a failure occurred in the 1975 mission. For 1985 it was assumed these modules
would be replaced as an entire unit. This again will make it easier for the
designer to provide a readily replaceable installation. These three modules
require replacement more frequently than any other in the system. The proba-
bility of failure of any one of these modules during a 180-day period is:
high pressure module---14%, low pressure module---52%, and transfer module---
28%.
With this concept of replacing complete assemblies when EVA is required,
the removed assemblies could be returned to the maintenance test station where
Degree "3" maintenance could be performed in a shirtsleeve environment. The
economics of doing this, however, would depend on the number of failures involved.
Removed modules should be enclosed in a propellant-resistant bag to prevent c
release of residual fuel within the spacecraft. A vacuum system could be used
to clean out the item before and during maintenance. This concept did result
in some increase in the expected failure frequency of the system, which for the
1985 system is 4666 hours (194 days).
7.1.12 REENTRY SYSTEM
Except for structure which was assumed to require repair (Degree "3"),
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended.
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The Apollo command module and service pack which comprise the reentry sys-
tem are stowed on the exterior of the spacecraft. While in orbital storage, the
reentry system will have no major equipment operating. Thirty and 90-day checks
of the stowed spacecraft will be conducted. The 90-day checkout will be the
more extensive and will be conducted just prior to a resupply mission so addi-
tional equipment can be requested if needed. Since it was not practical to go
into the kind of detailed analysis on the Apollo subsystems that was performed
on the basic spacecraft systems, a maintenance kit of a weight and volume esti-
mated to be required for an average reentry system repair was postulated.
Depending on the location of the malfunction, EVA may or may not be required.
If the reentry system is in one of the stowed positions, EVA will be required
to gain access to the system. If the reentry system is rotated to the docked
position, then the interior of the vehicle is accessible without EVA. Because
of the low operating time while stowed, the expected unscheduled maintenance
frequency for the 1975 system was quite iow---21,400 hours (about 2-1/2 years).
Maximum commonality of reentry systems and spacecraft systems should be achieved,
particularly for electronic equipment.
The same Apollo command module is used for the 1985 mission, but a service
module is required instead of the service pack. Also, two reentry systems are
required to provide abort capability for 12 men. The stowage arrangement is
such that access to the inside of the command modules is provided directly from
the mission spacecraft. EVA will still be required for components not within
the pressurized part of the command module. The expected unscheduled mainte-
nance frequency is 21,470 hours (2.5 years).
7.1.13 RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this system, but further study
should be made into details of the system to determine if repair of some items
might not be more practical.
Maintenance of the rendezvous and docking system will require EVA for all
components except the rendezvous radar transponder and interrogator. The fail-
ure rates of the mechanical components are relatively low and the operating time
is low; therefore few failures of these items are expected to occur. The
expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 system is 7189 hours
(300 days); the majority of failures are attributable to the radar transponder
and interrogator. These two components have a 14% and 13% probability, respec-
tively, of failing during any one 90-day interval. Therefore, these components
should be readily accessible and replaceable. The possibility of modularizing
these items to reduce the spares weight carried on board and to decrease the
maintenance time should be considered.
The only scheduled maintenance identified for this system was a 90-day
inspection and lubrication of mechanical linkages which will require EVA. This
function should be accomplished just before each resupply launch to ensure it is
operating correctly. It would be best to design the system so no lubrication
will be required, but when lubrication is required, particular attention should
be directed to permitting sufficient access to accomplish the task while in a
pressurized spacesuit. Before specifying a requirement for lubrication of any
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item, cognizance must be taken of the special problems created by the zero-g
space environment. This is an area that will require investigation on future
space flights and should be included as part of an experiment program.
For 1985, this system was changed to a simpler and more reliable docking
system, and the radar interrogator was deleted, which further increased the
system reliability. EVA still is required for maintenance of most of this
system. The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency is 15,768 hours (1.8
years).
7.1.14 STABILITY AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is generally the best for this system, except that
parallel redundancy is required for components that are critical to attitude
control of the spacecraft.
The system consists mostly of electronic components, a number of which have
relatively high failure rates. All of the components are accessible from within
the spacecraft, except for the two-axis narrow-angle sun seeker and the two-axis
horizon scanner. These two sensors are located on the exterior surface of the
spacecraft and will require EVA; however, these items have a low operating time
and will not be subject to very frequent failure. For easy replacement, they
should be mounted inside the spacecraft with a window to provide the desired
field of view. Since the horizon scanner is an infrared device, a germanium
window would be necessary. The control-moment gyros (CMG's) are heavy, bulky
components which, if replacement were required, very often could create a spares
storage problem. To facilitate maintenance of the E_G's, the rotor and torquer
bearing assemblies are each contained in a replaceable cartridge with a pre-
adjusted, prelubricated, matched-bearing assembly. Separating these components
out resulted in a sufficiently low failure rate such that only one spare of each
type CMG was required to achieve the desired 99% probability of mission success.
No CMG spares are required for a 99% probability of crew survival. Since the
simulation program indicated only a 2 to 3% probability of a spare CMG being
required during any one resupply interval, it is suggested that no spare CMG
initially be provided on board. This will reduce the initial spares weight by
about 112 kg and reduce the storage requirements by a little over 0.5 cubic
meter (18.5 cu ft). If a CMG malfunction should occur that cannot be corrected
by replacing a bearing assembly, there should be capability remaining in the
momentum storage system and reaction control propellant to operate satisfactorily
until the next resupply. At this time, a replacement CMG could be brought up
!to the spacecraft.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 system is 1074
hours (45 days). The most frequent failures were caused by the rate gyros (27%),
desaturation logic electronics (31%), and valve drive electronics (31%). The
percent values indicate the probability that one of these components will fail
during any one 90-day interval. There was no scheduled maintenance identified
for the stability and control system.
The 1985 system is basically the same as for the 1975 near-Earth orbital
mission except for the deletion of two CMG's and the inertial platform; the
172
÷ ÷
÷ ÷
D2-I13204-2
latter is now included as part of the navigation and guidance subsystem. Some
reliability improvement has been indicated for a number of the components. The
maintenance concept will still be the same as for the 1975 mission. The expected
unscheduled maintenance frequency is 2277 hours (95 days). The probability of
failure during any one 180-day period for the components which failed most fre-
quently were: desaturation logic electronics---24%, valve drive electronics---
63%, CMG sync and control electronics---23%.
7.1.15 STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM
Degree "3" maintenance (repair) is the most practical for structural items.
The only exceptions noted were ports and windows which would be replaced
(Degree "2").
Maintenance of this system will involve EVA whenever a failure concerns
external structure. The spacecraft structure is designed to better than 99%
probability of withstanding micrometeoroid impacts during the mission. There-
fore, maintenance of exterior structure will more likely be the result of damage
caused by inadvertent collision during EVA or docking operations. Punctures
might be sealed through the use of adhesive patches, metal or plastic plugs, or
patches secured by electron-beam welding or other types of fusion joining pro-
cess. Although repair of exterior structure or the pressurized hull is expected
to be infrequent, the structure still should be designed so that punctures can
be repaired from within the spacecraft whenever possible. Some thought must
also be given to means for detecting and locating pressure leaks. (This is
covered in more detail in Section i0.i.) Most damage is expected to be slight
enough that if the condition warrants it, the crew will have ample time to don
their spacesuits. Maintenance of interior structures will generally consist of
repairing inadvertent damage caused during equipment handling, personnel move-
ments, etc. Repairs will be accomplished using a basic metal or fabric repair
kit.
The expected unscheduled maintenance frequency for the 1975 structure sys-
tem is 625,000 hours (about 72 years) and therefore is not anticipated to be a
major problem.
The only scheduled maintenance identified is an inspection of the space-
craft exterior every 30 days. It may be possible to increase the interval be-
tween these inspections as more experience is gained on manned space flights
and adequate provisions are designed into the structure for automatically de-
tecting damage to exterior structures. Another aspect to consider is the grad-
ual deterioration of visibility through any windows from numerous micro-
meteoroid impacts or erosion from solar dust. This may require periodic
replacement of windows. It will be important that window design allow for easy
replacement. One possible design is a double window configuration in which the
inner window takes all pressure loads and the outer window is easily replace-
able and used to protect the inner window. In this case, outer window replace-
ment would not require spacecraft depressurization, and the only crew members
that would need to put on spacesuits are those that will perform EVA to accom-
plish the replacement.
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The 1985 system is the same as for 1975 except for some weight increases
and the requirement for a considerNble amount of radiation shielding. The prob-
ability of failure (defined as the requirement to repair the pressure shells,
e.g., a micrometeoroid puncture) is the same as for the 1975 mission, and is
estimated to be only 7% for a flight of 5 years duration.
7.2 GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS FOR
INTERPLANETARY MISSIONS
Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2 summarize, in matrix form, subsystem maintenance
concept recommendations for the 1975- and 1985-period planetary-class missions.
Recommended concepts are identified by degree of maintenance. Degrees of mainte-
nance are discussed and defined in detail in Section 3.4.1. Maintenance activ-
ity increases as the degree increases, Degree "0" indicating a maximum of redun-
dancy and automated maintenance, and Degree "3" indicating a maximum of manual
repair, including piece part repair. Detailed discussions by subsystem follow
in Sections 7.2.1 through 7.2.16. In Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2, recommended con-
cepts are indicated by heavy outlines and "R." Specific exceptions to the rec-
ommended concept are indicated under appropriate degrees of maintenance for each
subsystem. The need for further study into the degree of maintenance recom-
mended for a component or among different maintenance concepts is indicated by
"FS." It should be remembered that the maintenance concepts recommended apply
only to the requirement for unscheduled maintenance.
7.2.1 COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM
Degree "i" maintenance is recommended, with minor exceptions, for the 1975
interplanetary mission. This recommendation is made with the understanding that
the trade between Degree "i" and Degree "2" is so close that further study is
necessary; the recommendation is intended primarily to reduce maintenance work-
load. Under the Degree "2" concept, the subsystem becomes one of t_e major
contributors to unscheduled maintenance workload. Even under Degree "i," it
will contribute to the workload because of the exceptions that are noted.
Most of the components in the communications subsystem were augmented with
relatively small numbers of spares (i, 2, or 3). These items could be designed
as built-in spares (standby redundancy) without major weight penalty or design
problems. This might also be true for the antenna system, but repair of the
antenna seems more practical. Antenna repair was recommended as an exception
to the general Degree "i" concept, but further study is also required. The 500-
watt transmitter amplifier and possibly the transmitter power supply are also
exceptions. The transmitter amplifier was added as a spare 6 times, and it
seems impractical to design and install 6 standby transmitters. One level of
standby backed up by spares seems a practical way to go. The power supply was
added five times as a spare, and further study seems necessary to determine if
spares are preferable to built-in redundancy. Intercom control panels (of which
there are nine basic) were augmented by eight spares. Spare control panels are
recommended because of the wall space consumed and the complex switchover capa-
bility required to make the control boxes standby redundant. Wiring and inter-
connectioBs should be made repairable or replaceable where possible.
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For the 1985 communications subsystem, Degree "2" maintenance is recom-
mended. The primary means of data transmission to Earth for the 1985 mission
will be by laser, and some of the laser equipment poses a problem that requires
Degree "2" maintenance. The laser assembly has a low use life, about 2000 hours,
which makes scheduled maintenance mandatory. Because the laser assembly must be
designed for easy replacement, it is very likely that other associated compo-
nents can be made replaceable without much difficulty. Further, the telescope
and optical equipment used to control the laser beam are very bulky (but not
too heavy) and would consume a large volume if they were spared or made redun-
dant as complete assemblies. It seems necessary to design the optics (mirrors)
to be replaceable, and the supporting tube to be repairable. Most other ele-
ments of the communications subsystem were found to require minimum numbers of
spares and presented no problem to design of redundancy. Therefore, all other
components are recommended for Degree "i" maintenance. Further study into this
concept is recommended because the number of repair actions is expected to be so
low that allowing some repair activity may be desirable for crew morale and
stimulation.
7.2.2 CREW SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for the crew subsystem in both the
1975 and 1985 time periods. There is naturally a very high degree of similarity
between the crew systems for the two time periods, and significant weight and
reliability improvements are not foreseen. The major portion of the crew sys-
tem is equipment that has achieved its reliability and weight improvements al-
ready. Indicative of this point is the expected unscheduled repair time for the
1975 mission which was found to be 70 minutes on the average and expected to
occur about once every 3400 days. Most of the components in the crew system
can easily be replaced, upon failure, with a spare, and redundant design of many
poses a logic problem. For example, how does one design a redundant dental care
kit? Other items such as lighting must be designed for scheduled maintenance,
and sparing becomes a natural choice of repair mode. Overdesign to a point
where no failures can reasonably be expected is possible in some cases, but the
additional cost appears to be unnecessary.
There are a few exceptions to the recommendation of Degree "2" maintenance.
These include such items as bunks and TV tapes, which probably should be repair-
ed. The TV tapes, which are provided for recreation and leisure use, should be
repaired with a splicing kit or eliminated from any maintenance consideration
at all. These items were tentatively identified as Degree "3" maintenance
exceptions to the general Degree "2" recommendation.
7.2.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
In general, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for the data management
subsystem. Inaccessible sensors that are identifiable components in the 1975
subsystem are the only exception. Because of their inaccessibility, these
components must be augmented with some form of redundancy if they are essential
to the mission. Degree "0" maintenance is recommended for these items. It is
assumed that these will no longer be a problem in 1985, being integral with other
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components or improved to a point where failure is unlikely. A second excep-
tion to the Degree "2" concept is Degree "3" repair of wiring and connectors.
Some major assemblies in the subsystem, such as the TV unit and the film
processing unit, show a maintenance concept that closely borders on Degree "3"
maintenance. The maintenance tasks for these items include such things as
bearing replacement, clutch replacement, etc. These tasks could be considered
as repair tasks, but it was assumed that the equipment could be designed so
that these tasks could be accomplished on the installed equipment without too
much difficulty.
Most of the equipment in the subsystem is electronic, and would lend it-
self to modularization and commonality of replaceable modules. It is most
important that the data adapter and the computer be designed in this manner if
the Degree "2" concept is to be effective. Significant weight increase is the
penalty if this is not accomplished.
7.2.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM
Further study is necessary to determine the best maintenance concept for
the electrical power subsystem. Degree "2" has been tentatively recommended
as a point of departure. It is felt, however, that an overall concept for the
subsystem may be misleading because of the number of exceptions and areas for
further study that have been identified. Table 7.2-3 shows the electrical
power subsystem equipment component list for the 1975 and 1985 time periods
(integrated) and summarizes the basic component quantities, required parallel
redundancy,: and spares for the two time periods. Most of the parallel redun-
dancy is synthetic to meet mission power level requirements as discussed in
Section 1.4 of the appendix. Because there is a requirement for only one spare
for items like the inverters, the spare could be wired in with a switching
capability (standby redundancy) with little penalty. Items such as the radia-
tor require only one level of parallel redundancy, and items such as the
structural repair kit require only one spare which should be allowed because
of the implied repair necessity. Thus, it can be seen that there is a diver-
sity of logical maintenance concepts in the subsystem and these must be deter-
mined for each component.
It can be noted from Table 7.2-3 that the power conversion system (PCS)
unit of the 1975 mission was modularized for the 1985 mission. The combined
rotating unit (CRU) was the only modularized item of the PCS unit that was
spared, which leads one to believe that significant weight savings could be
made for the 1975 mission if the PCS unit was designed so the CRU could be re-
placed. The CRU weighs between 20 and 45 kilograms versus about 245 kilograms
for the complete PCS unit.
Repair of the Brayton cycle units could have a significant effect on the
overall maintenance concept and on spacecraft design. Even though the PCS
units are assumed to be repairable for the 1985 mission, it is not clear if
they should be repaired in the unpressurized electrical power bay or brought
into the spacecraft for repair. If they are in fact to be made repairable,
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Table 7.2-3: ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM EQUIPMENT COMPONENT LIST
Component Nomenclature
1975 1985
Basic Parallel Basic Parallel
No. Redundancy Spares No. Redundancy Spares
Fuel Block 2
Shield 1
Fuel Recovery System 2
PCS Unit 1
CRU
Gas Loops
Recuperator
Heat Sink HX
Heat Source HX
Duct System
Thermal Insulation
Argon/Water Glycol HX 1
Coolant Pump and Motor 1
Frequency Sensor 1
Parasitic Load 1
HV Transformer Rectifier 1
LV Transformer Rectifier 1
High-Voltage Regulator 1
Low-Voltage Regulator 1
Valves 20
Quick Disconnects i0
Evaporator System 1
Inverter (Square Wave) 1
Inverter (Sine Wave) 1
Variable Frequency Inverter 1
Speed Control (CRU) 1
Relays 40
Structure and Supports 1
Structure Repair Kit 1
Radiator 1
Radiator Insulation and
Attachment 1
Heat Dump Door Mechanism 1
Motor and Drive 1
Temp. Sensor and Control 1
Locking Actuator 1
Electrical Busses 12
Circuit Breakers 113
Wiring and Connectors---Power 250
Wiring and Connectors---Control 850
Wiring and Connectors---Inter. 999
Wiring and Connectors---Inter. 999
1 1
1
1 4
1 7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
20
i0
1
1
1
1
40
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 2
1 2
1
1
1
250
1
2
4
3
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
20
200
400
999
999
999
400
2
5
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a trade must be made to determine the repair site.
vantages to both repair locations:
i) Repair "in situ":
2)
There are a number of ad-
a)
b)
c)
Does not require moving the PCS unit into the spacecraft (with a
high probability of handling damage).
Does not require design of the airlock or spacecraft interior to
accept the unit.
Enables breaking the gas loops with low risk of contamination and
no purge requirements.
Repair in spacecraft "workshop":
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
Does not require multiple EVA excursions to complete the repair.
Requires less suit expendables.
Repair can be accomplished by one man with minor assistance.
Repair can be accomplished with bare hands.
Lighting is better and tools are readily accessible.
Repair "in situ" was selected as the baseline concept for the 1985 mission
analyses.
7.2.5 EXPERIMENT SYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is tentatively recommended for the experiment
subsystem in the 1975 time period. Further study is required into several
aspects of the mission experiments. The planetary probes to be carried on
the 1975 flyby missions may be designed in several ways. They might be de-
signed with sufficient internal redundancies and radio-controlled operation
modes that repair of the probes before launch need not be considered. Or,
the probes might be designed for checkout and replacement of internal mecha-
nisms before flight. Both of these concepts must be considered for further
study.
Onboard experiments are assumed to lend themselves to repair or replace-
ment maintenance concepts. Because of the flexibility that has been assumed
for the onboard experiments, it is felt that they may be repaired without much
difficulty, and Degree "3" maintenance is recommended for them. Degree "3"
maintenance is also required for certain items such as the experiment airlock.
Degree "2" is recommended because the probes and the onboard experiments are
considered as exceptions to the general concept.
Planetary probes are not considered as a part of the 1985 landing missions;
therefore, the onboard experiments will determine the general maintenance con-
cept. For this reason, Degree "3" maintenance is recommended for the 1985
missions. It cannot be overemphasized that further study is required in deter-
mining the maintenance concept to be applied to experiments. The determination
of this maintenance concept, and the nature of the experiments themselves, may
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have a significant effect on the maintenance concepts selected for other sub-
systems. Several other subsystems could be considered for Degree "3" mainte-
nance if there was little or no penalty associated with an onboard workshop.
If the experiments require an onboard workshop, the penalty could be considered
against the experiments and other subsystems could be designed to share the
experimental workshop for Degre e "3" maintenance. It is also possible that the
best maintenance concept for the experiments is Degree "3" maintenance, which
could justify Degree "3" maintenance for other borderline subsystems. The
idea of justifying a workshop from the combined requirements of several sub-
systems applies to the 1975 as well as the 1985 time period.
7.2.6 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY SUBSYSTEM
The extravehicular activity subsystem is essentially the same for both
the 1975 and 1985 time periods, and Degree "3" maintenance is recommended for
both. Degree "3" maintenance for this equipment will not require a workshop,
although it may require some special provisions on the holding and stowage
brackets for the larger items, such as the backpacks. The powered locomotion
units will be repaired by simple replacement of major parts (Degree "2" main-
tenance). Further study between Degree "2" and "3" maintenance is required
for this subsystem.
7.2.7 MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for this subsystem, although as the
equipment becomes better defined, further investigation into Degree "3" main-
tenance is necessary.
7.2.8 INFLIGHT TEST SUBSYSTEM
Without exception or qualification, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended
for this subsystem. Degree "3" maintenance is felt to be unnecessary, and less-
er degrees of maintenance have problems associated with them (for example, the
large increase in panel size and possibility of confusion when designing redun-
dant indicators). A more detailed discussion is provided in Section 1.7 of
the appendix.
7.2.9 LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
This subsystem (which includes environmental control as well as life sup-
port functions) is felt to be a key factor in spacecraft interior design. De-
gree "2" maintenance is tentatively recommended for it during both time periods
of interest; however, some elements of the subsystem require Degree "3" mainte-
nance, and if the weight and cost penalties for a workshop can be justified
for some other subsystem (or combination of subsystems), Degree "3" maintenance
may be desirable.
The placement of the life support subsystem in the spacecraft is felt to
be critical. Poor placement can cause maintenance time on the subsystem to
increase excessively, and the probability of maintenance error and damage to
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the equipment can increase inordinately. Section 1.8 in the appendix provides
additional discussion on this point.
7.2.10 NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE SUBSYSTEM
Degree "i" maintenance is recommended with some minor exceptions in both
1975 and 1985 missions. Electronic portions of the subsystem should be made
replaceable because they lend themselves well to the Degree "2" concept. The
backup equipment, manual sextants, etc., also fall in this category. The major
problem in specifying a maintenance concept is the stable platform. Nine addi-
tional platforms are required to achieve the mission reliability goals. These
platforms could be designed for standby redundancy or as spares. Replacement
of the platforms as spares could be a problem because of platform alignment
requirements. It may not be possible to achieve the required accuracy of
alignment with a replaceable unit. It is tentatively recommended that one
level of standby redundancy be provided, with the basic unit designed for re-
placement and backed up by spares. The standby unit could be operated while
the basic unit is replaced and proper alignment verified, and then the standby
unit could be shut down until another failure occurs. This concept requires
further study.
An alternate concept would be to provide a standby inertial unit, and
provide a repair capability for the failed units. This concept would work
much like the one discussed above, except that instead of replacing the failed
basic unit with a spare, it would be removed and the failure repaired at a
workshop facility. The repaired basic unit would then be reinstalled, aligned,
and reactivated. Again, this concept requires further study.
7.2.11 PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for the propulsion subsystem. Areas
of further study and exceptions to the recommended concept include inaccessible
items such as fluid expulsion devices, and large or bulky items such as tankage
and some parts of the midcourse engine(s). In general, it is felt that Degree
"2" maintenance is possible if the equipment is designed with this concept in
mind. The possibility of conducting Degree "3" maintenance should be
investigated.
The major problems for either concept will be providing accessibility to
replaceable parts, providing malfunction and leak detection capability, and
providing means of containing or neutralizing entrapped fluids that might be
released during repairs. Major propulsion stages such as the injection stage,
and the Mars capture stages for the 1985 mission, have not been considered as
repairable. Inspection of these stages has been considered, but it has not
been determined what could be accomplished by an inspection if repair is not
anticipated. In the case of nuclear stages, it has not been determined if
an inspection can be conducted.
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7.2.12 EARTH REENTRY SUBSYSTEM
In general, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for the command module
(CM) and the Earth reentry vehicle (ERV). Most of the subsystems within the
ERV can be broken down into replaceable modules. Exceptions to this are the
vehicle structure and heat shield, and the chutes and ground landing provisions.
It will be difficult or impossible to check out these items, and redundancy or
overdesign is recommended. Damage to the structure and the heat shield due
to docking operations or meteoroid impacts could be repaired (with difficulty).
It is possible that many elements of the ERV could be designed to be common
with replaceable items on board the mission module and spares requirements
could be reduced in this manner. Further study in this area is recommended.
7.2.13 RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING SUBSYSTEM
This subsystem was not separately identified for either time period. In
the 1975 time period, the elements of the subsystem were included under the
structure subsystem. This was also done for the ERV in the 1985 time period,
but there are additional docking and rendezvous requirements associated with
the planetary landing vehicle that were not determined in detail for this study.
7.2.14 PLANETARY LANDING VEHICLE (MEM)
No detailed study of the MEM was conducted; however, certain observations
regarding maintenance concepts can be made. Actually, maintenance concepts
for two distinct phases of operation must be considered. First, the concept
for maintenance before the MEM leaves the parent vehicle must be considered.
It is expected that the MEM will be subjected to a rigorous checkout before
it departs for the planetary surface. The results of this checkout may indi-
cate that maintenance is required. The concept for this phase could reason-
ably be Degree "2" maintenance, particularly if the MEM equipment is designed
for a high degree of commonality between the mission module (MM) and the ERV
equipment.
Second, the concept for maintenance while the MEM is separated from the
MM must be considered. It is expected that a second checkout via communica-
tions link will be accomplished before the MEM leaves the planetary orbit.
Degree "2" maintenance might also be accomplished here with transfer of re-
quired parts accomplished extravehicularly. While the MEM is in transit to
and from the planet's surface, there will be no time for maintenance other
than manual selection of standby units or alternate modes of operation. During
the stay on the planet's surface, it is desirable to minimize the maintenance
that could be performed. For the shorter-duration surface missions (20 to 30
days), combinations of parallel and standby redundancy should raise the vehicle
reliability to an acceptable level.
7.2.15 STABILITY AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for thestability and control subsystem
without exception during the 1975 interplanetary mission. This subsystem is
primarily electronic and can be modularized for easy replacement of packages.
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On the 1985 Mars landing mission, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for
the electronic part of this subsystem. Also, the stability and control sub-
system will include control-moment gyros (CMG's), which do not lend themselves
to repair as well as the electronic parts of the subsystem. The CMG masses will
probably not fail; however, the drive motors and torquers must be considered
for redundancy or replacement. Spares requirements for these items were rela-
tively small, and standby redundancy could be considered. Standby redundancy
for each drive motor and torquer might be desirable, but it is questionable
if standby redundancy for the CMG bearings could be accomplished. It is felt
that bearing replacement will be required, and once a maintenance capability
is provided on the bearings, replacement of the motors and torquers should be
relatively simple. Therefore, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended for these
items, although further study seems in order.
7.2.16 STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM
Degree "3" maintenance is recommended for the structure subsystem. To
permit Degree "3" structural maintenance, further study is required to deter-
mine typical repair actions and techniques to be employed. Some exceptions
to Degree "3" maintenance are the replacement of ports and windows, and ele-
ments of the rendezvous and docking equipment. These are borderline cases,
but are defined as requiring Degree "2" maintenance.
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8.0 MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN PRECEPTS
COMMON TO ALL MISS IONS
8.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The maintenance philosophy selected for a mission significantly affects
the approach taken in the basic design of the spacecraft. If a concept of
no maintenance is assumed, then the spacecraft must include parallel or
standby redundant components, with automatic or remotely controlled switchover
capability for all spacecraft functions that must operate for the duration of
the mission. For long mission durations this can result in an excessively
complex and heavy configuration (see Section 4.0).
Even when man is available to perform maintenance activities, there can
be a considerable difference in the level of maintenance involved that affects
the fault detection and isolation capability provided, the replaceable compo-
nent level designed into the system, the crew skills involved, etc. The ulti-
mate design for ease of maintenance would be an automatic fault isolation
capability that would be able to identify any item that might have to be re-
placed. However, this is at present not practicable and therefore some inter-
mediate approach must be taken. Where feasible, such as for electronic-type
equipment, it was assumed as a study expediency that the on-board inflight
test subsystem (which includes display panel indications) would isolate a
failure to the replaceable component level, realizing that certain design
problems may be implicit in such an approach. Otherwise it was assumed that
test points would be available so that, through use of maintenance and test
equipment, a fault could be isolated to the replaceable level. Other assump-
tions and guidelines used that can affect the design approach are included in
Section 3.0. The replaceable component level considered in this study is as
identified in the data sheets contained in Volume III. Notes on these data
sheets indicate where it was felt that a higher or lower level of component
replacement might be considered. In a number of instances these variations
were analyzed during the study. The results of these analyses are presented
in Sections 5.0 and 6.0.
In some cases it may actually be possible to perform some repair on a
failed component after it has been removed, such as replacement of seals,
mechanical linkages, solenoids, bearings, etc. However, a more detailed
analysis than was possible during this study would be required. For long-
duration unresupplied missions such as planetary flights, a limited second-
level (Degree "3") repair capability requiring the addition of a maintenance
shop or work bench might be practical in some cases. But for Earth-orbit mis-
sions, which include regular resupply, a Degree "3" capability is not con-
sidered to be advantageous. Past ground-based experience has shown a Degree
"3" maintenance (bench maintenance) capability to be economically effective
only when a large number of failures of like components are involved. The
number of similar failures that can be expected during a single spacecraft
mission do not justify a bench repair capability. This is borne out by the
limited unscheduled maintenance that resulted from the mission simulations
described in Sections 5.0 and 6.0.
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In general, selecting a maintenance philosophy requires consideration
of several factors. These include:
• Knowledge of mission objectives.
• Mission effects on system/subsystem design.
• Mission demands on crew time.
• Technical capabilities of the crew to provide maintenance.
• Feasible level of maintenance action and associated demands on packaging
concepts.
• An estimate of the inherent reliability of the subsystem hardware
(failure rates and useful life) and configuration.
• Safety implications associated with alternate maintenance philosophies
that are considered.
• An estimate of equipment allowable downtimes and repair/restoration times
(repair time distributions and math models used to evaluate probability
of no system failure due to exceeding the allowable downtime).
The optimum maintenance philosophy for a stated mission will be based on
the most effective blend of the parameters that measure the influence of these
factors. Section 7.0 discusses the maintenance philosophies or concepts that
were thought to be most effective for the subsystems of the missions selected
for this study. Section 8.2, which follows, summarizes those maintenance
philosophies that were found to be common to all the missions studied.
Once it has been determined that on-board maintenance is necessary to meet
the numerical requirement for probability of mission success, the next step is
to impose requirements on component/subsystem design that will ensure the suc-
cess of the maintenance actions to be performed. The analyses conducted as a
part of this study have resulted in a number of observations of general design
principles necessary to ensure maintainability of the spacecraft systems.
These are presented in Section 8.3. Some design precepts assumed during the
performance of the study are in Section 3.4.4.
8.2 MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY COMMON TO ALL MISSIONS
i)
2)
Plan maintenance on a remove-and-replace (Degree "2") basis whenever prac-
ticable. Component packaging must be at a level which will facilitate
this concept. Use special maintenance kits only for repairs of large,
bulky items for which a remove-and-replace concept may not be desirable;
e.g., structural parts, plumbing, ducts, large tanks, etc.
With relatively few exceptions, an on-board bench repair (Degree "3"
maintenance) capability is not justified. Exceptions must be evaluated
individually, since most unscheduled maintenance requirements are insuf-
ficient to warrant such a capability. Component replacement requiring
EVA, in which the removed assemblies are returned to the bench where Degree
"3" maintenance can be performed in a shirtsleeve environment; or situations
where the experiments subsystem requires an on-board workshop and other sub-
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3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
systems can be designed to take advantage of its availability, may be
considered for Degree "3" maintenance.
Use scheduled maintenance only when other means of attaining desired
assurance levels are too costly in terms of weight (spares, expendables),
crew time, cost, and reliability of affected systems.
When only one spare of an item is required to achieve the desired level
of assurance, consider making the spare standby-redundant so it can be
switched into the system when the main item fails. This will eliminate
a remove-and-replace maintenance action. Each individual instance will
have to be evaluated as it may not be practical to make all single-spare
components standby-redundant. The concept is particularly applicable to
Earth-orbit missions where a spare can be provided at the next resupply.
Give unscheduled maintenance precedence over scheduled maintenance; i.e.,
unscheduled maintenance has first priority over maintenance resources in-
cluding crew skills, except where unscheduled maintenance of nonsafety
critical items logically is preempted by scheduled maintenance of safety
critical items.
Make available fully detailed procedures for all scheduled and expected
unscheduled maintenance functions.
Provide adequate spares to ensure the required probability of crew sur-
vival and mission success.
8.3 DESIGN PRECEPTS COMMON TO ALL MISSIONS
The principles given below augment the assumptions listed in Section 3.2,
many of which likewise should be considered seriously when undertaking space-
craft design.
i) Place Emphasis on Design of Life Support Subsystem---The life support
subsystem, which included life support and environmental control in this
study, is the major source of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance work-
load. In addition, it requires an extended period of training to develop
the necessary operation and maintenance skill. Spacecraft interior de-
sign should be planned about a life support subsystem configuration and
location that optimizes operation and maintenance. Optimum location of
the life support subsystem is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.9.
2) Modularize High Failure Items---Equipment should be modularized whenever
it can be broken down in a number of identical modules. The greater the
number of identical modules, the more effective is the use of spares, and
initial spares weight provided for a mission is reduced considerably.
Modularization also should be aimed at grouping high-failure-rate com-
ponents into replaceable, low-weight modules.
3) Design for Commonality of Spacecraft Components---Achieve commonality of
components, within and between subsystems, whenver possible. Spares
requirements decrease significantly when a high degree of commonality can
be attained. For example, electronic subsystems could standardize on a
small variety of amplifier modules that would be replaceable and common
between the subsystems. The electrical characteristics of such a common
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module could be altered by pin connections used by particular installa-
tions. The objective would be to minimize the number of types of spares
that will increase the spares use and result in a reduction in overall
spares weight required.
Design for Commonality of Experiment and Spacecraft Equipment---In plan-
ning experiment programs and identifying the equipment required, use
items which are common with spacecraft system equipment wherever possible.
Better use of equipment, less cost, and fewer spares to support the space-
craft and experiments will result.
Spare Heavy Noncritical Items Only at Resupply---For some large items of
equipment, where the probability of failure is quite remote, only one
spare is necessary to achieve the desired assurance of mission success.
If resupply is available and Ifailure of the item can be tolerated for a
number of days by using an alternate mode of operation, the practicability
of not providing a spare initially should be considered. If the item
fails, a spare can be brought up at the next resupply.
Minimize EVA---In the interest of reducing EVA, place high-failure-rate
and long-maintenance-time items within the pressure hull whenever practi-
cal. When EVA is required to perform maintenance, the replaceable com-
ponents should be packaged in a size and shape that can be conveniently
handled by a pressure-suited man. In this case, modularizing equipment
into packages that are too small to be handled conveniently would not be
desirable unless the advantage to be gained is considerable.
Reduce Hazards to Personnel During EVA---Solar panels, antennas, and other
large equipment mounted on the exterior surfaces of the spacecraft present
a hazard to personnel moving about during EVA. Design such equipment to
withstand an inadvertent impact, and minimize the hazards to a pressure-
suited man by such means as eliminating unprotected sharp surfaces and
making surfaces easily visible under all lighting conditions.
Design Airl_ck for at Least Two Men---It is assumed that EVA will require
two workers for maximum safety (the "buddy" system). Accordingly, design
airlocks for a minimum of two spacesuited men and arrange for the doors to
interlock (permitting only one to open at a time) unless the cabin pres-
sure is dumped. An override for the interlock is desirable, but should be
activated only through a special sequence eliminating change activation.
The override must be operable from both sides of the lock. All airlock
operations, except pumpdown, should be independent of the spacecraft
electrical power system.
General Interior Design---Provide protection for all switches and controls
against inadvertent activation. Plan all maintenance tasks that could pos-
sibly cause loss of cabin pressure , and design the equipment so that func- i
tions can be performed by spacesuited personnel; for example, airlock in-
terior seal replacement. Also, consider compartmented design to reduce
the possibility of catastrophic failure throughout the spacecraft. Numer-
ous assumptions involving general spacecraft interior design that were
made at the beginning of this study are listed in Section 3.2. In general,
a spacecraft interior design that incorporates all of the features men-
tioned will greatly improve maintainability.
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i0) Develop Alternate Design of Panel Display Indicators---When designing
fault indication and status displays, consider electromechanical flags and
solid-state lights as well as a fault matrix display, as alternatives to a
conventional display with indicator lamps. Lamps can be chosen for rela-
tively low failure rates, but the number of lamps required makes failures
likely. The replacement of bulbs takes only a short time, but failures
must first be detected, and frequent replacement can be a major nuisance.
ii) Identify Fasteners Selectively---Limit fasteners for all items that can
be maintained to a few common types and sizes, to minimize tool require-
ments. Fasteners for items requiring removal by a spacesuited man should
be as large as practical and few in number. Screw type fasteners, which
permit the tool to torque out of the fastener, are not recommended for
zero-g use. Such fasteners require application of both torque and axial
force, complicating the task unnecessarily. For scheduled maintenance
items and high-failure-rste items, removal without the use of tools is de-
sirable. "Pip-pin" fasteners can be used when fitting tolerances are not
critical and the fastener is loaded in shear only. Guide pins and cam
lock fasteners can be used for close tolerance replacements.
12) Limit Electrical Connections---No EVA repair of connectors or plugs should
be planned. For interior electrical connections wire-wrap or crimp (one
or the other) connections should be used to permit inflight repair with-
out soldering.
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9.0 COST ANALYSIS
9.1 BACKGROUND DATA AND ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES
9.1.1 BASIC APPROACH
The groundrules and estimating assumptions used in obtaining total program
cost were generally based on the Douglas MORL mission described in Reference i.
More specific groundrules are detailed under the following costing discussions
for each of the missions considered during this study! 1975 near-Earth orbital
mission, 1985 L 1 Libration Center mission, 1975 Mars/Venus flyby mission, and
1985 Mars landing mission.
In general, emphasis in the estimating effort was placed on the mission
vehicle and on arriving at subsystem and software relative cost numbers to
maintain a basic assigned system, a maintainable system with selected redun-
dancies, and a redundant system. These systems were further broken down and
estimated by subsystem and component as defined on the MARCEP data sheets.
The total systems program cost tables, such as given in Tables 9.2-1 and
9.2-2 for the 1975 near-Earth orbital mission, were developed for each program
to show costing trends between programs and major program elements. The total
systems program costs do not include development costs for launch vehicles, new
tracking stations, or mission control centers, etc. For example, if a satellite
communication relay network or new laser tracking stations were used to fulfill
mission requirements, these would be considered already developed and costed
under other programs.
Some costs were included for test demonstration, but a large-scale test
program was not estimated. A complete flight test program, if estimated in
detail, could increase the total program costs considerably. Therefore, total
program costs should be considered as budgetary or planning estimates only.
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Costs excluded from the estimates used in this study are as follows:
Crew costs--training, yearly salary, etc.
Launch vehicle development for the S-IB, S-IB uprated, Saturn V, and
Saturn V-25S.
Facility Development--launch site, tracking stations, mission control cen-
ter, etc.
Initial recovery task force (ships, airplanes, etc.)
Experiments--development, hardware, integration, and operation.
Fuels (including nuclear) and gases for the mission vehicle and launch
vehicle.
Planetary lander (MEM)--propulsion modules and tanker development.
Assembly and docking units where required.
L
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9.1.2 ESTIMATING TECHNIQUE
The costing performed to determine unit relative cost values and develop-
mental costs was derived from a combination of parametric and detail estimating
techniques. Parameters are defined as sets of values based on statistical data,
expressing a relationship between variables, both dependent and independent.
These are developed by direct application of experience actuals, extrapolation
of historical data, detailed estimates of comparable systems, and other similar
information sources. These values are then expressed as a relationship to dol-
lars or manhours against weight, size, time, etc., to form a coordinate system
within which the relationship is expressed as a median line, or a set of limits.
The parametric approach was used in estimating the total systems cost as
well as a checkpoint for verifying the total mission vehicle cost. The param-
eters were derived from actual data or best estimated data for each subsystem
in the Apollo CSM, LEM, MORL, Gemini, MOL, and other programs. Cost data was
then correlated to one or more subsystem characteristics and plotted by sub-
system. With this information the total mission vehicle cost by subsystem was
estimated. Each subsystem was then apportioned a relative cost number in accord-
ance with the foregoing data so that the total for the mission vehicle equaled
1.000.
The total mission vehicle subsystem hardware relative cost numbers were
developed using MORL subsystem cost data from the Douglas reports as a guide.
The subsystem relative cost numbers were further broken down into component call-
outs as outlined in the MARCEP data sheets by direct comparison to similar types
of components used in other estimated Boeing space programs_ The components
for the basic system were estimated using a weight relationship to specific cate-
gories within each subsystem. For example, the communications subsystem was
broken into a telemetry unit, voice communications unit, television system, etc.
The components within each unit were then estimated by using engineering complex-
ity factors and weight relationships. As the component quantities increased
for the Degree 0 and Degree 2 maintenance concept during the analysis, the rela-
tive values of the respective systems were adjusted so that final values would
total to 1.00. The component level of estimating was performed to analyze rela-
tive cost comparison increases required by quantity changes to obtain maintain-
able systems with selected redundancies. The relative cost number of 1.00 repre-
sents the costs associated with the development, hardware, and operations re-
quired to obtain one operational mission vehicle.
9.2 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
9.2.1 INITIAL COST FOR A 90-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The total systems program cost (dollars in millions) is shown in Table 9.2-1,
for a 5-year program with 90-day resupply capability. The initial cost cate-
gory includes the total estimated costs required to achieve this mission opera-
tion, which are categorized as follows:
A) Mission vehicle equal to 1.000 and further broken down in Table 9.2-4.
The mission vehicle costs include:
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B)
C)
D)
E)
i) Development
a) Subsystem developmental costs including AGE development.
b) Estimated flight test demonstration including one spare mission
vehicle.
c) Development of software and launch site support.
2) Hardware--One mission vehicle estimated by subsystem.
3) Operation--Operational set of AGE and associated sustaining effort for
the software and launch site support.
Reentry Vehicle includes:
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain an eight-man vehicle.
2) Flight test demonstration to obtain a qualified system.
3) Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
4) Costs for the initial operational reentry vehicle.
5) System and subsystem integration.
Logistics Module:
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain an operational logistics module.
2) Flight test demonstration in conjunction with the reentry vehicle
where possible.
3) Costs for the initial operational logistics module.
4) Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
5) System and subsystem integration.
Launch Vehicles:
i) Flight test vehicles as required to obtain qualified reentry and logis-
tics modules.
2) Costs for the initial launch vehicle.
Operations
l)
2)
3)
Operations for the flight test demonstration.
Three years of downrange tracking and data acquisition costs accumu-
lated during the test demonstration and initial launch.
Recovery operations for the test demonstration.
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9.2.2 RESUPPLY COST FOR A 90-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The resupply cost category shown in Table 9.2-1 includes total estimated
costs required to supply the mission vehicle every 90 days for a 5-year period,
which are categorized as follows:
A)
B)
C)
D)
Mission Vehicle---Costs associated with the resupply spares packages
required every 90 days.
Reentry Vehicle---Costs associated with 20 resupply vehicles and sustain-
ing AGE.
Logistics Vehicle---Costs associated with 20 resupply vehicles and sus-
taining AGE.
Launch Vehicle---Costs associated with 20 resupply vehicles and sustaining
AGE.
E) Operations
i) Launch operating costs for 20 resupply vehicles.
2) Five years of downrange tracking and data acquisition costs
accumulated during the resupply period.
3) Five-year costs for recovery operations every 90 days during the
resupply period.
9.2.3 INITIAL COST FOR A 180-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
D)
E)
Table 9.2-2 gives total system program costs for a 5-year program with
180 days resupply capability. The initial cost category includes the total
estimated costs required to achieve this mission operation, which are cate-
gorized as follows:
A) Mission Vehicle--Increased according to subsystem variances, to the mission
vehicle described in Table 9.2-4, and itemized on Table 9.2-5.
B) Reentry Vehicle--The same as for the 90-day resupply period (9.2.B).
C) Logistics Module--The same as for the 90-day resupply period (9.2.C),
except that the module is increased to carry 155 kilograms more spares.
Launch Vehicle--The same as for the 90-day resupply period (9.2.D).
Operations--The same as for the 90-day resupply period (9.2.E).
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Table 9.2-1: 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION--90-DAY RESUPPLY
Mission Vehicle
Reentry Vehicle
Logistics Module
Launch Vehicles
Operations
Total
Total Systems Program Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Initial Resupply
$2,752 $ 20
1,762 905
304 153
454 620
82___.2_7 1,191
$6,099 $2,889
Table 9.2-2: 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION--180-DAY RESUPPLY
Mission Vehicle
Reentry Vehicle
Logistics Module
Launch Vehicles
Operations
Total
Total Systems Program Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Initial Resupply
$2,759 $ 16
1,762 472
319 86
454 310
829 i_125
$6,123 $2,009
i
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9.2.4 RESUPPLY COST FOR A 180-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The resupply cost category shown in Table 9.2-2 includes total estimated
costs required to resupply the mission vehicle every 180 days for a 5-year
period, which are categorized the same as for the 90-day resupply period,
except that the quantities have been reduced to accommodate ten resupplies.
9.2.5 MISSION VEHICLE RELATIVE COST NUMBERS
Table 9.2-3 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for the basic
system (with no redundancy or spares) by subsystems, AGE and spares, test
demonstration, software, and launch site support. The total relative cost
number includes the development, unit hardware, and operations required to ob-
tain a mission vehicle with no redundancy or spares, and is given here only to
represent the baseline system before adding a realistic spares system for the
90- and 180-day resupply periods.
Table 9.2-4 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for a main-
tainable system with selected redundancies for a 90-day resupply interval.
The total relative cost figures given for the items listed on Tables 9.2-3 and
9.2-4 can be directly associated with the total initial cost for the mission
vehicle given in Table 9.2-1, and the total relative cost number of 1.00 can
be equated to the initial cost dollars shown for the mission vehicle.
Table 9.2-5 shows the mission vehicle relative cost for a maintainable sys-
tem with selected redundancies for a 180-day resupply interval, and can be
directly associated with the total initial cost for the mission vehicle given
in Table 9.2-2.
9.3.1
9.3 1985 L1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
INITIAL COST FOR A 180-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The total systems program costs (dollars in millions) is shown in Table
9.3-1 for a 5-year program with 180-day resupply capability. The initial cost
category includes the total estimated costs required to achieve this mission
operation, which are categorized as follows:
A) Mission vehicle equal to 1.00 and further broken down in Table 9.3-4. The
mission vehicle costs include:
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Table 9.2-3: 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Basic System--With No Redundancy or Spares
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
Rendezvous and Docking
Stability and Control
Structure
Development Hardware
0.121 0.002
0.095 0.001
0.008 Negligible
0.014 0.001
0.027 0.005
0.023 0.001
0.001 Negligible
0.001 Negligible
0.040 0.001
0.008 0.001
0.116 0.003
0.038 0.006
Operation
AGE 0.059 0.003
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.063
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.039 0.002
Total 0.659 0.021 0.005
Total
0.123
0.096
0.008
0.015
0.032
0.024
0.001
0.001
0.041
0.009
0.119
0.044
0.062
0.063
Negligible
0.002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
0.041
0. 685
J
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Table 9.2-4: 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System--Degree "2" Maintenance (90-Day Resupply
Development Hardware Operation
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System 0.187 0.003
Communications 0.147 0.002
Crew System 0.012 0.001
Data Management 0.022 0.004
Electrical Power 0.042 0.005
Extravehicular Activity 0.036 0.001
Inflight Test 0.002 Negligible
Maintenance Equipment 0.001 Negligible
Propulsion 0.062 0.001
Rendezvous and Docking 0.012 0.003
Stability and Control 0.180 0.006
Structure 0.060 0.006
AGE 0.091 0.004
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.063
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming Negligible
Training Equipment 0.002
Simulation Equipment 0.003
Training Negligible
Technical Data Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0.001
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.039 0.002
Interval)
Total
0.190
0.149
0.013
0.026
0.047
0.037
0.002
0.001
0.063
0.015
0.186
0.066
0.095
0.063
Negligible
0.002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
0.041
Total 0.961 0.032 0.007 1.000
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Table 9.2-5: 1975 NEAR-EARTH ORBITAL MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System--Degree 'i2" Maintenance (180-Day Resupply
Development Hardware Operation
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System 0.187 0.004
Communications 0.147 0.002
Crew System 0.012 0.001
Data Management 0.022 0.004
Electrical Power 0.042 0.005
Extravehicular Activity 0.036 0.001
Inflight Test 0.002 Negligible
Maintenance Equipment 0.001 Negligible
Propulsion 0.062 0.002
Rendezvous and Docking 0.012 0.003
Stability and Control 0.180 0.007
Structure 0.060 0.006
AGE 0.091 0.004
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.063
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0. 001
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.039 0.002
Total 0.961 0.035 0.007
Interval)
Total
0.191
0.149
0.013
0.026
0.047
0.037
0. 002
0.001
0.064
0.015
0.187
0.066
0. 095
0.063
Negligible
O. 002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
0.041
1.003
I
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i) Development
a) Subsystem developmental costs including AGE development.
b) Estimated flight test demonstration including one spare mission
vehicle.
c) Development of software and launch site support.
2) Hardware--One mission vehicle estimated by subsystem.
3) Operation--Operational set of AGE and associated sustaining effort for
the software and launch site support.
B) Reentry Vehicle includes:
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain an eight-man vehicle.
2) Flight test demonstration to accomplish a qualified system.
3) Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
4) Costs for the two initial operational reentry vehicles.
5) System and subsystem integration.
C) Logistics Module
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain an operational logistics module.
2) Flight test demonstration in conjunction with the reentry vehicle
where possible.
3) Costs for the initial operational logistics module.
4) Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
5) System and subsystem integration.
D) Launch Vehicles
i) Flight test vehicles as required to obtain qualified reentry and
logistics modules.
2) Costs for the initial launch vehicles.
E) Operations
i) Operations for the flight test demonstration.
2) Three years of downrange tracking and data acquisition costs accumulated
during the test demonstration and initial launch.
3) Recovery operations for the test demonstration.
9.3.2 RESUPPLY COST FOR A 180-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The resupply cost category shown in Table 9.3-1 includes total estimated
costs required to supply the mission vehicle every 180 days for a 5-year period,
which are categorized as follows:
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A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
Mission Vehicle--Costs associated with the resupply spares packages required
every 180 days.
Reentry Vehicle--Costs associated with ten resupply vehicles and sustaining
AGE.
Logistics Vehicle--Costs associated with ten resupply vehicles and sustain-
ing AGE.
Launch Vehicle--Costs associated with ten resupply vehicles and sustaining
AGE.
Operations
i) Launch operating costs for ten resupply vehicles.
2) Five years of downrange tracking and data acquisition costs accumu-
lated during the resupply period.
3) Five-year costs for recovery operations every 180 days during the
resupply period.
9.3.3 INITIAL COST FOR A 360-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
Table 9.3-2 gives total system program costs for a 5-year program with
360-day resupply capability. The initial cost category includes the total
estimated costs required to achieve this mission operation, which are cate-
gorized as follows:
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
Mission Vehicle--Increased according to subsystem variances to the mission
vehicle described in Table 9.3-4, and itemized on Table 9.3-5.
Reentry Vehicle--The same as for the 180-day resupply period (9.3.B).
Logistics Module--The same as for the 180-day resupply (9.3.C), except that
the module is increased to carry 30 kilograms more spares.
Launch Vehicle--The same as for the 180-day resupply (9.3.D).
Operations--The same as for the 180-day resupply (9.3.E).
9.3.4 RESUPPLY COST FOR A 360-DAY RESUPPLY MISSION
The resupply cost category shown in Table 9.3-2 includes total estimated
costs required to resupply the mission vehicle every 360 days for a 5-year
period, which are categorized the same as for the 180-day resupply period, ex-
cept that the quantities have been reduced to accommodate five resupplies.
9.3.5 MISSION VEHICLE RELATIVE COST NUMBERS
Table 9.3-3 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for the basic
system (with no redundancy or spares) by subsystems, AGE and spares, test demon-
stration, software, and launch site support. The total relative cost number
includes the development, unit hardware, and operations required to obtain a
mission vehicle with no redundancy or spares, and is given here only to repre-
sent the baseline system before adding a realistic spares system for the 180-
and 360-day resupply periods.
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Table 9.3-1:
Mission Vehicle
Reentry Vehicle
Logistics Module
Launch Vehicles
Operations
Total
1985 L1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION--180-DAY RESUPPLY
Total Systems Program Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Initial Resupply
$2,518 $ 7
2,436 533
319 86
854 918
872 11130
$6,999 $2,674
Table 9.3-2:
Mission Vehicle
Reentry Vehicle
Logistics Module
Launch Vehicles
Operations
Total
1985 L1
Total Systems Program Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Initial
$2,525
2,436
345
854
876
$7,036
LIBRATION CENTER MISSION--360-DAY RESUPPLY
Resupply
$ 4
276
53
459
$1,893
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Table 9.3-3: 1985 L1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Basic System--With No Redundancy or Spares
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Navigation and Guidance
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
Rendezvous and Docking
Stability and Control
Structure
Development Hardware Operation
0. 104 0. 002
0.053 0.001
0. 006 O. 001
0.017 0.001
0.007 0.001
0.036 0.007
0.031 0.002
0. 001 Negligible
0. 001 Negligible
0.040 0.001
0. 006 O. 001
0.086 0.002
0.079 0.012
AGE 0.056 O. 004
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.092
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0.001
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT
Total
0.037
0.658 0.031
0.002
0.007
Total
0. 106
0.054
0.007
0.018
0.008
0.043
0.033
0.001
0.001
0.041
0.007
0.088
0.091
0.060
0.092
Negligible
0.002
0.005
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
0.696
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Table 9.3-4 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for a maintain-
able system with selected redundancies (Degree "2" maintenance) for a 180-day
resupply interval. The total relative cost figures given for the items listed
on Tables 9.3-3 and 9.3-4 can be directly associated with the total initial cost
for the mission vehicle given in Table 9.3-1, and the total relative cost num-
ber of 1.00 can be equated to the initial cost dollars shown for the mission
vehicle.
Table 9.3-5 shows the mission vehicle relative cost for a maintainable
system with selected redundancies for a 360-day resupply interval, and can be
directly associated with the total initial cost for the mission vehicle given
in Table 9.3-2.
9.4 1975MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
9.4.1 TOTAL SYSTEMS PROGRAM COST
The total systems program cost (dollars in millions) is shown in Table
9.4-1. The initial cost category includes the total estimated costs required
to achieve this mission operation, which are categorized as follows:
A) Mission vehicle equal to 1.00 and further broken down in Table 9.4-3.
The mission vehicle costs include:
i) Development
a) Subsystem developmental costs including AGE development.
b) Estimated flight test demonstration including one spare mission
vehicle.
c) Development of software and launch site support.
2) Hardware--One mission vehicle estimated by subsystem.
3) Operation--Operational set of AGE and associated sustaining effort
for the software and launch site support.
B) Reentry Vehicle includes:
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain a six-man vehicle.
2) Flight test demonstration to accomplish a qualified system.
3) Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
4) Costs for the initial operational reentry vehicle.
5) System and subsystem integration.
C) Tankers--Consist of modified S-IVB tanker modules.
D) Launch Vehicles
i) Flight test vehicles as required to obtain a qualified reentry and
mission vehicle.
2) Launch vehicles required to achieve initial mission operation.
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Table 9.3-4: 1985 L 1 LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System--Degree "2" Maintenance (180-Day Resupply Interval)
Development Hardware Operation Total
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Navigation and Guidance
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
0.161 0.004 0.165
0.082 0.003 0.085
0.010 0.001 0.011
0.026 0.003 0.029
0.010 0.002 0.012
0.054 0.012 0.066
0.049 0.002 0.051
0.002 Negligible 0.002
0.001 Negligible 0.001
0.062 0.001 0.063
Rendezvous and Docking
Stability and Control
Structure
0.010 0.001 0.011
0.132 0.005 0.137
0.123 0.012 0.135
AGE 0.087 0.007 0.094
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.092 0.092
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible Negligible Negligible
0.002 Negligible 0.002
0.004 0.001 0.005
Negligible Negligible Negligible
Negligible Negligible Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.037 0.002 0.039
Total 0.944 0.046 0.010 1.000
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Table 9.3-5: 1985 LI LIBRATION CENTER MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System--Degree "2" Maintenance (360-Day Resupply
Develogment Hardware Operation
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System 0.161 0.004
Communications 0.082 0.003
Crew System 0.010 0.001
Navigation and Guidance 0.026 0.003
Data Management 0.010 0.002
Electrical Power 0.054 0.013
Extravehicular Activity 0.049 0.002
Inflight Test 0.002 Negligible
Maintenance Equipment 0.001 Negligible
Propulsion 0.062 0.001
Rendezvous and Docking 0.010 0.002
Stability and Control 0.132 0.006
Structure 0.123 0.012
AGE 0.087 O. 007
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.092
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.004
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0.001
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.037 0.002
Total 0.944 0.049 0.010
Interval)
Total
0.165
0.085
0.011
0.029
0.012
0.067
0.051
0.002
0.001
0.063
0.012
0.138
0.135
0.094
0.092
Negligible
0.002
0.005
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
1.003
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E. Operations
l)
2)
3)
Operations for the flight test demonstration.
Downrange tracking and data acquisition costs accumulated during the
test demonstration and operational mission.
Recovery operation for the mission.
9.4.2 MISSION VEHICLE RELATIVE COST NUMBERS
Table 9.4-2 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for the basic
system (with no redundancy or spares) by subsystems, AGE and spares, test demon-
stration, software, and launch site support. The total relative cost number
includes the development, unit hardware, and operations required to obtain a
mission vehicle with no redundancy or spares, and is given here only to repre-
sent the baseline system before adding a realistic spared system.
Table 9.4-3 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for a main-
tainable system with selected redundancies (Degree 2 maintenance). The total
relative cost numbers given for the items listed on Tables 9.4-2 and 9.4-3 can
be directly associated with the total initial cost for the mission vehicle given
in Table 9.4-1, and the total relative cost number of 1.00 can be equated to the
initial cost dollars shown for the mission vehicle.
Table 9.4-4 shows the mission vehicle relative cost for a redundant system,
as discussed in Section 4.2 and the appendix.
9.5 MARS LANDING MISSION
9.5.1 TOTAL SYSTEMS PROGRAM COST
The total systems program cost (dollars in millions) is shown in Table
9.5-1. The initial cost category includes the total estimated costs required to
achieve this mission operation, which are categorized as follows:
A) Mission vehicle equal to 1.00 and further broken down in Table 9.5-3. The
mission vehicle costs include:
i) Development
a) Subsystem developmental costs including AGE development.
b) Estimated flight test demonstration including one spare mission
vehicle.
c) Development of software and launch site support.
2) Hardware---One mission vehicle estimated by subsystem.
3) Operation---Operational set of AGE and associated sustaining effort
for the software and launch site support.
B) Reentry vehicle includes:
i) Basic developmental costs to obtain an eight-man vehicle with
reentry cone.
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Table 9.4-1:
Mission Vehicle
Reentry Vehicle
Tankers
Launch Vehicles
Operations
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support
Communications
Crew System
1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Total Systems Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Total
Table 9.4-2:
Mission
Basic System---With
Development
System
Initial
$3,198
2,145
218
1,374
1,578
$8,513
1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Vehicle Relative Cost Number
No Redundancy or Spares
Hardware Operation
0.095 0.002
0.128 0.001
0.011 0.001
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
0.023 0.001
0.027 0.002
0.024 0.002
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
0.001 Negligible
0.001 Negligible
0.076 0.002
Navigation and Guidance
Stability and Control
Structure
0.021 0.001
0.013 Negligible
0.048 0.007
AGE 0.056 0.003
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.096
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT 0.037 0. 002
Total 0.662 0.019 0.005
Total
!
0.097
0.129
0.012
0.024
0.029
0.026
0.001
0. 001
0.078
0.022
0.013
0.055
0.059
0.096
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
0.686
L
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Table 9.4-3: 1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System---Degree "2" Maintenance
SUBSYSTEMS
Development Hardware Operation
Life Support System 0.148 0.004
Communications 0.198 0.004
Crew System 0.017 0.001
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
AGE
0.035 0.005
0.043 0.004
0.037 0.002
0.001 Negligible
0.001 Negligible
0.117 0.003
Navigation and Guidance 0.032 0.008
Stability and Control 0.019 0.006
Structure 0.075 0.008
TEST DEMONSTRATION
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT
Total
0.087
0.097
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
0.037
0.949 0.045
0.004
Negligible
Negligib le
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0.002
0.006
Total
0.152
0.202
0.018
0.040
0.047
0.039
0.001
0.001
0.120
O.O4O
0.025
0.083
0.091
0.097
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
1.000
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Table 9.4-4: 1975 MARS/VENUS FLYBY MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Redundant System---Degree 0 Maintenance
Development Hardware Operation Total
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
Navigationand Guidance
Stability and Control
Structure
0.172 0.006 0.178
0.230 0.005 0.235
0.019 0.002 0.021
0.040 0.010 0.050
0.050 0.007 0.057
0.043 0.005 0.048
0.002 Negligible 0.002
0.001 Negligible 0.001
0.156 0.004 0.140
0.038 0.008 0.046
0.022 0.007 0.029
0.087 0.008 0.095
AGE 0.i01 0.005 0.106
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0.097 0.097
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.003
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible Negligible
Negligible 0.002
Negligible 0.003
Negligible Negligible
Negligible Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT
Total
0.037
1.080
0.002 0.039
0.062 0.007 1.149
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c)
D)
E)
F)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Flight test demonstration to accomplish a qualified system.
Development of associated AGE and an operational set.
Costs for the initial operational reentry vehicle.
System and subsystem integration.
Propulsion Modules---Consist of the propulsion modules as outlined in the
Integrated Manned Interplanetary Spacecraft Concept Definition (IMISCD)
study, Reference 86.
Tankers---Consist of the tanker module.
Launch Vehicles
i) Flight test vehicles as required to obtain a qualified reentry and
mission vehicle.
2) Launch vehicles required to achieve initial mission operation.
Operations
i) Operations for the flight test demonstration.
2) Downrange tracking and data acquisition costs accumulated during the
test demonstration and operational mission.
3) Recovery operation for the mission.
Table 9.5-1: 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Total Systems Cost
(Dollars in Millions)
Initial
Mission Vehicle $3,438
Reentry Vehicle 2,047
Propulsion Modules 142
Tankers 145
Launch Vehicles 1,796
Operations 2,013
Total $9,581
9.5.2 MISSION VEHICLE RELATIVE COST NUMBERS
Table 9.5-2 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for the basic
system (with no redundancy or spares) by subsystems, AGE and spares, test dem-
onstration, software, and launch site support. The total relative cost number
includes the development, unit hardware, and operations required to obtain a
mission vehicle with no redundancy or spares, and is given here only to repre-
sent the baseline system before adding a realistic spared system.
Table 9.5-3 shows the mission vehicle relative cost numbers for a main-
tainable system with selected redundancies (Degree "2" maintenance). The total
relative cost numbers given for the items listed on Tables 9.5-2 and 9.5-3 can
be directly associated with the total initial cost for the mission vehicle
given in Table 9.5-1, and the total relative cost number of 1.00 can be equated
to the initial cost dollars shown for the mission vehicle.
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Table 9.5-2: 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Basic System---With No Redundancy or Spares
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
Navigation and Guidance
Stability and Control
Structure
Development Hardware Operation
0.090 0.002
0.051 0.001
0.006 0.001
0.005 Negligible
0.029 0.002
0.024 0.002
0.001 Negligible
Negligible Negligible
0.071 0.002
0.008 Negligible
0.128 0.003
0.048 0.007
AGE 0.055 0.003
TEST DEMONSTRATION 0. 118
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
Negligible
0.002
0.006
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT
Total
0.037
0.679 0.020
0.002
0.005
Total
0.092
0.052
0.007
0.005
0.031
0.026
0.001
Negligible
0.073
0.008
0.131
0.055
0.058
0.118
Negligible
0.002
0.006
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
0. 704
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Table 9.5-3: 1985 MARS LANDING MISSION
Mission Vehicle Relative Cost Number
Maintainable System---Degree "2" Maintenance
SUBSYSTEMS
Life Support System
Communications
Crew System
Data Management
Electrical Power
Extravehicular Activity
Inflight Test
Maintenance Equipment
Propulsion
Navigation and Guidance
Stability and Control
Structure
Development Hardware Operation
0.140 0.003
0.078 0.003
0.009 0.001
0.008 0.002
0.044 0.004
0.038 0.002
0.001 Negligible
0.001 Negligible
0.109 0.003
0.012 0.001
0.198 0.004
0.075 0.008
AGE 0.086 0.004
TEST DEMONSTRATION
SOFTWARE
Computer Programming
Training Equipment
Simulation Equipment
Training
Technical Data
0.118
I
Negligible
0.002
0.006
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
0.001
Negligible
Negligible
LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT
Total
0.037
0.962 0.031
0. 002
0.007
Total
0.143
0.081
0.010
0.010
0.048
0.040
0.001
0.001
0.112
0.013
0.202
0.083
0.090
0.118
Negligible
0.002
0. 007
Negligible
Negligible
0.039
1.000
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10.0 AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL STUDY
OR TECHNICAL RESEARCH
As a part of the analysis conducted in this study, it was necessary to chan-
nel the effort into certain areas to stay within budgetary time and cost con-
straints. Consequently, a number of areas of interest were uncovered that could
not be adequately covered in this study. Since the study investigated missions
proposed for the 1975 and 1985 time periods, it was also necessary to make certain
estimates and assumptions about the expected state of the art for those time
periods. In many cases, additional technology research effort will be required
to determine the best approach to be taken. Those areas requiring additional
study or technical research have been categorized into four major headings:
hardware design, methodology development, space data and environment, and mainte-
nance procedures and techniques. In some instances, the study or research effort
identified could logically be placed in more than one category. These areas
fare then discussed under the first applicable category and have not been
irepeated.
i0.i HARDWARE DESIGN
i0.i.i LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM PACKAGING CONFIGURATIONS
The life support system imposes the greatest unscheduled and scheduled main-
tenance workload on the spacecraft crew. Optimum design, packaging, and layout
of this system within the spacecraft are necessary to reduce this workload. A
major effort in additional study and research is required to achieve this
reduction.
10.1.2 COMMONALITY OF SPACECRAFT COMPONENTS
Maximum commonality of spacecraft components, within and between subsystems,
was found to be an effective means of reducing on-board spares requirements and
the maintenance workload. Reentry vehicle and experiment systems also use a large
number of components that perform functions common to other spacecraft equip-
ment. Additional study is required to make a detailed investigation of the tom-
ponents used in a space mission and to determine what components can be designed
for realistically common usage.
i0.i.3 COMMONALITY OF EXPERIMENT COMPONENTS
Equipment used for experiments should be considered not only for intraexperi-
ment commonality, but also for commonality with components in other subsystems of
the mission vehicle. This would provide an additional source of spares, allow
more effective use of the spares provisione@on-board, and permit a reduction in
_total spares requirements. In addition, if the experiments require an on-board
workshop, the use of Degree "3" maintenance for both experiment and subsystem
support becomes increasingly effective and its justification is considerably
stronger.
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10.1.4 MODULARIZATION
Modularization of relatively high-failure-rate equipment was determined to
be an effective way to reduce spares weight requirements. Additional research
is required to identify the most effective technique of modularizing different
types of equipment to obtain the maximum benefits to the spares concept.
10.1.5 EXTERNAL LSS PLUG-IN RECEPTACLES
The feasibility of providing external plug-in receptacles that could be
used to operate spacesuits from the spacecraft life support system instead of the
backpack should be investigated. Supplying the spacesuit requirements directly
from the spacecraft life support system would extend the length of time an astro-
naut could be outside the spacecraft. It could also result in a saving in weight
because of the water and oxygen that is lost during backpack operation and must
be provided for in the initial supplies and resupplied for the Earth-orbit
missions.
10.1.6 STRUCTURE LEAK DETECTION AND REPAIR
Structural repair was assumed for both mission time periods, but it is not
clear what methods, techniques, and tools will be required to accomplish it.
The major structural repair task is assumed to be sealing of the pressure hull.
In the available literature reviewed, it appeared that repair from within was
generally assumed. It is felt that repair from outside should be strongly con-
sidered. Repair from within _poses the problem of locating the puncture or leak
and reaching it through the equipment stacked against the hull. The interior
equipment could be placed away from the hull, but this is volumetrically ineffi-
cient and eliminates the radiation protection provided by hull-mounted equipment.
Repair from the exterior could be hampered by meteoroid shielding, but this
depends on the design of the shielding. The exterior repair offers the advan-
tages of easy access to the puncture and relative ease of location by visual
observation (of frosting or vapor indications as well as damage), and by ioni-
zation gages or sonic detectors (Reference 89). The hardest breaches to locate
are expected to be the slow leaks, and these will be extremely difficult to
locate from the interior. Interior patching capability might be limited to
emergency patches to seal large meteoroid punctures. It is recommended that
the general field of structural repair be reviewed and that the most promising
methods of repair be investigated in detail. The techniques presented in Refer-
ence 89 are among those that might be subjected to a test by practical application.
10.1.7 FILAMENT-WOUND TANKS
The use of filament-wound storage tanks for fluid was assumed for the 1985
mission at a considerable saving in weight. This technology should be researched
further so the benefits can be used as soon as possible (such as for the 1975
missions).
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Tank repair should be investigated in conjunction with Items 10.1.6 and
10.1.7. The failure modes of various types and sizes of tanks should be identi-
fied and the possibility of repair assessed considering the failure mode, type
of material, pressure, and tank contents. It is conceivable that some tankage can
be patched before the tank contents are lost, assuming timely detection of the
failure.
10.1.9 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCE
The use of an isotope fuel invites the investigation of an interesting
method of generating emergency power. It should be possible to incorporate
thermocouples in the fuel block or in the block shield to provide emergency
electrical power for the spacecraft. The power generated would be low level,
but adequate to provide minimum lighting and control power until the main power
system is restored to operation.
i0.i.i0 RADIATION SHIELDING FROM EXPENDABLES
Considerable radiation shielding weight could be saved by judicious place-
ment of spares, food, other expendables, and waste products. A study should be
made to determine practical methods of storing these items to obtain maximum
shielding benefits while permitting access for easy removal and/or storage.
i0.i.ii REFURBISHMENT OF REENTRY VEHICLES
A long-duration mission with periodic resupply requires the use of a con-
siderable number of reentry vehicles. It is believed the total cost of the mis-
sion could be reduced substantially if the command module were designed for
refurbishment and subsequent reuse.
10.1.12 VACUUM SYSTEM FOR MAINTENANCE
One of the items of maintenance equipment postulated in this study is a
vacuum system to be used in controlling debris or fluids while performing main-
tenance. Different vacuum devices should be evaluated to arrive at the optimum
procedures and equipment to control the variation in conditions that could be
encountered.
10.1.13 BATTERY AND ENGINE WEAROUT LIFE
The expected life for the batteries and reaction control engines was esti-
mated to be one year for the 1975 time period. This resulted in a considerable
scheduled maintenance workload being imposed on the mission. Improvements in
the expected life of equipment such as this will result in substantial reduc-
tions of the workload.
10.1.14 ISOTOPE FUEL SOURCE RECOVERY
The optimum method for recovery of the fuel block for those missions using
a Pu-238 heat source needs to be determined. There are several methods of
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recovery described in the available literature on isotope-fueled space power
systems. However, all have some operational or design problem that makes selec-
tion of the superior method difficult. In this study, weight was allocated to
the recovery system, but the exact method was not defined.
10.2 METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
The area of space mission analysis and optimization has a number of defi-
cient areas that should be improved. Refined mission planning requires deter-
mination of definitive and valid optimization criteria, development of a better
data base to enable accurate total mission planning, construction of more versa-
tile mission risk and probability models, and the availability of better opti-
mization techniques.
10.2.1 ESTABLISHING VALID OPTIMIZATION CRITERIA
General optimization models can consider any set of pertinent variables in
making an optimal selection. Unfortunately, determination of what variables are
pertinent and what the weighting of these variables should be is beyond the scope
of any optimization model. Such judgments must be based on man's assessment of
the political, economic, and risk effects of the variables in relation to the
mission objective. Minimum dollar cost for a fixed degree is a desirable objec-
tive, but it is a difficult one to grasp because of the intricacies of the
costing required. For example, low-cost additions may cause an inappropriate
weight increase resulting in much higher launch costs and a net increase in
total mission cost. Methods that go beyond the present parametric techniques
must be developed.
10.2.2 DATA DEFICIENCIES
All of the analysis models discussed above thrive on data; in fact, the
accuracy of the results derived depends on the accuracy of the data available.
This is the reason that this study went to as great a depth as possible to
define missions and mission hardware. It was found in accumulating data for
this study that such information is not readily obtained from a single source.
It would be of great value to future studies to compile, in some form, a data
bank of detailed information about space systems, subsystems, boosters, launch
and launch support systems, etc. Such a data bank should contain cost ranges,
state-of-the-art information, expected state-of-the-art improvements, and other
necessary variables.
10.2.3 MISSION RISK DETERMINATION
It is found that mission risk is more complex than a simple component relia-
bility problem. Factors such as orbital assembly, abort after injection, branch
excursions such as the Mars lander, and discrete mission events such as "kick"
stage operation for the Mars flyby mission are related in a complex manner to
the total mission risk (if such an expression actually exists). If a mission
profile is known, and all the necessary probabilities are known, a risk model
can be constructed for a specific mission. What is not presently available is
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a general model into which mission profiles and parameters can be placed to
optimize alternate concepts and compare different mission profiles.
10.2.4 OPTIMIZATION MODEL DEFICIENCIES
The MARCEP technique used in this study is one of the most advanced optimi-
zation models available, and yet it has a number of "soft" areas which should
be improved.
i) One area is in the ability of the model to handle structural elements.
Under the limitations of the model, it is impossible to accurately add
structural and tank redundancy weight, which is a necessity if repair by
kit cannot logically be accomplished.
2) Another area is in the field of standby redundancy, or more accurately,
the "neo-spare" area, where one standby item can be switched in to replace
any one of several similar items. MARCEP standby redundancy is by cell
only: one basic component, one standby; two basic, two standby; etc.
This is realistic in many cases, particularly for mechanical items, but
for electrical items it is somewhat deficient.
3) Missing also is an algorithm for assessing additional structure, develop-
ment cost, training costs, power drain, tools, packing material, storage
volume and weight, etc., required to accomplish parallel, standby, or
spares additions over and above the incremental dollar, weight, volume, and
repair time penalties now assessed.
4) Also missing is the ability to consider and trade alternate design
approaches for a function in a single optimization process.
10.3 SPACE DATA AND ENVIRONMENT
10.3.1 LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF SPACE ENVIRONMENT
The long-term effects of space environment factors on the life and opera-
tion of spacecraft equipment need to be defined. For example, the effects of
radiation, micrometeoroids, magnetic fields, cosmic rays, orbit perturbation
(gravity), etc., were not evaluated or were given only cursory consideration
in this study. The long-term effects of the space environment on the shelf
life of spares in storage also need to be defined. It may be necessary to ro-
tate or recycle some of the spares due to shelf-life degradation. Crew members
are rotated periodically to limit the radiation dose received, but if the same
problem exists with equipment, it needs to be identified.
10.3.2 HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN SPACE ENVIRONMENT
There is a need for further quantification of human performance in the space
environment. Until this is done, all design criteria and mission planning will
be based on limited data that is insufficient to safely perform the mission
goals. The precise capabilities and limitations of man in the space environ-
ment must be further tested to the extent of performing a wide variety of mainte-
nance tasks in pressurized suits, under conditions of simulated maintenance,
....work space, lighting, and restraint. The crew performance reliability needs to
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be predicted in order to determine the extent to which the system must be
designed to either compensate for the crew's limitations or to take advantage
of their capabilities.
10.3.3 SPACECRAFT LEAKAGE RATES
For purposes of this study, the spacecraft leakage rate assumed was 2.0
pounds per day (per Reference i). Boeing studies indicate that this is overly
optimistic and that 5.0 pounds per day would be more realistic, especially for
the 1975 time period. Additional research is required in this area to establish
and validate a realistic leakage rate for various spacecraft structure configu-
rations.
10.4 MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES
10.4.1 ANTICIPATORY MALFUNCTION DETECTION
The data from this study indicates relatively short time periods required
for unscheduled maintenance. It also indicates average scheduled maintenance
exceeds unscheduled maintenance by a large factor. However, both scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance frequency and duration requirements may still be greatly
decreased by the application of improved anticipatory malfunction detection and
checkout techniques. Further study effort is needed to determine these tech-
niques and their probable impact upon maintenance considerations for long-duration
manned space flight.
Scheduled maintenance is primarily based on trend analyses, which histor-
ically have been pessimistic. If component failure can be more accurately pre-
dicted or impending failure precisely detected, scheduled maintenance may be
performed only when necessary on those components that would eventually require
unscheduled maintenance. This would tend to maintain the integrity of the sub-
system, and require less crewtime and fewer spares. Maintenance to avert the de-
tected impending failure could be performed within a span of time at the conven-
ience of the crew. In effect, this would amount to only scheduled maintenance,
with unscheduled maintenance being eliminated.
Several possibilities for meeting the need for anticipatory malfunction
detection are being developed at the present time. These techniques include
X ray, electromicroscope, infrared screening, and analysis of generated noise.
With the exception of the generated-noise technique, and possibly the infrared
screening, the techniques listed appear to be too costly for the immediate future
and require additional crew training to use. While a component is operating
within specifications, the existence of a detectable defect will change the char-
acter of the noise spectrum or signature of the equipment. The analysis of the
noise signature will lead to the detection of incipient failure in the equipment.
Both acoustic and vibration transducers could be employed for mechanical compo-
nents. The evaluation of electronic noise has been an accepted technique already
used to determine the quality of components, to measure radio frequency inter-
ference, to detect and protect against transients, and as a troubleshooting tool.
The use of noise monitoring to detect incipient failures must be further studied
in regard to reducing maintenance tasks.
!
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10.4.2 BUILT-IN TEST EQUIPMENT
Another method for reducing maintenance time, independent from the tech-
nique of anticipatory maintenance, is that of built-in test equipment (BITE).
The failure of many of the vehicle components will require their immediate
repair; however, troubleshooting techniques are often time consuming. The BITE
concept would provide a means of sensing faults and providing indication of the
condition of the equipment being monitored, either in the vicinity of the fail-
ure or at a single monitoring source, as appropriate. This would eliminate the
need for auxiliary external test devices to perform checks and would provide a
continuous monitor of system performance during the mission. Trade studies
need to be conducted on the use of the BITE concept as opposed to the use of
external test equipment, which implies the need for crew skills and training
to operate the test equipment.
10.4.3 MAINTENANCE TECHNIQUES AND SPARES CONCEPTS FOR LARGE ASSEMBLIES
Large assemblies such as radiators, tanks, airlocks, or equipment for
which adequate detail was not available (such as reentry vehicles, experiments,
probes, powered locomotion devices, etc.) were all assumed to be rePaired by
a special maintenance or repair kit. Because of inadequate details available,
it was necessary in this study to assume an average weight and volume required
to repair a failure of one of these items. Additional study is required in
these areas to determine the best techniques for repair of this equipment and
the resulting effect on the spares requirements.
10.4.4 HANDLING LARGE EQUIPMENT
Handling of large items of equipment that require two men and coordination
of their actions could present problems in a zero-g environment and needs to be
researched.
10.4.5 REPAIR OF LARGE EQUIPMENT
There is a need to investigate the area of space radiator repair, large
tank repair, antenna repair, solar cell repair, and repair of similar large
items for which it is not practical to use a total "remove and replace" concept.
The use of equipment such as electron-beam welders, fusion joining processes,
and other possible techniques should be evaluated.
10.4.6 EVA ENVIRONMENT
There may be problems associated with EVA performed under extreme variations
in light contrasts, light intensities, and temperatures. Techniques for coping
with these conditions should be studied.
10.4.7 SPACECRAFT HAZARDS TO EXTRAVEHICULAR MOVEMENT
It is anticipated that solar arrays, antennas, external experiments, and
experiment booms will present a hazard to EVA and to rendezvous and docking
maneuvers. Similarly, EVA and resupply-vehicle maneuvering will present a
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hazard to solar panels and other appendages. The magnitude of these hazards
should be assessed and procedures and equipment should be developed to minimize
the hazards.
10.4.8 SPACECRAFT-EVA TRANSITION PROCEDURES
For maintenance involving EVA, the time required in making the transition
from a shirtsleeve environment to the external space environment should be
evaluated in detail to establish techniques by which a reduction can be accom-
plished in the time required for prebreathing pure oxygen, donning and checkout
of spacesuit equipment, egress and ingress through an airlock, etc.
10.4.9 HANDLING FLUIDS IN ZERO-G ENVIRONMENT
Procedures and techniques for handling fluids in zero-gravity environment
during servicing and maintenance activities need to be established and evaluated
under actual space-flight conditions. These activities are basic to mainte-
nance of manned systems and should be included early in any space experiment
program.
10.4.10 CARRYING EQUIPMENT AND SPARES
Carrying maintenance equipment and spares that are too large for a tool
kit or for a garment pocket may also present problems in zero-g during both
exterior and interior maintenance. Methods of carrying such items need to be
evaluated under actual space conditions.
i0.4. ii DEGREE "3" (REMOVE AND REPAIR) MAINTENANCE
This concept should be studied in more detail to determine specifically
when it may be economical and what workshop facilities and crew skills are re-
quired. For some of the subsystems, it might be possible to justify a limited
bench-level repair capability, but this needs to be studied more thoroughly.
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AppendixI
SUBSYSTEM LEVEL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT COMPARISON
Investigation into the effects of maintenance concept selection were con-
ducted on the subsystem level because it was recognized that a gross system-
level maintenance concept would be meaningless or very difficult to define in
practical terms, and that working concepts could be identified more easily at
the subsystem level. The figures accompanying each subsystem discussion com-
pare weights added for each of the maintenance concepts evaluated. Other var-
iables not apparent in the weight comparisons are discussed, and the expected
mean unscheduled repair time and interval between repairs is indicated. This
information was derived from simulation of the 1975 Mars flyby mission; more
detail on unscheduled maintenance time for each mission is provided in Sec-
tions 5.3 and 6.3. The difference in relative cost between the Degree "O"
and Degree "2" maintenance concepts is also indicated. Table 4.1.2 provides
a relative cost summary for each of the maintenance concepts evaluated. Addi-
tional costing information may be found in Section 9.0.
The assurance levels used for each of the subsystems were obtained from
the system level concept comparisons, where the reliability goals allocated
to each subsystem were identified. Individually, these goals are necessarily
higher than the 99% assurance level required of the total system.
iff
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I.l COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE I-l)
Figure I-i shows that a Degree "2" maintenance concept results in about
I00 kilograms less weight being added to the subsystem than is added for the
Degree "0" maintenance concept at about 0.998 probability of assurance. The
relative cost numbers found for the competitive maintenance concepts were 0.202
and 0.235 for the Degree "2" and the Degree "O" maintenance concepts, respec-
tively. The cost and weight comparisons indicate that Degree "2" maintenance
is desirable; however, the trade is so close that further study is indicated.
Other factors, such as skill level required, EVA penalties, technical informa-
tion requirements, etc., may ultimately determine the maintenance concept se-
lected. From the simulation of the 1975 Mars/Venus flyby mission it was deter-
mined that the average unscheduled repair time per failure would be about 280
minutes and failures would occur approximately every 122 days. This makes the
communications subsystem one of the major contributors to the total unscheduled
maintenance workload. Recognizing this, and the fact that most of the mainte-
nance actions are one-of-a-kind actions (expected to occur only once), a com-
promise between Degree "2" and Degree "0" maintenance is indicated. Degree
"i" maintenance with deviations for selected components is the recommended
choice of maintenance concept for the planetary class of missions in the 1975
time period. Further guidelines to the selection of a maintenance concept
for this system are provided in Section 7.2.1.
<_i¸_
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1.2 CREW SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE I-2)
The weight difference between the two maintenance concepts is obviously
small, about 50 kilograms in favor of Degree "2" maintenance at the required
level of assurance. The curves for mission success are interesting because
they indicate that redefinition of an item in the system is required. The
deflection in those curves at the 0.999 assurance level is caused by statis-
tical stagnation due to reluctance of the optimization program to add an addi-
tional set of TV tapes. Finally, the entire package of tapes was added as a
spare which caused a significant increase in weight added. This seems to
indicate that a better approach would be to provide a small splicing kit to
accomplish repairs on broken tapes. Other types of tape failure such as em-
brittlement, demagnetization, etc., would probably be caused by environment
and would affect the spares also.
The relative cost difference was also small, 0.003 in favor of the Degree
"2" concept. It would seem that Degree "0" maintenance might be seriously
considered for this subsystem to reduce crew time expenditure. However, the
expenditure saved would be very small. The average unscheduled repair time
was determined to be 70 minutes which would occur about every 3400 days.
Further, there are many items in the subsystem which cannot logically be made
redundant. In toto, therefore, Degree "2" maintenance is recommended.
/
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1.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE I-3)
The data management subsystem is comprised primarily of components related
only to mission success. The exceptions to this are the on-board computer,
and the data adapter which interfaces with the computer and other spacecraft
subsystems. It is apparent, then, that the weights added for crew survival are
additional computers and replaceable modules of the data adapter. The computer
was not modularized in this analysis; however, the on-board computer was modu-
larized in the 1985 missions. Three spare computers were added for crew sur-
vival and one additional for mission success. The additional spare added for
mission success increases the probability of crew survival above the required
0.99 by some increment. The exact amount of the crew survival bonus was not
determined because this type of event occurs a number of times in the system
level analysis, and exact determination of the end probability of crew survival
is beyond the scope of this study. It is sufficient to say that the 0.99
probability of crew survival requirement was met, and that when 0.99 probabil-
ity of mission success is expected, the inherent crew survival probability is
higher than 0.99.
The nature of the components comprising the data management subsystem and
the weight penalty incurred by designing a Degree "0" maintenance subsystem
indicate that Degree "2" maintenance should be planned for this subsystem.
The components of this subsystem are primarily electronic in nature and could
be modularized into replaceable packages or circuit boards. This also applies
to most of the sensors that are part of the equipment, in particular those
that are located within the pressurized mission module. Some of the sensors
require redundancy---those located externally in unpressurized parts of the
space vehicle or in locations highly inaccessible to a spacesuited repairman.
The relative cost difference between the competitive maintenance concepts
was found to be 0.010 in favor of the Degree "2" concept. The average un-
scheduled repair time is expected to be 105 minutes and occurs about every
ii days. ....
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1.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE I-4)
The electrical power subsystem is almost entirely related to crew survival.
The weights of components related only to mission success were so low that mis-
sion success curves were not plotted for this subsystem. The basic subsystem
required for the mission includes two independent Brayton cycle power conver-
sion loops driven by a common isotope fuel block. Each unit produces about
5.5 kwe which is enough to sustain the necessary crew survival equipment. To
prevent gross underestimation of crew survival probability, a single Brayton
cycle unit was identified in the mission data. This item was coded such that
at least one unit would be added in parallel redundancy. In practice this
unit would operate to carry the electrical load of the mission success equip-
ment (experiments, etc.). In the event of failure of one unit, the other
operating unit would be switched to the essential bus and provide power to
essential equipment until the first unit could be replaced. Therefore, the
curve for the Degree "2" maintenance subsystem includes parallel redundancy
of one of the heaviest components in the subsystem. After being added in
parallel redundancy, as desired, one spare power conversion unit was added.
Practically, this is the only choice available if reliability improvement of
the unit cannot be achieved (the failure rate estimate includes improvement
to the 1975 time period). Additional parallel or standby redundancy of the
power conversion unit would require an additional isotope fuel source and
shielding, or a major redesign of the gas loops to permit the source heat
exchangers to be switched to the standby unit.
The degree of maintenance for the balance of the items in the electrical
power subsystem should be determined by item. Some items could be designed
into the spacecraft as standby units rather than as spares with little penalty;
others are required in sufficient backup quantities to make standby redundancy
undesirable.
The relative cost difference was determined to be 0.010 in favor of the
Degree "2" maintenance concept. The average unscheduled repair time was
found to be about 200 minutes, and repairs would occur about every 114 days.
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1.5 EXPERIMENT SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-5)
In the first analysis of the experiment subsystem, complete probes were
identified as spare or backup units for the Degree "O" maintenance concept.
This approach resulted in the curve identified as "B." In a practical appli-
cation of this concept, all probes probably would be launched whether they
checked out or not. The end result is that over 28,000 kilograms of probes
and experiment packages were added to achieve 0.99 probability of mission
success. The total effect of sparing complete probes on mission weight could
be reduced somewhat by eliminating all probe checkout which requires equip-
ment in addition to that required for monitoring and control of the probes.
The added weight resulting from this approach was so large that a second
analysis considering a different approach to designing for Degree "O" mainte-
nance was run. In the second analysis the probes were improved to the required
level of reliability by adding fixed increments of parallel redundancywithin
the probes. The basic increment was assumed to be the weight of the repair
kit identified for the Degree "2" concept. This weight was spread statis-
tically over all the mechanisms within the probe every time a level of parallel
redundancy was added. The result of the second analysis is indicated by the
curve labeled "A." The curve of the Degree "2" concept subsystem and curve
"A" are indistinguishable on the gross scale. Greater detail is shown on the
insert in the lower right corner of the figure. The small penalty of the
Degree "O" maintenance subsystem (curve "A") over the Degree "2" maintenance
subsystem indicates that additional configuration and trade studies could be
worked on the probes to be carried. It is felt that the_on-board experiment
packages, used during midcourse and planetary passage, should be repairable
by Degree "3" maintenance because of the flexibility that probably will be
required to adapt the experiments to unanticipated conditions and observational
requirements. If the on-board experiment packages are designed for flexibility,
it is felt that it is a small step to providing repair capability for the
experiments;
Because of _ high degree of uncertainty, experiments were not costed and
a relative cost difference between maintenance concepts was not determined.
The average unscheduled repair time is expected to be about 560 minutes, and
will occur about every 680 days. The high average repair time is due primari-
ly to the character of the repair actions to be accomplished on the probes.
Repair of the probes was considered to be difficult and time-consuming due to
the limited work space and the inaccessibility of the internal mechanisms.
/
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1.6 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-6)
The extravehicular activity subsystem includes such items as pressure
suits, power locomotion devices, airlocks, etc. In the analysis of the
maintainable subsystem these items were repaired by kits. In the "nonmain-
tainable" analysis, these items were added in redundancy or as gross spares.
The pressure suits, maneuvering units, and similar items were spared as com-
plete units because parallel or standby redundancy could not be rationalized
for them. Items such as the airlock were allowed to be added in fixed redun-
dancy, even though this might not be a solution to an airlock failure.
It can be seen from the figure that repair of the EVA subsystem achieves
a significant advantage over the nonrepairable subsystem. From a purely
safety standpoint, an airlock repair capability, at least to the extent of
replacing seals and closing mechanisms, is highly desirable. For the same
reason, a backup spare suit would seem desirable; however, it was determined
in the simulation analyses that an event that required all the crew to be
in suits when one suit happened to be under repair was highly unlikely. In
a simulation of 200 missions this event did not occur at all.
In general, Degree "3" maintenance is recommended as the concept for the
EVA subsystem. It is necessary that the airlock can be repaired by a pressure-
suited man even though the repair action may take place within the pressurized
compartment. To ensure crew safety, it is expected that tasks related to
the pressure integrity of the hull willrequire all suits on (possibly with
face-plates up) even though loss of pressure is not expected.
The Degree "2" maintenance concept will result in a mean unscheduled
repair time of 190 minutes. The repair actions will occur about every 1770
days. The relative cost difference is 0.009 in favor of the Degree "2"
maintenan_ce concept.
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1.7 INFLIGHT TEST SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-7)
First inspection of the figure seems to indicate that designing thein-
flight test subsystem to eliminate maintenance might be desirable in view of
the relatively low weight penalty. However, there are some hidden effects of
designing parallel redundant (the dominant mode of addition) test indicators
that are undesirable. Parallel redundant indicators will require additional
panel area and weight increase. A first estimate indicates that panel area
will increase between two and three times the basic panel area. Other hidden
effects are the increased power drain and the increased probability of oper-
ator confusion and error. The maintenance time recorded for the subsystem
appears to be relatively high in comparison to the size of the subsystem;
however, the estimated task times for this subsystem are all quite pessimistic.
The fault indicator panel, which was planned as a matrix of lights, could
be a problem. Recent developments in solid state lamps and mechanical flag
indicators may be incorporated in place of indicator lamps and achieve a sig-
nificant decrease in the number of indicator failures expected.
The relative cost difference between the competitive concepts is 0.001
in favor of the Degree "2" maintenance concept. The average unscheduled
repair time was found to be about 80 minutes with repair actions occurring
every 39 days on the average.
÷
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1.8 LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (FIGURE I-8)
It should be noted that the no-maintenance approach applies to unscheduled
maintenance only. Scheduled maintenance activities such as filter, wick, and
catalyst changes have not been automated. Automation of these activities is
possible only if the operating life of these elements can be significantly
increased.
It is apparent from the figure that Degree "2" maintenance is the proper
selection over the Degree "O" concept. In order to achieve this goal, careful
placement of the life support_subsystem within the mission module is necessary,
as well as careful location of subsystem components in relation to each other.
The only general recommendations with regard to component location are that
scheduled maintenance items be immediately accessible, and those requiring
servicing weekly or more frequently should be accessible without removal of
any access panel. High failure rate items should be given next priority in
location. With regard to subsystem placement, it is recommended that the sub-
system be located so that component accessibility can easily be achieved.
The placement of this subsystem is of concern because it contributes a major
portion to the total maintenance load for the entire spacecraft. One place-
ment arrangement that seems to be advantageous is locating the subsystem
centrally in a disk or washer-shaped space between living and working spaces
of the mission module. This configuration would provide accessibility to
equipment from both sides, and when covered by relatively light sealed cover
panels, would provide a capability to isolate the crew compartments and to
work on the subsystem from a pressurized compartment in the event the other
were depressurized.
The relative cost difference between'the _aintenance concepts is 0.026
in favor of the Degree "2" concept. The expected unscheduled repair time was
found to be 143 minutes per failure with the failures expected to occur about
every 37 days.
\
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1.9 NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-9)
The small difference in the weights added for the two different mainte-
nance concepts indicates that redundancy might be preferred over a Degree
"2" maintenance for this subsystem. This seems to be a logical choice with
some minor exceptions. Redundancy is desirable for optical elements and the
inertial platform because of possible alignment problems caused by replace-
ment. The skill level required to make replacement of these items is also
felt to be high in relation to that required by other subsystems. The elec-
tronics packages related to the optical equipment and to the inertial plat-
form were added in standby redundancy for the Degree "0" concept. It seems
quite reasonable to spare these items because fault indication could be
automatic and to indicate a replaceable circuit board that would require a
minimum amount of tools and maintenance time.
A relative cost difference of 0.006 was found in favor of the Degree "2"
concept. The average unscheduled repair time was determined to be 364 minutes
per failure. The interval between failures is •expected to be about 66 days
which makes this subsystem second only to the data management subsystem in
its impact on the unscheduled maintenance workload.
\
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1.10 PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-10)
It is apparent from the curves that a maintenance capability is desirable
for the propulsion subsystem. This subsystem includes the reaction control
equipment necessary to control the spacecraft's attitude, and the midcourse
correction propulsion equipment. Maintenance on the reaction control modules
should be relatively easy compared to that required on the midcourse hardware.
Degree "3" repair of some of the reaction control modules might be considered.
In this event, the failed module would be removed from the reaction control
package and brought into the spacecraft for replacement of the failed item
within the module.
The midcourse correction hardware will be more of a maintenance problem
because of the size and inaccessibility of the equipment. It is felt that
these problems can be overcome if Degree "2" maintenance is planned for during
the design of the equipment. The important thing is that the necessary main-
tenance actions are anticipated before the hardware is configured.
The backpacks required with the pressure suits for EVA are estimated to
consume 0.68 kilogram of water per hour of use. This leads to a maximum
expected total accountable to the propulsion subsystem of 441 kilograms.
This factor significantly decreases the advantage of maintenance. Design of
the spacecraft and the suits to permit external connection of the suits to
the interior life support system could regain a significant part of the ad-
vantage lost. This capability would also have an impact on the maintenance
of other subsystems, particularly the electrical power and communications
subsystems.
The expected unscheduled repair time determined for the 1975 Mars/Venus
flyby missiQn was about 250 minutes per failure, which was expected to occur
about once every 58 days. All repair actions required at least two men
because the activity was all extravehicular. The relative cost difference
was found to'be 0.020 in favor of the Degree "2" maintenance concept.
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I.ii EARTH REENTRY SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE I-ii)
The Earth reentry subsystem (the six-man uprated Apollo class vehicle) is
one of those subsystems required almost entirely for crew survival. For this
reason, no mission success curves are indicated. For the analysis of the Degree
"2" concept, each of the Earth reentry vehicle (ERV) subsystems was assigned a
repair kit of what was felt to be appropriate size. These kits served to repair
the ERV subsystems whenever a failure was found during periodic checkouts of
the ERV.
For the Degree "0" concept analysis, each of the gross subsystems was
allowed to be added in redundancy. The analysis selected standby redundancy
universally for all ERV subsystems having additions. It is recognized that
this will result in a heavier added weight than could be obtained if the ERV
subsystems were analyzed to a greater level of detail. No attempt to go into
greater depth on the ERV was made because this was beyond the scope of this
study. Looking at the ERV at the level of depth shown, it is still a good esti-
mate that Degree "2" maintenance should be performed on it.
Relative costs were not calculated for the Earth reentry vehicles. The
expected unscheduled repair time was found to be about 440 minutes per failure.
Failures are expected to occur about every 1830 days.
\
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1.12 STABILITY AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-12)
The stability and control subsystem is the electronic part of the total
loop which controls the spacecraft attitude. This equipment is located in the
pressurized spacecraft and can be modularized easily into replaceable packages
or circuit boards. As the subsystem appears to be remarkably devoid of prob-
lems and trouble spots that might impair the performance of maintenance, Degree
"2" maintenance is recommended for this subsystem.
The relative cost difference between the competitive maintenance concepts
was found to be 0.004. The mean unscheduled repair time was determined to be
172 minutes per failure, with failures occurring about every 78 days.
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1.13 STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM (FIGURE 1-13)
For a subsystem with an initial weight of 16,628 kg, relatively little
weight was added to improve the mission probabilities. This is because of the
low structural failure rate assigned and because repairs were made by kit in
most cases. In applying the Degree "0" concept, it was considered illogical to
add parallel, standby, or even spare structural elements (these are the mission
module hull, the interior structure, the probe compartment, etc.). For this
reason, redundancies were limited to a few selected items in the structure sub-
system that were felt to be appropriate. This is apparent in the small differ-
ence in weight between the curves. In general, Degree "3" maintenance is rec-
ommended for the structure subsystem. When repair is considered, the expected
unscheduled repair time will be about 430 minutes, and repairs are expected to
occur about every 1770 days. The repair concept, Degree "3" maintenance, will
cost relatively less than the Degree "0" concept by 0.012.
Design and configuration of the structure are critical to maintenance con-
cepts considered for the various spacecraft subsystems. In particular, the
configuration of the spacecraft internal compartments is critical to planned
maintenance on the subsystems located in the pressurized compartment. The
greatest interface impact is between the life support subsystem (LSS) and struc-
ture, because of the large amount of space the LSS occupies and its inherent
tendency to inaccessibility. Location of the LSS against the pressure hull about
the center section of the mission module or at either end of the mission module
has the advantage of being volumetrically efficient and adds a measure of radia-
tion shielding to the interior of the mission module. Unfortunately, this con-
figuration tends to be highly inaccessible for both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance and makes the hull difficult to patch from the interior due to the
layer of equipment that must be penetrated to reach the hull. In general, it
can be said that the structure subsystem interfaces with the maintenance con-
cepts selected for the remaining subsystems. The degree of the interface and
the impact of the interface on weight and maintenance time are determined by
the subsystem_cQmponents, the subsystem maintenance concept, and the configura-
tion pl_cement of the subsystem in relation to the spacecraft structure. Making
general recommendations in this area is felt to be highly risky at the present
time. Detailed configuration trade studies for spacecraft internal arrangement
should be made considering weight, crew comfort, operability, radiation shield-
ing effects of equipment, radiation shelter requirements, and equipment accessi-
bility for maintenance.
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